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ABSTRACT
The banking industry is one of the most important components of modern economies,
providing a variety of essential economic functions. However, a banking system is
inherently fragile, and this has been widely witnessed during the great financial
crisis in 2008. Another lesson learnt from the crisis is that the cost of a banking
crisis can be substantial. Thus, it is important for us to understand how a banking
system could be destabilised and thus consider the prudential policies that could be
specifically designed to prevent a banking crisis from occurring.
This thesis uses micro-econometric methods to explore factors that could have an
impact on banking stability. The first essay examines whether a liquidity shock to a
banking system could be transmitted to other economies through a network of bank
ownership. First, it constructs cross-border ownership networks for banks located
in European countries. Then, it exploits the liquidity crisis generated by the 2010
European sovereign debt crisis as a quasi-natural experiment. The analysis shows
that subsidiary banks located outside of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
(GIIPS) but with ownership linkages to these countries have a lower loan growth
rate during the crisis period, which suggests that the liquidity shock experienced
by the GIIPS countries was indeed transmitted to those banks through ownership
linkages. Larger subsidiary banks and those subsidiaries that were more profitable
are found to be more resilient to the shock. Furthermore, It also shows that the
i
parent bank’s characteristics affect the transmission of the shock, supporting the
notion of an internal capital market operating within these banking groups.
The second essay focuses on the effect of sovereign shocks on banks’ lending activi-
ties through their exposures to the distressed sovereigns. Furthermore, it identifies
whether bank strength, specifically bank capital, can act as a transmission chan-
nel through which poorly capitalised bank tend to be more fragile in response to a
sovereign shock. Using a rich dataset on banks’ sovereign exposures from the Euro-
pean Banking Authority, it also disentangles the transmission channel by breaking
down the type and accounting classification of the exposure. The results suggest
that highly exposed banks tend to have lower lending over the crisis period. But
it shows that it is banks’ available-for-sale sovereign exposures that plays the key
role in the transmission from sovereign distress to bank lending through the capital
channel.
The third essay explores the relationship between banking competition and banking
stability, using the staggered banking deregulation levied by individual states in the
U.S. as a natural experiment. Specifically, it identifies the effect of the intensified
competition induced by the deregulation on the stability of the U.S. banking sector.
Analysis is conducted at state-level as well as bank-level, and the overall result
shows that the competition shock improves banking stability at both state- and
bank-level. Furthermore, it reveals that there is significant heterogeneity among
banks in response to the intensified competition: intra-state competition shock has
a greater effect on the stability of small banks while banks with a larger size or better
profitability are more likely to be affected by the inter-state competition shock. It
also suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between banking competition
and stability, as the competition shock has a greater effect on banks operating in a
less competitive environment.
ii
Overall, the findings from this thesis may help regulatory authorities to maintain
the stability of the banking sector in three ways. First, it helps regulators to design
micro-prudential policies towards foreign banks to prevent them from transmitting
foreign liquidity shocks which could potentially destabilise the domestic banking
system. Second, it produces guidance on how the regulatory treatment on banks’
sovereign exposures should be specified in the future macro-prudential policy frame-
work, to better isolate banks from sovereign shocks. Third, it helps regulators to
balance between policies on facilitating competition in the banking sector and those
on maintaining stability of the financial system.
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INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 1 1.1. MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
The banking industry is one of the most important components of modern economies.
The economic function of the banking system has been widely investigated in the
literature. A banking system can be seen as a coalition of borrowers through which
the problem of adverse selection between lenders and borrowers could be alleviated.
As the model proposed by Brealey et al. (1977) suggests, firms can have a lower
cost of capital if they borrow through a coalition of borrower (financial intermedia-
tion) and the cost of capital is negatively associated with the size of the coalition.
Furthermore, as Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggest, banks can
also act as a coalition of depositors to provide liquidity to individuals and firms in
the economy in case they receive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In addition, banks
can also function as delegated monitors to alleviate the moral hazard problem be-
tween borrowing firms and dispersed lenders/depositors (Mayer, 1988; Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997).
Though these economic functions of the banking system can facilitate the op-
eration of a modern economy, the existence of banking sector can also be a threat
on the stability of the economy. The theoretical models proposed by Bryant (1980)
and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) point out a special intrinsic feature of the banking
system which is that the system could end up with a bad equilibrium - a situation
of bank run - where the welfare of each individual in the economy would be strictly
worse-off. As the banking system is established based on the law of large numbers,
an unexpected systemic liquidity shock to the economy can easily collapse the whole
system, and this had been widely witnessed during the 2007-08 global financial crisis
(e.g. the bank run on Northern Rock in 2007, and Bear Stearns followed by Lehman
Brothers in 2008). Another lesson from the 2007-08 crisis is that the cost of a bank-
ing crisis can be substantial. It had been reflected by a steep decline in output and
2
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a significant rise in unemployment rate in almost all major developed economies in
the aftermath of the crisis. Therefore, it is important for us to understand how a
banking system could be destabilised and thus consider the prudential policies that
could be specifically designed to prevent a banking crisis from occurring.
The three essays in this thesis identify factors that could have an impact on the
stability of the banking system. The first essay is motivated by the extensive glob-
alisation of the banking sector in the past two decades. Banks from one country to
the next are increasingly connected by cross-border interbank lending relationships
and ownership ties. Additionally, there has been a large increase in the presence
of foreign-owned banks in a typical domestic banking system. The overall share of
domestic banking assets held by foreign banks has increased from 15% in 1995 to
23% in 2005 (International Monetary Fund, 2007). As a result, the role of foreign
banks and foreign-owned domestic banks in the banking system has become more
important, in both developed countries and emerging markets. Yet the implications
of increasing foreign banks are not well understood in literature.
On one hand, access to foreign banking capital may intensify the competition
of the domestic banking sector, thereby stimulating financial innovation, and the
efficiency of domestic companies (Claessens et al., 2001; Sturm and Williams, 2004).
Such ‘spillovers’ can help establish a modern financial system in developing countries
and lead to better financial regulations (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). On the other
hand, a large proportion of foreign owned banks in the domestic banking system
could increase a country’s exposure to an international liquidity shock. If so, micro-
prudential policies should be designed in order to limit the potential contagion so
that the financial stability of the domestic banking system is preserved. Therefore,
the first essay aims to identify the following issues:
1. Can a foreign liquidity shock be transmitted to the domestic banking system
3
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through bank ownership linkages?
2. Is there any heterogeneity among banks in transmitting the liquidity shock?
3. Is this transmission more pronounced in developing economies?
The answers to these research questions can be helpful in terms of designing
micro-prudential policies specifically towards foreign banks to prevent them from
transmitting foreign liquidity shocks which could potentially destabilise the domestic
banking system.
A previous version of the first essay was submitted to the special issue of the
Journal of International Financial Market, Institutions and Money (JIFMIM) on
‘Cross Country Issues on Credit, Banking, Asset Pricing, and Market Liquidity’ in
early 2016. After two rounds of conferences held for the special issue, and one round
of revise & resubmit, the work was finally published on the JIFMIM volume 53 in
March 2018 1.
The second essay is motivated by the recent European sovereign debt crisis, which
showed how banks’ large exposures to distressed governments could lead to insta-
bility in the banking system. Large exposures could give rise to a ‘bank-sovereign
nexus’ or a ‘doom loop’ between governments and the banking system (Acharya
et al., 2014; Cooper and Nikolov, 2013; Farhi and Tirole, 2016). For instance, banks
with large exposures to distressed sovereigns may respond by cutting lending, which
causes slower economic growth, which in turns increases further the sovereign’s dis-
tress. The impact of the distress experienced by certain sovereigns during the Euro
Area sovereign debt crisis on the banking system may have been more pronounced
because the regulatory requirements on banks’ sovereign exposures were very low
(European Systemic Risk Board, 2015). For example, banks are not required to have
any capital against the credit risk they face with their exposures to EU sovereigns
1DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.017
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irrespective of the risk those sovereigns may default. Regulatory limits on the size of
exposures a bank can have to a counterparty exempt exposures to sovereigns. And
until 2017, banks were not required to deduct fully from regulatory capital losses
incurred on sovereign exposures held in the available for sale part of their balance
sheets.
The links between sovereign exposures and bank lending have been explored in a
number of papers (Gennaioli et al., 2014a,b; Popov and Van Horen, 2015; De Marco,
2016). However, those papers do not provide clear evidence on the channels through
which the sovereign shock could be transmitted to the banking system. In addition,
existing literature might have missed a potential nuance to how banks’ are exposed
to sovereigns: sovereign exposures can be found in different parts of the balance sheet
with distinct accounting treatments, and related regulatory treatments. One of the
key differences in accounting treatment according to where in the balance sheet
an exposure is located is the approach to valuing an exposure. Some exposures are
valued according to their value when they were created (‘historical cost’ basis), while
others are valued according to their current market value (‘fair value’ basis). Some
have put forward theories for why fair value accounting can increase instability in
the banking system Cifuentes et al. (2005); Allen and Carletti (2008); Heaton et al.
(2010). Thus, the second essay answers the following research questions:
1. Can a sovereign shock negatively affect banks’ lending activity?
2. Through which channel a sovereign shock can destabilise the banking sector
(capital channel or funding channel)?
3. Can the accounting and regulatory treatments of sovereign exposures affect
the strength of transmission of the sovereign shock?
This essay is developed based on a research project at the Prudential Policy
5
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Directorate, Bank of England when I was doing summer internships at the Bank
in 2015 and 2016. Thus, this work is co-authored with my previous colleagues at
the Bank and I contributed at least 33% of the work. It is expected that another
version of the work would be published on the Bank of England Staff Working
Paper Series in late 2018. The output of this essay may produce guidance on how
the regulatory treatment on banks’ sovereign exposures should be specified in the
future macro-prudential policy framework.
The third essay is motivated by a long on-going debate on the relationship be-
tween banking competition and financial stability which has been further intensified
by the 2007-08 global financial crisis. On one hand, the competition-fragility hy-
pothesis argues that in a more competitive environment banks would lose their
"charter value" thus are more likely to shift risk towards depositors with the deposit
insurance policy, while in a less competitive environment banks tend to have higher
profit and also more capital buffer, thus are not likely to take excessive risks which
could endanger the whole financial system (Keeley, 1990; Beck et al., 2006; Berger
et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2013).
On the other hand, the competition-stability hypothesis argues that there is a
positive relationship between bank competition and financial stability, rather than a
trade-off. Lower lending rates resulted from higher level of bank competition reduces
borrowing cost for both firms and individuals, and this in turn would reduce banks
credit risk. Thus, the banking system as a whole would be more stable in a compet-
itive environment (Schaeck et al., 2009; Anginer et al., 2014). In addition, it is also
possible that there is an U-shaped relationship between competition and stability.
For a less competitive banking system, more competition would be preferred due to
increased efficiency and stability, but if the system is already highly competitive,
further increase in competition might induce excessive risk taking which threatens
6
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the stability of the system. Therefore the effect of competition on stability could
go either way depending on where the banking system is located on the U-shaped
curve (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011). Overall,
both theoretical models and empirical evidence provide mixed results. Using a solid
empirical setup, the third essay aims to address the following issues:
1. Can banking stability be improved by a positive competition shock in the
banking sector?
2. Is the effect of banking competition on banking stability non-linear?
3. Is there any heterogeneity among banks in response to a higher level of com-
petition?
These may help regulatory authorities to balance between policies on facilitating
competition in the banking sector and those on maintaining stability of the financial
system.
7
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1.2 Overview of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first empirical essay which
identifies the cross-border bank ownership linkages as an international transmission
of liquidity shocks. Following Chapter 2, the second empirical essay presented in
Chapter 3 examines the mechanism on how sovereign distress event would have
an impact on banks with exposures to the distressed sovereigns. Then, Chapter 4
presents the last empirical essay which provides evidence on the relationship be-
tween banking competition and banking stability. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis
by summarising the findings from the three essays, providing policy implications,
and proposing future scopes of research.
A common feature among the three essays in the thesis is that the identifica-
tion strategies in these essays are all based on the Different-in-Differences (DID)
method, with specific alterations for the three research topics: the first essay exploit
the liquidity crisis in the banking systems in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
(GIIPS) during the sovereign debt crisis as an experiment to implement the DID
method, to identify whether the liquidity shocks in GIIPS countries were transmit-
ted to other European countries through bank ownership linkages; the second essay
applies the DID method by using the sovereign shocks indicated by sovereign down-
grades during the European sovereign debt crisis, to examine how a sovereign shock
would have an impact on banks’ lending activities; the third essay takes the advan-
tage of the staggered timing of the banking deregulation in the U.S. during the 1980s
to implement the DID method, and identifies whether the intensified competition
induced by the deregulation would affect banking stability.
Though the identification methodologies are similar across the three essays, the
data for the empirical analysis in the three essays are collected from three distinctive
sources. The main datasets analysed in the first essay are collected from the Bureau
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van Dijk Bankscope2 database which contains historic balance sheet and income
statement data for banks across the world. Most importantly, the database provides
information on bank ownership at subsidiary bank level, which is essential for the
first essay to construct bank ownership linkages across European countries. The
second essay also focuses on European banks during the European sovereign debt
crisis, however, it takes the advantages of the quarterly frequency of the banking
data from the SNL database and the granularity of the sovereign exposure data
disclosed by European Banking Authority (EBA) through a series of stress test,
transparency exercises and capital exercises since 2010. The third essay turns to
focus on the banking deregulation in the U.S. during the 1980s, so the main datasets
in the analysis are collected from the Consolidated Reports on Condition and Income
(Call report) which provides detailed historic data on balance sheet and income
statement for all banking institutions regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company (FDIC).
The rest of this section provides a overview for each essay in the thesis.
1.2.1 Chapter 2 Overview
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether a liquidity crisis spread internationally
in accordance with the bank ownership networks. The European sovereign debt crisis
that began in 2010 provides an excellent quasi-natural experiment to test possible
contagion effects, due to the fact that this shock generated a liquidity crisis in GIIPS
countries, plus the banking systems of GIIPS countries are very well interconnected
with other European countires through bank ownership linkages. Thus, this study
specifically examines how this shock was propagated to the other European countries
through ownership linkages of banks and their subsidiaries. Using subsidiary bank
2The name of the database has been changed from Bankscope to Orbis Bank Focus by Bureau
van Dijk in 2016.
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level data collected from the Bankscope Database, it constructs ownership networks
for banks located in all European countries. The exposure to the liquidity crisis in
GIIPS countries is constructed for each international banking group (network) as
measured by the proportion of their total banking assets in GIIPS countries. Then
the banking group level exposure is assigned to each bank within the network. For
example, a bank is classified as highly exposed to the crisis if the proportion of
its group’s total assets in GIIPS countries is high. This is an appropriate measure
because banks located in a GIIPS country are those most affected by the sovereign
shock. Indeed, banks hold more domestic government debts rather than foreign
debts on their balance sheet, a phenomenon known as home bias. If there is a
sovereign credit event, domestic banks as government bond holders are directly
affected.
The primary focus of this study is the performance of the subsidiary banks
located in non-GIIPS countries who are connected with banks in GIIPS countries
through bank ownership linkages and thus have a positive exposure to the crisis.
The working hypothesis is drawn from the theory of capital markets developed by
Morgan et al. (2004). Their analysis predicts that banks exposed to a sovereign crisis
will reduce their lending during the crisis period in order to support their parent
or subsidiary banks. In this essay, it will be the subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS
countries with higher exposure to GIIPS countries through their ownership linkages
who will reduce their lending. This effect is labelled as the contagion effect3 of the
internal capital market in a bank ownership network.
The difference-in-difference (DID) method is implemented to test this hypothe-
sis, where the treatment in the DID setting is a subsidiary bank’s indirect exposure
to the GIIPS crisis through ownership linkages. The baseline results from the DID
regressions imply that a bank’s lending growth rate would reduce by 5.75 percent-
3This effect is called support effect by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010).
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age points if the bank’s exposure increases by 1 percent. The results support the
hypothesis that highly exposed banks’ lending performance is negatively affected by
the foreign liquidity shock due to the cross-border ownership linkages. Furthermore,
this study disentangles the transmission effect by exploring the heterogeneity among
subsidiary banks in the ownership network. It suggests that larger subsidiary banks
and those subsidiaries that were more profitable are found to be more resilient to the
shock. It also shows that the parent bank’s characteristics affect the transmission
of the shock, supporting the notion of an internal capital market operating within
these banks. The analysis also shows that subsidiary banks located in Eastern Eu-
rope are more fragile when facing a external liquidity shock, compared with those
located in Western Europe. This implies that subsidiary banks operating in devel-
oping countries tend to be more dependent on liquidity support from their parent
banks, as the financial sector is usually less developed in developing countries.
The findings from this chapter build on the existing literature by providing em-
pirical evidence at the level of the banks and their subsidiaries on the operation of
an internal capital market with a cross-country setting. Furthermore, it adds to the
literature, by including both developed and developing economies in the sample and
testing at the bank level whether bank ownership linkages across Europe can serve
as a vehicle to transmit liquidity shock.
This chapter also provides several policy implications. First, as a liquidity shock
can be transmitted through cross-border bank ownership linkages, regulatory au-
thorities across countries might think carefully about the activities of international
banks and whether any of these should be ring fenced. Specific policies targeted at
international banks so as to isolate foreign liquidity shocks could help support the
stability of a domestic banking system. This is especially important for regulatory
authorities in developing countries, as the transmission effect is found to be more
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pronounced for subsidiary banks located in Eastern Europe. Second, regulators
across countries would do better to coordinate their activities and agree policy on
an international rather than domestic level. This may help alleviate the potential
for contagion across an international bank’s internal capital market.
1.2.2 Chapter 3 Overview
Following Chapter 2, this Chapter aims to identify how the sovereign crisis in GI-
IPS countries could be transmitted to the banking sector which had evolved into a
liquidity crisis, with a special focus on the different accounting treatment that these
exposures can have. These differences might have important implications, not only
to understand the transmission channels from sovereign shocks to bank lending, but
also for the design of new regulation. Thus, this chapter specifically investigates
whether the accounting treatments of sovereign exposures affected the strength of
transmission of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis onto banks and bank lending.
The key difference in accounting standards is between those exposures that are val-
ued on a historical cost basis and those valued on a fair value basis. Loans and
government bonds that a bank intends to hold to maturity (HTM) are valued on a
historical cost basis, which means that any sovereign distress which falls short of the
sovereign defaulting does not change the value of those exposures on a bank’s bal-
ance sheet. Whereas exposures that are fair valued are valued using current market
prices; this means changes in market prices resulting from sovereign distress will re-
duce the value of those exposures on a bank’s balance sheet and create a loss that is
deducted from a bank’s equity. Bonds that are classified as available for sale (AFS),
held for trading (HFT), or under the fair value option (FVO), and derivatives are
fair valued.
To identify the the potential adverse effect of those different types of exposure on
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banking stability, detailed information on banks’ sovereign exposure is collected from
the disclosure of a series EU-wide stress tests and exercises conducted by the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA) since 2010. These disclosures contain granular data
on banks’ sovereign exposures, including the information on counterparty countries,
residual maturities, accounting classifications. Other bank-level data are collected
from the SNL database while sovereign shock indicators and macroeconomic data
were collected from Moody’s, Bloomberg and Datastream.
In line with previous studies, the analysis shows that negative shocks to sovereign
bond are associated to lower subsequent bank lending for banks more exposed to
the shocks. Furthermore, it shows that the negative effect of a sovereign shock on
bank lending is weaker for better capitalised banks, what is known as the ‘capital
channel’. It also shows that bank capital matters especially for exposures that
are both mark-to-market and subject to no capital requirements, such as available
for sale (AFS) exposures: this seems to be the type of exposure through which
sovereign shocks are transmitted directly to bank solvency. The capital channel
is less important for book-value exposures (held to maturity) and exposures with
positive capital requirements (held for trading). It is also revealed that the capital
channel is particularly important for short-term exposures (rather than medium-
and long-term) and domestic exposures (rather than foreign).
This chapter takes a step further from the previous studies, and provides em-
pirical evidence on how exactly a sovereign shock could be transmitted to banks
through the ‘capital channel’ and the ‘funding channel’. Furthermore, this essay
also examines the heterogeneity among different types of banks’ sovereign expo-
sures with distinctive accounting and regulatory treatment in terms of transmitting
sovereign shocks. This issues has not been fully explored in the literature. In ad-
dition, this essay also contributes to the literature on the effect of the application
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of fair value accounting in the banking industry where there is no consensus in the
literature yet whether fair value accounting could cause excess negative impact on
a bank’s financial condition and lending activities.
Chapter 3 also provides some implications in terms of designing regulatory treat-
ment on banks’ sovereign exposures in the macro-prudential policy framework. The
findings from this chapter suggest that regulatory authorities may need to increase
the risk weight on banks’ sovereign exposures to make sure banks can weather
sovereign shocks without unduly restricting their lending activity. More specifically,
the risk weight on banks’ sovereign exposures should be determined by the partic-
ular level of credit risk of the sovereign. A risk-sensitive risk-weighting framework
on banks’ sovereign exposure may be essential in protecting banks from sovereign
shocks. Furthermore, the risk weight on sovereign exposures should be specifically
designed according to the accounting classifications of those exposure, as different
accounting treatment can cause different economic consequences.
1.2.3 Chapter 4 Overview
This Chapter turns to explore the relationship between banking competition and
banking stability. The U.S. bank branching deregulation in the 1980s provides an
opportunity to implement the difference-in-difference (DID) method to identify the
causal relationship between the competition shock on banking stability. In the late
1970s, the ability of banks to compete over a longer distance was enhanced by some
technological improvement, such as the invention of ATM. As a result, individual
states started to deregulated their banking system both intra-state and inter-state
branching, which resulted in a higher level of competition in the banking sector. A
very important feature of the deregulation is that different states deregulated their
banking system at different point in time. Taking advantage of this feature, the
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DID method is implemented to address the causality issue. In addition, dynamic
DID method also implemented as a robustness check. Following Beck et al. (2013),
the banking stability is measured by Z-score calculated with a 3-year rolling win-
dow. Furthermore, alternative indicators for banking stability are also adopted in
the analysis, such as the inverse standard deviation of ROA and non-performing
loan ratio. All these indicators are calculated at both state-level and bank-level.
The data for this analysis are collected from the Consolidated Reports on Condition
and Income (Call report) which provides detailed balance sheet and income state-
ment data for all banking institutions regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company (FDIC).
The analysis shows that the intensified competition shock caused by the intra-
state branching deregulation significantly improves the state-level banking stability.
Meanwhile, it shows that the inter-state branching deregulation is estimated to
have no significant impact on banking stability at state-level. This baseline result is
confirmed by the dynamic difference-in-difference regressions and also the regressions
with alternative stability indicators. The bank-level analysis shows consistent result
that the intra-state competition shock has a positive and significant effect on the
stability of individual banks, which is also robust with the dynamic DID setting and
alternative bank-level stability indicators. However, the scale of the estimated effect
at bank-level is much smaller.
The unbalanced feature of the bank-level panel dataset may bias the estimated
effect of the competition shock on bank-level stability. To examine this issue, both
typical DID and dynamic DID regressions are implemented with a balanced bank-
level panel dataset. The results from these regressions are qualitatively unchanged
compared with the previous findings from the bank-level analysis. Furthermore, it
examines the heterogeneity among banks from three perspectives: bank size, bank
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profitability and the competition environment faced by the bank. It shows that the
intra-state competition shock has a greater effect on the stability of small banks,
while big banks and more profitable banks are more likely to be affect by the inter-
state competition shock. The heterogeneity test also shows that the stability of
banks operating in a less competitive environment are more likely to be improved
by the inter-state competition shock, which provides evidence on the non-linear
relationship between banking competition and stability.
Overall, this chapter builds on the existing literature in two ways. First, it
exploits the intensified competition in the banking sector induced by the U.S. bank-
ing deregulation as an exogenous shock and identifies the the relationship between
banking competition and banking stability with a Difference-in-Differences setting,
instead of GMM which is the method exploited by most of the empirical papers in
the literature. Second, it provides empirical evidence on the non-linear relationship
between banking competition and banking stability predicted by theoretical mod-
els, which is a issue that has not been fully investigated in the empirical literature.
The policy implication from this chapter is that regulatory authorities may need to
develop policies to facilitate effective competition in the banking sector, along with
their prudential policies which are specifically designed to maintain the stability
of the financial system, because a relative competitive environment in the banking
sector may also improve the overall stability of the financial sector.
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CHAPTER 2 2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
During the past two decades, the globalisation of the world’s financial sector has
reached an unprecedented level. Banks are internationally connected by both cross-
border interbank lending relationship and ownership ties. There has been dramatic
increase in the presence of foreign-owned bank in domestic banking system. As
Figure 2.1 shows, the overall share of domestic banking assets held by foreign bank
increased from 15% in 1995 to 23% in 2005, with large increase in Eastern Europe
and Latin America. As a result, the role of foreign banks and foreign-owned domestic
banks in a banking system has become more important, in both developed countries
and emerging markets.
Figure 2.1: Share of Banking Assets Held by Foreign-owned Bank, by
Region
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Notes: This figure shows the trend of the share of domestic banking assets held by foreign-owned bank from 1995 to 2005. As it
shows, the overall share increases from 15% to 23%. The the share of foreign bank in Eastern Europe and Latin America increases
more significantly than other area, while there is a small decrease of the foreign bank share in Africa.
Yet the implication of an increase in foreign banks are theoretically unclear.
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On one hand, the access to foreign banking capital may intensify the competition
of the domestic banking industry, stimulate financial innovation, thus improving
overall efficiency of the financial sector (Claessens et al., 2001; Sturm and Williams,
2004). In terms of emerging economies, foreign banks from developed countries may
provide advanced management techniques for financial institutions and introduce
new financial products, services, or business models. These "spillover effects" are
helpful for the establishment of a modern financial system and the improvement of
financial regulations (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). Positive spill-over effects may be
more significant for emerging economies, since King and Levine (1993) suggest that
the financial system in developing countries is usually under-developed.
On the other hand, a strong relationship with foreign banks or a large propor-
tion of foreign owned banks in the domestic banking system could be a threat to the
financial and economic stability, and the dependence of the banking system on for-
eign banks creates exposure to any international liquidity crises. For instance, Peek
and Rosengren (2000) show that the subsidiaries of Japanese banks in the United
States significantly reduced their lending due to the Japanese banking crisis in the
1990s, which had a negative real effect on U.S. economy. In addition, the recent
global financial crisis shows that a banking crisis initiated from the United States
finally led to the most serious global recession since the great depression, for which
the highly globalised financial sector provided the propagation channel (Aiyar, 2012;
Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011).
The aim of this work is to test whether the liquidity crisis spread internationally
in accordance with the bank ownership networks. The European sovereign debt
crisis provide us a natural to work on this issue due to the fact that it led to a
serious liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain),
and that the banking system of GIIPS countries are very well interconnected with
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other European countries through bank ownership linkages. Though the European
debt crisis is seen as a legacy of the 2008 global financial crisis, it was still a promi-
nent shock to the GIIPS countries’ banking system, which further deteriorated the
economic recession in the wider European area.
Specifically, this study tests whether the liquidity shock to the GIIPS countries’
banking system were transmitted to other European countries through the banks’
cross-border ownership linkages. To do this, subsidiary bank level data are collected
to construct ownership networks for banks located in all European countries. The
exposure to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries is measured for each international
banking group (network) according to the level of their banking activities in GIIPS
countries, which is captured by proportion of their total banking assets in GIIPS
countries. Then the banking group level exposure is assigned to each bank within the
network. For example, a bank would be highly exposed to the crisis if the proportion
of its banking group’s total assets in GIIPS countries is high. The reason why bank’s
exposure could be measured in this way is that banks located in a GIIPS country
are those most likely affected by the sovereign shock, since banks tend to hold more
domestic government debts rather than foreign debts in their balance sheet (home
bias effect). Once there is a sovereign credit event, domestic banks as government
bond holders would be directly affected.
Thus, the primary focus of this study is on the performance of the subsidiary
banks located in non-GIIPS countries who are connected with banks in GIIPS coun-
tries through bank ownership networks and thus have a positive exposure to the
crisis. The working hypothesis is developed based on the theory of internal capital
market proposed by Morgan et al. (2003). Their analysis predicts that bank’s with
positive exposure to the crisis would reduce their lending during the crisis period to
support their parent or peer subsidiary banks in GIIPS countries who is suffering
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from the sovereign shock. It labels this transmission mechanism as the contagion
effect of the internal capital market.1 To summarise, the hypothesis of this study is
that the subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries with higher exposure to the crisis
will reduce their lending more than those with lower exposure during the crisis.
The difference-in-difference (DID) method is implemented to test this hypothe-
sis. The conventional DID method requires two groups: control group and treatment
group; and two periods: pre-period and post-period. In this study, the treatment
is the exposure to the crisis, so the control group here contains non-GIIPS sub-
sidiary banks that are not exposed to the GIIPS crisis, while the treatment group
includes those subsidiaries who are exposed to the crisis. The year of 2010 is de-
fined as the first year of post-period as usually defined by the literature (Popov and
Van Horen, 2013); moreover there is a clear discontinuity in the the CDS spread for
GIIPS countries in that year. Thus the pre-period is 2008-2009 and the post period
is 2010-2013. Preliminary results from the DID regressions show that the interac-
tion between treatment (exposure) and post dummy is negative and statistically
significant, which is very consistent across models with different specifications. This
implies that subsidiary banks that are highly exposed due to the ownership linkages
would significantly reduce their lending during the crisis period, even if they are not
directly exposed to the crisis. The magnitude of the negative effect is large: if the
bank’s exposure increase by 1 percent, then the bank’s lending growth rate would
reduce by 5.756 percentage points.
A dynamic DID setting is also applied, which aims to observe the behaviour
of the treated group over the sample period. Results show that the interaction
between treatment and the year dummy of 2009 (pre-period) is not significant, but
the interaction term with dummies for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 is negative and
significant. This seems to confirm the results from the conventional DID regressions
1This effect is called support effect by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010).
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that highly exposed banks’ lending performance is negatively affected by the foreign
liquidity shock due to the cross-border ownership linkages.
Furthermore, this study tries to disentangle the transmission effect by looking
at bank heterogeneity. First, it examines the heterogeneity in subsidiary bank’s
characteristics. The following 5 dimensions are tested: bank size (log of total assets),
funding structure (proportion of deposit funding), profitability (ROA), risk attitude
(capital and liquidity), and capability in their core business (interest margin and
bank weakness). Explanatory regressions show that smaller, more capitalised and
less profitable subsidiary banks are more likely to be affected by the foreign liquidity
shock, as the negative effect of exposure due to the cross-border ownership linkages
are more significant for these banks. Second, it also tests the heterogeneity in parent
bank’s characteristics. The regression results show that the liquidity crisis is more
likely to spillover internationally if the parent bank is more risk-averse, less capable
for its core business, or has higher profitability.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature on banking networks and the potential for shocks to transmit through the
banking system. Section 2.3 describes the empirical framework, including how to
use the information on ownership and construct the measurement on exposure to
the sovereign crises. Section 2.4 presents descriptive statistics before explaining the
DID method in Section 2.5 which generates the results in Section 2.6. Section 2.7
aims to establish robustness before Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
There is an ample literature investigating banking networks; following Allen and
Babus (2009) it can be categorised into two broad areas: network effect and network
formation. The former focuses on the financial contagion caused by the interbank
lending relationship within the banking system. Allen and Gale (2000) introduce
a framework for analysing network resilience to contagion. Based on the liquidity
preference model proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they constructed a
simple banking system with four banks exchanging their deposit to others to insure
against random liquidity shocks. This makes the system exposed to contagion since
if a bank fails other banks cannot liquidate their liabilities (deposits) by the failed
bank easily. It follows that in a complete network where banks are all connected with
each other, if one bank meets a liquidity problem, everyone just takes a little loss by
sharing the shock through the network thus the contagion effect is very small. On
the other hand, in a poorly connected network where banks are rarely linked with
each others by interbank lending, a failure of a bank may drive the whole system
to collapse, due to serious financial contagion. Iyer and Peydro (2011) empirically
show that the interbank lending linkage has a contagion effect. They use the failure
of a big Indian bank due to fraud as a quasi-natural experiment, and suggest that
interbank exposure to the failed bank has a negative effect on banks deposit growth,
and the effect is smaller for banks with more solid fundamentals.
The second strand of research looks at the formation and evolution of the inter-
bank lending network. Hale (2012) constructs a global interbank lending network
for 7938 banks from 141 countries by using syndicated loan database, and studies
the dynamics of this network. The empirical results suggest that recessions and
banking crises have a negative effect on the formation of new interbank lending con-
nections. This has an important implication that economic and financial shocks can
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change the structure of the interbank lending network, thus it may be inappropriate
to model the network as static when analysing effects of financial shocks. All these
literatures explore the effect and formation of the interbank lending network as a
broad concept, yet this study focuses on the international contagion effect induced
by bank’s cross-border ownership networks. However, there is evidence suggesting
that an bank ownership network may intrinsically be a subset of an interbank lend-
ing network, since banks within a banking group operates internal capital market
to maximise the return on their banking assets.
The banking literature has explored the role of the internal capital market within
a banking group. This literature provides a theoretical grounding as to why a liq-
uidity shock can be transmitted through bank ownership linkages. Using US bank
data provided by the Federal Reserve Y-9 tapes and the Federal Reserve Reports of
Income and Condition (Call Report) from 1986-1989, Houston et al. (1997) suggest
that there is an internal capital market established by the bank holding company al-
locating scarce capital resources among the subsidiary banks. Morgan et al. (2004)
examine the effect of the integration of the US banking system during economic
volatility. The empirical results support the idea of an internal capital market,
through which inter-state banks smooth business cycles. Furthermore, there is evi-
dence for multinational banks; for instance, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) suggest
that the parent bank and its foreign subsidiary often borrow and lend through their
internal capital market; they show that large global-oriented banks in the US use
the internal capital markets with their foreign subsidiaries to smooth domestic liq-
uidity shocks. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) construct a network for 45 large
multinational banks and their foreign subsidiaries. They support the hypothesis
that there exists an internal capital market within international banking groups,
and that there is a positive relationship between a parent bank’s financial strength
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and a subsidiary bank’s loan growth.
Along side these benefits of being part of a bank network, there is the risk that the
foreign subsidiary banks are too dependent on its parent, especially for subsidiaries
located in emerging markets where capital is relatively scarce and expensive, and
alternative funding sources are more difficult to find. In this case, a liquidity shock
received by a parent bank can be ultimately transmitted to its vulnerable foreign
subsidiaries through an internal lending channel. Using the Japanese banking cri-
sis in 1990s as a quasi-natural experiment, Peek and Rosengren (2000) show that
Japanese banks in the US significantly reduced loan supply during the crisis and this
loan supply shock had a negative real effect on economic activities since demand for
loans cannot easily be fulfilled with alternative forms of financing. Looking at the
recent global financial crisis, Aiyar (2012) uses UK quarterly bank-level data from
the Bank of England to show that an external funding shock had a significant and
substantial impact on domestic lending activities. Specifically, the evidence suggests
that subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks tighten their credit supply more than
domestic banks during the crisis.
Other researchers focus their attention on whether and how an economic shock
erupted in developed countries could be transmitted to emerging economies. Ce-
torelli and Goldberg (2011) examine the transmission of liquidity shocks between
developed countries and emerging countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, by
using aggregated country-level data from Banks for International Settlements(BIS).
Their results suggest three channels spreading the shock to emerging markets: first,
a decline of foreign banks’ direct, cross-border credit supply; second, a decline of
lending by domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks; and third, a decline of lending
by domestically owned banks which are affected by the tight cross-border interbank
lending market during the crisis. Popov and Udell (2010) examine whether the re-
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cent global financial crisis which erupted in advanced economies was transmitted
to central and eastern Europe through foreign banks. They construct an index to
measure the level of financial distress in the 14 countries in the region and exploit
the data on SMEs provided by the 2008 Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey. The results of this study imply that SMEs in central and eastern
Europe would have a higher probability of rejection on their loan applications if the
banking system was dominated by foreign banks. Another study on Eastern Euro-
pean countries by Ongena et al. (2015) support these results. It is shown that during
the recent financial crisis, internationally-borrowing local banks and subsidiaries of
foreign banks reduce their loans more than locally funded banks, while lending by
banks with more retail deposits are relatively stable no matter whether the banks
are foreign-owned or borrowing internationally.
Schnabl (2012) exploits the 1998 Russian default to examine how a liquidity
shock received by international banks was transmitted to Peru. Taking advantage
of detailed interbank lending databases provided by the central bank of Peru, the
author shows that the liquidity shock was transmitted through an international in-
terbank lending channel. Compared with locally funded banks, both internationally
borrowing banks and foreign owned banks are affected more by this channel. Specif-
ically, foreign owned banks perform relatively better than those borrowing abroad,
since international banks reduce their interbank lending to these banks more than
their foreign subsidiaries. Anginer et al. (2014) examine the association of default
risk between international parent banks in developed countries and their subsidiaries
in emerging economies during the recent financial crisis, rather than transmission
channels of the liquidity shock. Controlling for different financial regulation across
different countries, they show a significant and positive correlation between a par-
ent’s and a subsidiary’s default risk. Moreover, it shows that the default risk of
26
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 2
subsidiaries with higher capital, retail deposits, profitability and independency is
less correlated with the parents’ default risk.
The above papers focus on a liquidity shock in a single country transmitted into
another country (Peek and Rosengren, 2000), or a global liquidity shock transmitted
to a single country (Aiyar, 2012). This essay builds on these papers by providing ev-
idence at the level of the banks and their subsidiaries on the operation of an internal
capital market with a cross-country setting. A prior cross-country analysis (Cetorelli
and Goldberg, 2011) examines whether a liquidity crisis in advanced economies could
be transmitted to emerging markets through foreign banks at country level. This
essay adds to this work, by including both developed and developing economies into
the sample and testing at the bank level whether bank ownership linkages across
Europe can serve as a vehicle to transmit liquidity shocks. This proposition has yet
to be tested in the literature.
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2.3 Empirical Setting
2.3.1 The Crisis as an Experiment
This study tests whether a liquidity shock could be transmitted internationally
through a cross-border bank ownership network. The European sovereign debt cri-
sis provides a unique opportunity to work on this issue. In December 2009, Fitch,
Moody’s, and S&P downgraded the rating for Greek sovereign credit when they
perceived that the Greek government was suffering from public deficit difficulties.
During April 2010, Greek bonds were downgraded to junk status by S&P. This event
is typically regarded as the start of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Immediately
after, Moody’s downgraded the rating for the Irish sovereign debt, and Spain lost its
top credit rating. The crisis further deepened in 2011 when Portuguese and Italian
sovereign debt rating were downgraded.
Figure 2.2 depicts the CDS (Credit Default Swap) spread of GIIPS countries’
5-year sovereign debt, along with the CDS spread of German 5-year bond as a
comparison. A CDS is a financial arrangement by which the buyer of the CDS will
be protected by the seller in the event of credit default. Thus, the CDS spread for
sovereign indicates the default risk of the sovereign debts, so Figure 2.2 describes
the evolution of the sovereign debt crisis. As it shows, after the Greek bond was
downgraded to junk status in April 2010, the sovereign crisis formally erupted and
the CDS spread of all GIIPS countries started to scramble up and peaked at the
beginning of 2012, while the CDS spread of German bonds remained low and stable
during the whole period.
Banks holding downdgraded bonds may begin to suffer liquidity issues. As Popov
and Van Horen (2015) and De Marco (2013) suggest, there may be two channels
through which the valuation haircut on the GIIPS sovereign debts have a negative
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Figure 2.2: CDS Spread of GIIPS Sovereign Debts (5 Year), by Coun-
try
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Source: Datastream
Notes: This figure depicts the CDS spread of GIIPS sovereign debt which captures the default risk of the government, thus describes
the evolution of the sovereign debt crisis. The unit for Greek debt’s CDS spread is depicted by the vertical axis to the right. As it
shows, after the Greek bond was downgraded to junk status in April 2010, the sovereign crisis formally erupted and the CDS spread
of all GIIPS countries started to scramble up and peaked at the beginning of 2012, while the CDS spread of German bonds remained
low and stable during the whole period. The CDS spread for Greek bank remained constant since 2012 as the trading for the products
had been suspended.
effect on a bank’s liquidity and thus lending activities. These are the ‘funding
channel’ and ‘capital channel’. Banks are likely to be affected by a sovereign credit
event through the funding channel because the value reduction of the sovereign debt
directly weakens the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, and also affects the bank’s
borrowing capacity in the interbank lending market due to the fact that banks often
use sovereign debt as collateral. They are also likely to be shocked through the
capital channel because the capital loss due to the devaluation of sovereign debt
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may drive a bank’s capital ratio below the regulatory ratio. In response, the bank
reduces lending to maintain their capital ratio. Therefore, the sovereign debt crisis
can be seen as a liquidity shock for banks who were holding a relatively large amount
of impaired sovereign debts in their portfolio. Since banks usually tend to hold more
domestic sovereign debts rather than foreign government bonds (an effect known as
home bias), the GIIPS sovereign debt crisis represents a severe liquidity shock to
banks located in GIIPS countries.
Figure 2.3 shows the overall GIIPS sovereign debt holdings for 21 EU banking
systems, as recorded by the European Banking Authority (EBA) stress test in 2010,
2011 and 2014. The tests selected banking groups to cover at least 50% market share
of a country’s banking system. Though it is not a complete survey for all the banks
in the sampled countries, the result is the best proxy available for the European
banking system. As the figure shows, excluding GIIPS Countries, Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus and Luxembourg had a relative high exposure to GIIPS sovereign debts
in 2010. Significantly, banks in these countries reduced their GIIPS debt holdings
during the crisis. Meanwhile, the portfolio of GIIPS banks contains a consistent
home bias over the same period. Thus if the valuation haircut of sovereign debt has
a negative effect on a bank’s liquidity, it is very likely that banks in GIIPS country
had received the strongest liquidity shock due to the crisis.
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Figure 2.3: GIIPS Sovereign Debt Exposure, by Country
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Source: European Banking Authority, Stress Test 2010, 2011 and 2014
Notes: This figure shows to what extent a banking system of a EU country was exposed to GIIPS sovereign debts, which is revealed by
the EBA stress tests. As it shows, despite GIIPS countries, banks in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg were highly exposed
to the GIIPS debts in 2010. However, those banks significantly reduced their GIIPS debt holding during the crisis. Meanwhile, the
sovereign debt portfolio of banks in GIIPS countries performed a consistent home bias. Data for Austria, Germany, France, UK,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden in March 2010 is missing.
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Figure 2.4: Growth Rate of Loans to Domestic Non-Financial Corpo-
rations, by Country
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Source: European Central Bank Data Warehouse
Notes: This figure presents the loan growth rate to domestic non-financial companies for GIIPS countries and Germany. Banks in
all GIIPS countries and also Germany reduce their lending significantly during the global financial crisis in 2008. In the beginning of
2010, banks in all countries tend to recover their credit supply. However, the trends start to diverge when the sovereign shock comes
up in April 2010. Growth rate of bank lending in GIIPS country shrinks again during the crisis while German banks increase their
lending with a low but stable rate.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the trend of bank credit supply in GIIPS countries and
Germany during the crisis period. The growth rate of bank lending fell sharply
during the 2008 and 2009 due to the global financial crisis. This can be interpreted
as a common trend before the sovereign debt crisis. At the beginning of 2010,
banks in all countries show a recovery of their credit supply. However, the trends
start to diverge when the sovereign shock comes in April 2010. The growth rate of
bank lending in GIIPS country shrinks again during the crisis while German banks
increase their lending with a low but stable growth rate. It is worth noting that
the poor performance of German banks might also be partly due to the crisis in
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Figure 2.5: Interest Spread (on ECB deposit facility) for New Loans
to Non-Financial Corporations, by Country
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Source: European Central Bank Data Warehouse
Notes: As this figure shows, the interest spread in GIIPS countries start to rise up after the shock while the spread in Germany is
relatively low and stable during the crisis period. Together with figure 4, evidence shows that there is a liquidity squeeze in banking
system of GIIPS countries during the sovereign debt crisis.
GIIPS countries. In addition, Figure 2.5 shows the interest spread on the policy
rate for new loans for the same countries from 2007 to 2014. The story is similar,
the trends started to diverge as the crisis occurs. Overall, the evidence shows that
banks in GIIPS countries appear to have suffered from liquidity problems during
the crisis period, and this can be attributed to the sovereign debt crisis. This study
tests whether the liquidity shock on the banking systems in GIIPS countries were
transmitted to other European countries through the cross-border bank ownership
network in Europe.
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2.3.2 Network Construction and Exposure Measurement
This study constructs ownership networks for banks located in all European coun-
tries to examine whether the liquidity shock in GIIPS banking systems was trans-
mitted to other banks through ownership linkages. Ownership networks connect
banks in GIIPS countries with banks in other European economies which are not
directly exposed to the impaired sovereign debts. An effective ownership linkage be-
tween a parent and a subsidiary bank is defined by a control stake where the parent
bank holds 50% or more of the subsidiary bank’s total equity. Figure 2.6 provides
an illustration of the three possible scenarios of the network. Scenario 1 shows the
case that both the parent bank P1 and the subsidiary bank S1 are located outside of
GIIPS countries, so this banking group has no linkages with banks in GIIPS coun-
tries thus they do not have any direct exposure to the liquidity crisis in the GIIPS
banking system. In scenario 2, one of the two subsidiary banks S4 is located in a
GIIPS country, thus there is a possibility that the liquidity shock received by S4
could be transmitted to the parent bank P2 and the other subsidiary S2. The last
possible scenario is that the parent bank is located in GIIPS country. As scenario
3 shows, the parent bank P3 and subsidiary bank S5 are located in GIIPS countries
while the other subsidiary bank S3 is located in other economies. In this scenario,
it is plausible that the liquidity shock in GIIPS countries may have an effect on S3
since it has a relatively large exposure.
The main objective of this study is to test whether the liquidity shock received by
either S4, S5 or P3 would be transmitted to S2 and S3, respectively, through cross-
border ownership linkages. In other words, it focuses on whether subsidiary banks
S1, S2 and S3 behave differently during the crisis due to the ownership linkages with
banks in GIIPS countries.
It is necessary to identify the degree of exposure to the crisis based on the
34
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Figure 2.6: Three Scenarios of Bank Ownership Network
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Notes: This figure illustrates 3 possible scenarios of bank ownership network in this study. Pi stands for parent banks and Si stands
for subsidiary banks. Scenario 1 is the case that both parent banks and subsidiary bank are located in non-GIIPS countries thus this
banking group is not exposed to the crisis. Scenario 2 shows that one subsidiary of the banking group is located in GIIPS country
thus there is a possibility that the liquidity shock received by S4 could be transmitted to the parent bank P2 and the other subsidiary
bank S2. The last possible scenario is that the parent bank is located in GIIPS country. In this case, it is very likely that the liquidity
shock received by the parent bank would be transmitted to S3 through the ownership linkage.
identified cross-country bank ownership networks. In order to do this, an exposure
measurement is constructed at the banking group level, indicating the extent to
which the subsidiary banks in a banking group are exposed to the crisis. The
measurement can be given by the equation below
Exposureit =
∑
k
Assetsikt
Total Assetsit
× CDSkt
where i identifies the banking group, t denotes time point and k stands for each
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GIIPS country. TotalAssetsit is the total assets of the parent banks of the banking
group. The first term captures the extent to which the banking groups are involved
with the business in GIIPS countries, thus the exposure of the banking group to
the crisis. The second term, CDSkt captures the intensity of the crisis in different
countries. Therefore the exposure of each subsidiary bank outside of the GIIPS
countries is given by the calculated exposure of the banking group.
Figure 2.7: Example of a Simple Network
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Notes: This figure illustrates an example of a simple network in scenario 2 where the parent bank P is located in non-GIIPS country.
Figure 2.7 illustrates an example of a simple bank ownership network across
European countries, as in scenario 2. The parent bank of this banking business
group is located in a non-GIIPS European country, say France, while it has two
subsidiaries in GIIPS countries, S2 in Greece (GR) and S3 in Italy (IT ). There
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are also two subsidiary banks S1 and S4 located in non-GIIPS countries, which
could be both domestic subsidiaries in France or foreign subsidiaries in countries
like Germany or the UK. The exposure to the crisis for S1 and S4 at time t are then
given by the exposure of this banking group X at time t:
ExposureXt =
AssetsS2t × CDSGRt + AssetsS3t × CDSIT t
Total AssetsXt
where Total AssetsXt = AssetsPt +
4∑
i=1
AssetsSit
2.3.3 Theory and Hypothesis
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) propose an incentive model for financial intermedia-
tion. This model suggests that the moral hazard problem of firms as a borrower
can be alleviated by monitoring from banks, but banks as financial intermediators
can neglect to monitor and thus also generate a moral hazard problem to deposi-
tors (indirect investors). In this case, banks’ loanable funds and firms’ investment
spending are determined by the stock of bank capital and firm collateral. Both a
credit crunch caused by a capital shock on banking system and a collateral squeeze
in the real economy can reduce the loanable funds and investment spending. Mor-
gan et al. (2004) extend this model to a two-state version to analyse the effect of
inter-state banking on economic volatility in the US during the bank integration
process after 1978. The model shows that the effect of a credit crunch in a state can
be dampened under the interstate banking regime while a collateral squeeze will be
amplified through the internal capital market between banks.
This conceptual framework can easily be extended to the context of multinational
banks where there is some non-negative degree of capital mobility between host
countries. The application of this model for explaining the effect of multinational
37
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banks during the European debt crisis is illustrated in Figure 2.8, with two classical
demand-supply diagrams. The X-axis denotes the loan quantity and Y-axis denotes
loan rate or bank capital return. Consider country 1 as one of the five GIIPS
countries and country 2 as a non-GIIPS European country. The valuation haircut
of the GIIPS debts may reduce the liquidity of banks in country 1 through both the
capital channel and the funding channel, which shifts the bank credit supply curve
to the left, resulting in a lower amount of bank lending and a higher interest rate.
This process is supported by the trend of loan growth and interest spread depicted
in Figure 2.4 and 2.5.
Figure 2.8: Internal Capital Market Hypothesis
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Notes: In the left panel, a liquidity shock at the banking system of Country 1 lead to a lower level of loan supply and a higher
loan interest rate. If Country 2 is connected with Country 1 by bank ownership networks, the model predicts that the shock will
be alleviated in Country 1 but transmitted to Country 2 in the right panel, through the channel of banking group’s internal capital
market.
If there is no multinational banking, the story would end here and nothing would
happen in country 2. However, country 1 and country 2 are connected by bank
ownership networks. Observing higher capital return in country 1, the bank holding
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company or headquarters will reallocate their banking assets across countries, by
reducing their lending in country 2 and increasing credit supply in country 1. The
mitigation of the liquidity shock in country 1 due to the internal capital market is
called the ‘support effect’ by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), whereas the credit
contraction in country 2 is labelled as the ‘contagion effect’ in this essay, since the
liquidity shock spills over through the internal capital market. The major objective
of this study is thus to identify the contagion effect in the banking system of non-
GIIPS countries during the European sovereign debt crisis.
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2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In section 2.3.2, a bank is defined as a parent bank’s subsidiary if 50% or more of its
total equity are directly held by the parent bank. 50% is the natural cutoff which
gives the parent bank absolute control over its subsidiary and hence plausibly part of
the internal capital market. 2 In order to identify banks ownership ties, it extracts
banks’ shareholder information from Bankscope and then links parent banks with
their subsidiaries.3 Finally, bank ownership networks across European countries is
constructed based on banks’ shareholder information in the year of 2010, which is
the starting point of the sovereign debt crisis.
Table 2.1 shows the sample of countries used in this study and the number of
parent banks and subsidiary banks in each country that could be identified from
the data. The data records information for 8,872 banks from which shareholder
information could be observed for 709 subsidiary banks belonging to 281 banking
groups. The sample is limited to include four types of banks: commercial banks,
cooperative banks, mortgage banks, and saving banks. Bank holding companies
are initially included in the sample in order to construct the ownership network,
as the holding company is the most important node in a ownership network. Once
the networks are constructed, bank holding companies are dropped from the sample
because they do not function as the other four types of banks that collect deposit
and originate loans.
As Table 2.1 shows, 455 subsidiary banks are located in Western European coun-
tries while 254 subsidiary banks are based in Eastern Europe. In terms of parent
banks, there are 238 banks from Western Europe and 43 banks are located in East-
2Additionally, the study also explored whether differences emerge between nearly wholly sub-
sidiaries (90–100% ownership) and majority owned subsidiaries (50–90% ownership). Splitting
the sample at this cut-off did not reveal differences between these entities and the results of this
exercise are presented in Section 2.7.4.
3Some banks’ shareholders are also owned by other European banks. In this case, these banks
are all defined as the subsidiaries of the ultimate parent banks.
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Table 2.1: Sample Country, Parent Banks and Subsidiary Banks
Western Europe Eastern Europe
Countries Parent Subsidiary Countries Parent Subsidiary
Andorra 1 2 Albania 1 8
Austria 25 42 Belarus 1 7
Belgium 6 16 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 9
Cyprus 4 7 Bulgaria 1 11
Denmark 12 21 Croatia 1 11
Finland 3 6 Czech Republic 2 9
France 30 91 Estonia 0 4
Germany 35 71 Hungary 2 13
Gibraltar 0 0 Kosovo 0 1
Greece 5 - Latvia 0 9
Iceland 2 1 Lithuania 1 3
Ireland 2 - Macedonia 0 8
Italy 15 - Moldova 0 4
Liechtenstein 1 1 Montenegro 0 3
Luxembourg 7 53 Poland 3 27
Malta 0 2 Romania 1 16
Monaco 1 0 Russia 26 65
Netherlands 11 20 Serbia 0 12
Norway 8 10 Slovakia 0 6
Portugal 3 - Slovenia 2 6
San Marino 0 1 Ukraine 2 22
Spain 3 -
Sweden 7 9
Switzerland 27 46
Turkey 9 7
United Kingdom 21 49
Total 238 455 Total 43 254
Notes: This table shows the sample country for this study and the number of parent banks and subsidiary banks in each country
that could be identified from the database thus included into the ownership network. The categorisation between Eastern and Western
European countries is classified by Bankscope. Initially Bankscope records information for 8,872 banks in the sample countries, from
which shareholder information could be observed for 709 subsidiary banks belonging to 281 banking groups. Subsidiary banks in
GIIPS countries are not included in the sample since this study focus on subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries only.
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ern European countries. Subsidiary banks in GIIPS countries are not included in the
sample since this study focus on subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries only. How-
ever, subsidiary banks are allowed to be owned by parent banks in GIIPS country,
in which case the banking group would be in scenario 3 according to the taxonomy
of the analysis.
Banks’ balance sheet data are also obtained from Bankscope. Bank-level uncon-
solidated data are collected for 709 subsidiary banks and 281 parent banks, from
2008 to 2013, resulting in an unbalanced panel dataset. GDP growth rate and unem-
ployment rate data for the sample banks’ host and home countries are also collected
from the World Bank DataBank. Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for the
variables that used in the following econometric analysis.
The key variable of interest in this study is the subsidiary bank’s exposure to
the crisis. In order to scale the bank’s exposure according to the intensity of the
crisis, CDS spread data for GIIPS country’s 5-year senior debts are collected from
DataStream.4 It takes the average level of sovereign debt CDS spread in December
each year to scale the bank’s exposure. As a result, exposure becomes a time-varying
variable though the ownership network is constant. Since the magnitude of the CDS
spread varies remarkably (as the trends in figure 2 suggest), the magnitude of the
calculated exposure also varies, hence the logarithm of the final exposure variable is
used in order to harmonise the data. Figure 2.9 depicts the distribution of exposure
data for banks with positive exposure to the crisis. Grey bars show the exposure
distribution for subsidiary banks in scenario 2 where the parent banks are located in
non-GIIPS countries, while black bars show the distribution for banks in scenario 3
where their parent banks are located in GIIPS countries. Clearly, banks in scenario
3 tend to have higher exposure than banks in scenario 2, which suggests that the
4The trend of the CDS spread for other types of sovereign debts are highly correlated thus the
CDS spread for 5-year senior debt is used as the indicator for the crisis intensity.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Variable Bank Type Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observation
Bank Level
Loan Growth Subsidiary 10.70 54.97 -100.00 900.00 3,001
Parent 10.68 54.56 -100.00 796.81 822
Size Subsidiary 14.61 2.17 4.22 21.63 3,210
Parent 16.35 2.23 8.65 21.86 955
Deposit Subsidiary 57.57 31.86 0.00 100.00 3,004
Parent 53.11 28.20 0.00 100.00 793
Liquidity Subsidiary 28.70 23.33 0.01 100.00 3,205
Parent 21.33 17.05 0.00 89.37 909
Capital Subsidiary 11.96 13.36 0.25 100.00 3,199
Parent 22.33 28.93 0.00 100.00 944
Interest Margin Subsidiary 3.05 3.76 -3.95 61.49 3,080
Parent 2.28 3.04 -25.20 35.20 862
Profitability Subsidiary 0.31 4.62 -94.33 98.21 3,195
Parent -0.54 13.62 -233.42 35.56 946
Country Level
GDP Growth Host Country 0.77 3.40 -17.95 10.20 4,235
Home Country 0.47 3.11 -14.80 10.20 1,672
Unemployment Host Country 8.07 4.72 2.60 47.50 4,095
Home Country 7.21 3.29 2.60 27.30 1,634
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables that used in our econometric analysis. Bank level data are
obtained from Bankscope while country level data are collected from World Bank. Loan Growth is the annual growth rate of gross
loans, including net loans and also loan loss reserves. This variable is used as the performance indicator for bank’s lending activities.
Size is log of a bank’s total assets, which is a typical measurement for bank size. Deposit is a bank’s customer deposit divided by
its total assets. Liquidity is a bank’s liquid assets over total assets, while Capital is a bank’s total equity over total assets. Interest
Margin is a bank’s net interest margin indicating the bank’s capability in its core business. Profitability is indicated by bank’s return
on total assets. GDP Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP while Unemployment is the unemployment rate for each country in
our sample.
exposure measurement works well because banks in scenario 3 are expected to be
more exposed to the crisis compared with scenario 2 banks.
Figure 2.10 shows the trends of average loan growth rate for banks in different
level of exposure. In the final sample, 525 banks have no exposure to the crisis, thus
these banks are in scenario 1. For positive exposure, 97 banks are categorised into
low exposure group while 85 banks are categorised into high exposure group, based
on the exposure data in 2010. As the figure shows, the lending activity of banks
in all 3 types collapsed between 2007-2009 due to the global financial crisis, and
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Figure 2.9: Exposure Distribution
Notes:This figure depicts the distribution of exposure data for banks with positive exposure to the crisis. Grey bars show the
exposure distribution for subsidiary banks in scenario 2 where the parent banks are located in non-GIIPS country, while black bars
show the distribution for banks in scenario 3 where their parent banks are located in GIIPS country. It clearly shows that banks in
scenario 3 tend to have higher exposure than banks in scenario 2, which suggests that the exposure measurement works well since
banks in scenario 3 are expected to expose more to the crisis compared with scenario 2 banks.
this dynamic can be interpreted as a common trend. However, in the year of 2010,
which is the first year of the European debt crisis, banks in scenario 1 and banks
with lower exposure experienced a strong recovery in their lending growth while
highly exposed banks did not show the same level of recovery. More importantly,
the average lending growth rate for banks with higher exposure continues to drop
in 2011 with the further deterioration of the European debt crisis, and there is no
sign of recovery until 2014. Another thing to be noticed here is that though lending
growth for both scenario 1 banks and lower exposed banks has been recovered since
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Figure 2.10: Trend of Loan Growt Rate, by Exposure Group
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Notes: This figure shows the trends of average loan growth rate for banks with different level of exposure. In the final sample, 525
banks have 0 exposure to the crisis (scenario 1 banks). For those who have positive exposure, 97 banks are categorised into low
exposure group while 85 banks are categorised into high exposure group, base on the exposure data in 2010. As the figure shows, the
lending activity of banks in all 3 types collapsed between 2007-2009 due to the global financial crisis. In 2010, which is the first year
of the European debt crisis, banks in scenario 1 and banks with lower exposure experienced a strong recovery in their lending growth
while highly exposed banks did not recover to the same extent. The average lending growth rate for banks with higher exposure
continues to drop in 2011 with the further deterioration of the European debt crisis, and there is no sign of recovery until 2014.
Though lending growth for both scenario 1 banks and lower exposed banks has been recovered since 2010, the performance of lower
exposed banks is much more volatile than scenario 1 banks during the crisis period.
2010, the performance of lower exposed banks is much more volatile than scenario
1 banks’ during the crisis period. This suggests that the stability of banks’ lending
activity would also be affected even they are just marginally exposed to the crisis.
It also explored whether the decline in loan growth observed over the sample period
varied at points in the distribution other than the mean, but the decline is at all
percentiles.
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2.5 Econometric Method
It employs the method of difference-in-differences (DID) to identify whether the liq-
uidity crisis in GIIPS country’s banking system due to the European sovereign debt
crisis could be transmitted to other European countries through bank’s cross-border
ownership linkages. A conventional DID setting requires two groups: control group
and treatment group; and two periods: pre-treatment period and post-treatment
period. Two dummy variables will be created to indicate whether an observation
gets the treatment or not before and after the implementation of the treatment; and
whether this observation is in pre-treatment period or post-treatment period. It
tests the difference in the difference between the treated group and control group in
the two periods. Thus a significant difference in difference would suggest a significant
treatment effect.
Specifically, the treated groups in the DID analysis are the non-GIIPS-based
banks exposed to the liquidity crisis in a GIIPS country, due to their ownership
linkages with banks in a GIIPS banking system. The control group is represented
by banks without an ownership link with banks in the GIIPS countries (e.g. scenario
1). The year of 2010 is used as the cut-off between the pre- and post-period, since
early 2010 is considered the sating of the debt crisis. In terms of grouping, in
the control group there are 525 (scenario 1), while in the treated sample there are
172 banks with positive exposure (scenario 2 or 3). Note that exposure here is a
continuous variable so it can measure the intensity of the shock.
The specifications of the regression model are illustrated by the equations be-
low. It first applies the conventional DID method to find the treatment effect. As
equation 2.1 shows, the DID method is implemented by the interaction term be-
tween bank’s exposure (treatment) and the dummy variable for post-period. The
estimated coefficient on the interaction term, αˆ2, will examine the hypothesis that
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the subsidiary banks with higher exposure to the crisis would reduce their lending
growth more than those with lower exposure during the crisis.
∆Li,j,t = α1 + α2Expoj,t ∗ Postt +
m∑
k=3
αkXi,t +
n∑
k=m+1
αkXj,t + γt + γi + ξi,j,t (2.1)
∆Li,j,t = β1 +
p∑
k=2
βkExpoj,t ∗ Y eart +
q∑
k=p+1
βkXi,t +
s∑
k=q+1
βkXj,t + γt + γi + i,j,t(2.2)
where
• i stands for each subsidiary bank in the sample;
• j stands for each parent bank/banking group;
• t denotes each year in the sample, ranging from 2008 to 2013;
• ∆Li,j,t is loan growth rate of subsidiary bank i in banking group j at time t;
• Expoj,t is banking group j’s exposure to the crisis at time t;
• Postt is a dummy variable for post-period which takes value 1 if the time is
in between 2010 to 2013; otherwise 0;
• Y eart is time dummy variables, which indicate each year in the sample, ranging
from 2008 to 2013;
• Xi,t is a set of control variables for subsidiary bank i at time t;
• Xj,t is a set of control variables for parent bank j at time t;
• γt is time dummy variables controlling for year effect;
• γi controls for bank level fixed effect for subsidiary bank i;
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• i,j,t is the error term for bank i in group j at time t.
This analysis also applies the dynamic DID method in the robustness check
section. The conventional DID with two periods can only identify whether the
treatment has an effect in the post period, while the dynamic DID allows us to see
the impact of treatment as it evolves over the years in the post period. In other
words, the advantage of dynamic DID method is that it is able to show when the
treatment becomes effective and when the effect dies out. As equation 2.2 shows,
the dynamic DID method is implemented by introducing a interaction term between
bank’s exposure and year dummy variables. The estimated coefficient on this term
shows the effect of a bank’s exposure on bank lending activity in each year over
the sample period, thus the assumption of common trends before the shock can be
inspected.
The dependent variable, Loan Growth, is the annual growth rate of gross loans,
including net loans and also loan loss reserves. As suggested by De Haas and
Van Lelyveld (2010), it captures the changes in loan that is due to changes in
loan loss provisions. This variable is used as the performance indicator for bank’s
lending activities. Finally, the following variables is included into the regressions to
control for both subsidiary and parent characteristics. Size is log of a bank’s total
assets, which is a typical measurement for bank size. Deposit is a bank’s customer
deposit divided by its total assets. This variable indicates bank’s funding stabil-
ity by capturing to what extent the bank is funded by stable customer deposits.
Liquidity is a bank’s liquid assets over total assets, while Capital is a bank’s total
equity over total assets. Liquidity and Capital measure a bank’s risk aversion and
solvency. A higher liquidity/capital ratio indicates that the bank is taking less risk
and is more solvent. Interest Margin is a bank’s net interest margin indicating the
bank’s capability in its core business. Profitability is indicated by bank’s return on
48
2.5. ECONOMETRIC METHOD CHAPTER 2
total assets. Summary statistics for the variables is presented in Table 2.2.
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2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 Baseline Result
The baseline results of this study are presented in Table 2.3. Columns (1) to (3) show
the results from the conventional DID regressions. The first specification does not in-
clude any control variables while the second and third specifications include controls
for the subsidiary’s characteristics and for the parent’s characteristics respectively.
The number of observations decreases as more control variables are included into to
the model. The estimated coefficient on Exposure is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that banks with higher exposure tend to have a higher lending
growth rate during the whole sample period. However, this effect is not significant
once it controls for the characteristics of subsidiary or parent banks, as shown in
columns (2) and (3). Post dummy has a negative coefficient, indicating that the
lending activity of all banks are negatively affected during the crisis, though again
it is not significant once it includes control variables for both subsidiary and parent
banks. The interaction between Exposure and Post dummy is the key term in the
conventional DID regressions and the estimated coefficient on this term shows the
baseline result of the analysis. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant
and is consistent across the each specification. Taking the estimate from column (3)
as an example, the estimated coefficient implies that if a bank’s exposure increases
by 1 percent, the bank’s lending growth rate would decrease by 5.756 percentage
points. The subsidiary bank’s exposure is calculated based on the bank’s ownership
linkages with banks located in GIIPS country where there is a liquidity crisis, thus
it captures to what extent the subsidiary bank is exposed to the crisis due to its
ownership ties. The regression results then show that the ownership linkages be-
tween banks in GIIPS country and bank in Non-GIIPS EU countries transmit the
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liquidity crisis. In other words, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the liquidity
crisis in GIIPS country was transmitted to other European countries through bank
ownership networks.
The estimates include a rich set of control variables. These are presented in the
second and third columns of Table 2.3. They show that the size of a subsidiary
bank is positively and significantly related to the bank’s lending growth rate, and
the effect is large: if the size of the subsidiary bank increases by 1 percent, its
lending growth rate would be 21.9 percentage points higher on average during the
sample period; bank liquidity is negatively related with the loan growth rate and
this effect is also significant: a 1 percentage point increase in a bank’s liquid assets
reduce its loan growth rate by 1.4 percentage points; however, subsidiary bank’s
deposit, capital and profitability are not significantly related with a bank’s lending
activity during the sample period. Apart from bank level controls, host country’s
characteristics controlling for country-level demand-effects also have significant ef-
fects on bank performance. As to be expected, the subsidiary bank’s lending growth
is positively related with the host country’s GDP growth while negatively related
with the unemployment rate. This suggests that the subsidiary banks expand their
credit supply faster in those countries where the economy is growing.
The parent bank’s characteristics are also important for the subsidiary’s lending
activity, as suggested by the internal market hypothesis. As the third panel of
Table 2.3 shows, the interest margin of parent bank is the only significant factor.
Contrary to the findings by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), a parent bank’s
interest margin is negatively related with tis subsidiary’s lending growth. Since
interest margin captures a bank’s capability in its core business, this result suggests
that the subsidiaries of parent banks with better performance tend to have a lower
lending growth rate during the sample period. However, this could be explained
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Table 2.3: Baseline Results
Dependent variable: Diff-in-Diff
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3)
Exposure 5.325** 3.083 7.108
(2.100) (2.257) (4.794)
Post -12.918*** -7.701* -5.017
(2.767) (4.323) (6.730)
Exposure*Post -5.189*** -3.920** -5.756**
(1.476) (1.590) (2.354)
Subsidiary Characteristics
Size 14.546** 21.892**
(6.439) (10.901)
Deposit -0.109 -0.048
(0.161) (0.326)
Capital -0.420 -0.527
(0.533) (0.633)
Profitability 2.779 3.543
(2.623) (3.248)
Liquidity -0.971*** -1.404***
(0.245) (0.434)
Parent Characteristics
Size -8.077
(9.466)
Capital -0.163
(0.321)
Profitability 0.195
(0.319)
Liquidity -0.188
(0.154)
Interest Margin -2.301*
(1.262)
Constant 18.835*** -149.046 -85.719
(2.252) (97.619) (191.716)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,001 2,736 1,616
No. of banks 638 590 393
R2 0.030 0.108 0.158
Notes: This table presents the Baseline results of this study, where the dependent variable is the annual
growth rate of gross loans. We do not include any control variables in the first regression while the second
regression includes controls for subsidiary’s characteristics and then in the third regression we further
include controls for parent’s characteristics (GDP growth and Unemployment rate are also included in the
regressions). Size is log of a bank’s total assets. Deposit is a bank’s customer deposit divided by its total
assets. Liquidity is a bank’s liquid assets over total assets, while Capital is a bank’s total equity over total
assets. Interest Margin is a bank’s net interest margin indicating the bank’s capability in its core business.
Profitability is indicated by bank’s return on total assets. The interaction between Exposure and Post
dummy is the key term in the conventional DID analysis. Overall, the estimates from the conventional DID
method suggest that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries were transmitted to other European countries
though bank’s cross-border ownership linkages. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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by the internal capital market hypothesis that if the parent bank observe better
investment opportunities in the home country, then they would focus more on its own
market rather than support its subsidiary banks abroad, thus the foreign subsidiaries
would have relatively lower lending growth rates. Besides, the control variables for
home country characteristics have no significant effect on a subsidiary bank’s lending
growth. To summaries, the estimates on the control variables only provide weak
evidence on internal market hypothesis.
2.6.2 Bank Heterogeneity
The baseline results suggest that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries’ was trans-
mitted to other European countries through the banks’ cross-border ownership link-
ages. This section disentangles the transmission effect by looking at bank hetero-
geneity. In other words, it examines which characteristics of the banks could help
subsidiary banks to be more resilient to external liquidity shocks, and which char-
acteristics could instead intensify the propagation of the shock.
To do this, the sample is evenly divided into 3 sub-samples according to different
levels of a bank’s pre-crisis balance sheet structure as of 2009. For example, in
terms of the size of the subsidiary banks measured by log of total assets, the level
I sub-sample only includes small banks in the initial sample, while big banks are
categorised into the level III sub-sample, leaving banks in level II of the sub-sample
as medium sized. Then the DID method is implemented with the same estimating
specifications for the sub-samples separately to show whether the transmission effect
varies with the size of the subsidiary banks.
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Subsidiary Characteristics
This section first explores the heterogeneity in the subsidiary banks’ characteristics.
Table 2.4 presents results from the DID regressions. Six types of subsidiary bank
features are tested: size, deposit, profitability, capital, liquidity and interest mar-
gin. The interaction between bank’s exposure and Post dummy variable is the key
variable of interest in these regressions.
The test on bank size shows that smaller banks are more vulnerable to the
external liquidity shock if the subsidiary bank is highly exposed, since the estimated
coefficient on the interaction term is only significant for banks in level I sub-sample.
This could be due to the fact that smaller banks do not have access to various
alternative funding sources, and hence would be more reliant on the funding from
their parent bank. As a result, a liquidity shock received by the parent bank in
the home country could be directly transmitted to smaller subsidiary banks. Larger
subsidiary banks (banks with more assets) have easier access to alternative liquidity
support (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
The influence of a bank’s deposit funding on the transmission effect is then
examined in this section. Previous empirical work by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)
suggests that a bank’s lending activity would be more resilient during the global
financial crisis if the banks had better access to deposit financing and less reliant
on other forms of short-term debt. Thus it is expected that the transmission effect
would be alleviated if the subsidiary banks relies more on deposit funding. However,
weak evidence is found for this argument. As the table shows, the interaction term
is only significant for banks in level II sub-sample, but not significant for level I
or level III banks, though the coefficients are all estimated to be negative. This
suggests that there is no clear trend that banks with more deposit funding would
be more resilient to external liquidity shocks.
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Table 2.4: Heterogeneity in Subsidiary’s Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Level I Level II Level III
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size
Exposure*Post -9.618* -12.343* -2.558 -2.142 -0.485 -0.331
(5.029) (6.421) (2.169) (2.650) (1.191) (1.848)
Observations 768 484 943 574 921 505
No. of Banks 176 125 179 127 171 104
R2 0.132 0.235 0.162 0.217 0.241 0.246
Deposit
Exposure*Post -2.090 -0.681 -8.755*** -7.386* -3.043 -1.837
(2.100) (5.386) (2.918) (3.869) (2.475) (2.718)
Observations 768 484 943 574 921 505
No. of Banks 174 109 173 115 173 130
R2 0.256 0.361 0.158 0.226 0.058 0.150
Profitability
Exposure*Post -10.158** -7.825 -3.774* -4.735 -0.086 -1.570
(4.607) (4.917) (2.059) (3.244) (1.620) (3.011)
Observations 909 532 912 516 808 532
No. of Banks 183 126 175 116 167 112
R2 0.112 0.155 0.146 0.205 0.240 0.215
Capital
Exposure*Post -0.257 0.817 -6.259* -2.157 -4.839** -11.265**
(1.730) (2.892) (3.317) (2.205) (2.271) (5.233)
Observations 876 502 924 547 832 514
No. of Banks 168 109 179 122 179 125
R2 0.126 0.186 0.090 0.259 0.168 0.244
Liquidity
Exposure*Post 0.900 -0.473 -4.628** -8.435** -6.634 -4.824
(1.279) (2.156) (2.277) (4.146) (4.499) (4.426)
Observations 873 520 930 591 829 452
No. of Banks 169 111 181 130 176 115
R2 0.266 0.305 0.151 0.198 0.115 0.208
Interest Margin
Exposure*Post -7.797 -13.763*** -1.419 -0.018 -3.399 -7.945**
(4.724) (5.210) (1.744) (2.645) (2.160) (3.701)
Observations 789 377 917 594 836 557
No. of Banks 159 91 176 131 174 126
R2 0.097 0.237 0.130 0.221 0.240 0.322
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents test results for heterogeneity in subsidiary bank’s characteristics. Refer to Table 2.3 for full specifications.
It shows that smaller bank is more vulnerable to the external liquidity shock if the subsidiary bank is highly exposed; that higher
profitability would alleviate the external liquidity shock that transmitted from foreign parent banks to domestic subsidiaries; that
bank with more capital would be more cautious on expanding their credit during the crisis period; that there is trend that banks
with more liquid assets would reduce their lending growth more during the crisis; and that there is no clear evidence suggesting that
bank’s interest margin would affect subsidiary banks lending activities during the crisis period. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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In terms of bank’s profitability, panel three shows that the interaction term
is negative and significant if the bank has a lower ROA (level I), while it is not
significant for level III banks where banks’ ROA are relatively higher. Though the
interaction term is also marginally significant for level II banks, there is still evidence
that higher profitability would alleviate the external liquidity shock that transmitted
from foreign parent banks to domestic subsidiaries.
Bank capital and liquidity are tested as a measurement for a bank’s risk aversion
that could have a negative effect on a bank’s loan growth performance; or as a
indicator for a bank’s capital or liquidity constraints to expand their loan business
thus could also be positively related with a bank’s lending activity. De Haas and
Van Lelyveld (2010) show that subsidiary banks’ capital and liquidity conditions are
negatively related with their lending growth, suggesting that subsidiary banks with
higher capital ratios and more liquid assets would be more risk-averse thus tend to
have a lower lending growth rate. Moreover, Black and Strahan (2002) suggest that
less capitalised subsidiary banks are more likely to expand credit quickly due to
moral hazard. These tests would show the effect of bank capital and liquid assets on
a bank’s lending growth when their parent bank is suffering from a liquidity crisis.
As the table shows, the interaction term is only significant for the level III sample
where banks are better capitalised, while for less capitalised banks in level I the effect
is estimated as small and insignificant. This implies that a bank with more capital
would be more cautious on expanding their credit during the crisis period. In terms
of a bank’s liquidity condition, the effect is similar with bank capital. It shows that
the interaction term is only significant for level II banks with a medium level of
liquid assets, while it is not significant for banks in levels I and III. However, if we
compare the estimated coefficient for level I and level III banks, there is a very clear
trend that banks with more liquid assets would reduce their lending growth more
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during the crisis. These findings show that a liquidity crisis in a home country could
intensify a subsidiary bank’s moral hazard problem.
It also tests the influence of a bank’s interest margin, which reflects a bank’s
capability in their core business. However, there is no clear evidence suggesting
that these factors would affect subsidiary banks lending activities during the crisis
period. Thus the transmission effect of ownership linkages is not likely to be affected
by this characteristic of the subsidiary bank.
Parent Characteristics
This section repeats the analysis above by considering the parent banks’ character-
istics. The liquidity shock in home country is transmitted from parent banks to
subsidiary banks located in the host countries thus it is reasonable to test whether
parent banks’ characteristics would affect the transmission effect, as the internal
capital market hypothesis suggests. It tests four types of parent banks’ character-
istics: profitability, capital, liquidity and interest margin. Table 2.5 presents the
results for the heterogeneity tests.
The test for parent banks’ profitability shows that the interaction term is only
significant in the level III sample where the parent banks have a better profitability.
This suggests that if the ROA of the parent bank is higher then its foreign subsidiary,
the bank tends to have a lower lending growth during crisis period. A higher profit of
a bank may due to higher risks which may be adversely affected during the liquidity
crisis. As a result, the bank’s foreign subsidiaries may also be affected as they may
highly rely on funding from their internal capital market.
It then explores the effect of a parent bank’s capital and liquidity. The results
in Table 2.5 show that if the parent bank is better capitalised then the liquidity
shock would be more likely to transmit to its foreign subsidiary banks, since the
interaction term is only significant for the sample of level III. The parent bank’s
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liquidity condition is also negatively related to the subsidiary bank’s lending growth
during the crisis period. On one hand, this could be due to the fact that better
capitalised banks and banks with more liquid assets are more risk-averse, thus these
banks tend to cut funding support towards their foreign subsidiary banks during the
crisis period. On the other hand, the moral hazard problem is amplified due to the
liquidity crisis, thus less capitalised banks and banks with less liquid assets tend to
take more risk to expand their credit by supporting foreign subsidiary banks.
Finally, this section tests whether the transmission effect could be affected by
the capability of parent banks in the core business, which is indicated by the bank’s
interest margin. The interest margin test shows that the interaction term is only
significant for the level I sample where the parent bank has a lower interest margin.
This suggests that subsidiary banks’ lending activity would be significantly affected
during the crisis period if their parent bank has a low interest margin, while the
negative effect is not significant for subsidiary banks with a parent bank that has
higher interest margin. The results from the test imply that if the parent bank has
a better performance in its core business, it would be able to keep supporting their
foreign subsidiary banks during the crisis period thus the subsidiary banks’ lending
growth rate would not be significantly affected. Conversely, if the core business
performance of the parent bank is inferior, then a liquidity shock hitting the parent
bank would be transmitted to its foreign subsidiary banks.
Overall, the analysis on the heterogeneity in a parent bank’s characteristics pro-
vide strong evidence for the internal capital market hypothesis. It shows that a
parent bank’s balance sheet structures and business capability have significant ef-
fect on the subsidiary bank’s lending activity during the crisis. It is noticeable that
the transmission effect is not affected by the subsidiary bank’s own interest margin
and weakness indicator, but can be significantly affected by parent bank’s interest
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity in Parent’s Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Level I Level II Level III
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability
Exposure*Post -0.440 -9.760 -5.065 -4.583 -11.671** -10.111**
(1.548) (9.740) (3.187) (2.786) (5.267) (4.887)
Observations 642 468 634 605 542 483
Number of Banks 135 117 134 132 121 112
R2 0.098 0.170 0.292 0.308 0.149 0.176
Capital
Exposure*Post -1.528 0.974 -3.420 -6.143 -22.717*** -24.039***
(2.773) (2.880) (2.257) (3.961) (7.455) (9.070)
Observations 619 600 682 642 519 314
Number of Banks 137 134 145 142 109 85
R2 0.163 0.155 0.215 0.258 0.195 0.336
Liquidity
Exposure*Post -0.040 -1.562 -4.161 -5.868 -4.267* -6.917*
(1.510) (1.738) (3.892) (6.216) (2.506) (3.714)
Observations 573 433 608 569 584 551
Number of Banks 120 109 135 131 124 120
R2 0.202 0.224 0.167 0.197 0.217 0.284
Interest Margin
Exposure*Post -4.766* -11.053*** 0.092 -4.812 6.325 1.783
(2.870) (3.988) (2.402) (4.554) (7.766) (3.542)
Observations 590 533 559 539 559 483
Number of Banks 126 120 118 117 125 123
R2 0.179 0.250 0.118 0.168 0.252 0.283
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the test results for the heterogeneity in parent bank’s characteristics. Year fixed effect and bank level
fixed effect are controlled in each regression. Refer to Table 2.3 for full specifications. The test for parent bank’s profitability suggests
that if the ROA of parent bank is higher then its foreign subsidiary banks tend to have a lower lending growth during crisis period.
Capital test shows that if the parent bank is better capitalised then the liquidity shock would be more likely to transmit to its foreign
subsidiary banks. Parent bank’s liquidity condition is also negatively related with subsidiary bank’s lending growth during the crisis
period. The interest margin test suggests that subsidiary banks’ lending activity would be significantly affected during the crisis
period if their parent bank have a low interest margin, while the negative effect is not significant for subsidiary banks with a parent
bank that has higher interest margin. Overall, the analysis on the heterogeneity in parent bank’s characteristics provide evidence for
internal capital market hypothesis. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
margin and weakness, which clearly identifies that the liquidity crisis is transmitted
through the internal capital market operating within a bank ownership network.
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2.6.3 Subsidiary Location: West vs. East
In this section, it separates the sample according to the subsidiary bank’s location to
explore the difference between the subsidiaries banks located in Western European
countries and those in Eastern European countries. By doing this, it examines
whether the strength of the crisis transmission is contingent on the operating country
of the subsidiary bank. In particular, are foreign banks in developing economies
less resilient to an external liquidity shock than those foreign banks in developed
economies?
As Table 2.6 shows, the estimates on the interaction term are statistically sig-
nificant without parent bank controls, and the size of the negative effect is similar
for subsidiary banks located in both Western and Eastern Europe. However, once
it controls for parent characteristics in Columns (3) and (6), a relatively greater
negative effect is estimated for Eastern European banks while the interaction term
is not statistically significant for banks located in Western European countries.
This result suggests that banks located in developing countries (Eastern Europe)
are more fragile when facing an external shock, compared with banks located in de-
veloped countries (Western Europe). One possible explanation is that subsidiary
banks operating in developing countries are more dependent on their parent banks’
liquidity support, as the financial sector is usually less developed in developing coun-
tries. For banks operating in a developed financial system, they would have easier
access to alternative funding even if their parent banks or the banking group as a
whole are suffering from a liquidity shock. One policy implication can be drawn
here. Regulatory authorities in developing countries might wish to target liquidity
regulation specifically at foreign subsidiary banks operating in their domestic bank-
ing sector. This could be justified if, as suspected, a higher dependency on parent
bank funding harms the stability of the domestic banking system should an external
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Table 2.6: Subsidiary Location: West vs East
Dependent Variable: West European Banks East European Banks
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 5.732** 4.24 5.284 5.258* 1.889 9.576
-2.883 -2.853 -4.228 -2.883 -3.481 -9.101
Post -7.264** -8.596** -10.393 -22.535*** -7.742 -0.751
-2.898 -4.323 -6.324 -5.878 -11.339 -14.118
Exposure*Post -4.569** -4.184* -3.023 -5.966*** -4.465** -10.210***
-2.298 -2.301 -2.29 -1.885 -2.087 -3.740
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,913 1,764 932 1,088 972 684
No. of Banks 393 367 224 245 223 169
R2 0.03 0.067 0.124 0.057 0.213 0.252
Notes: This table shows the results for bank heterogeneity in terms of the bank’s location. Refer to Table 2.3 for full specifications.
The estimates on the interaction term are consistently significant without parent bank controls, and the size of the negative effect
are similar for subsidiary banks located in both Western and Eastern Europe. However, once we control for parent characteristics in
Column (3) and (6), a relatively greater negative effect is estimated for Eastern European banks while the interaction term is not
statistically significant for banks located in Western European countries. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
liquidity shock occur.
2.6.4 Parent Location: Scenario 2 vs. Scenario 3
This section explores the heterogeneity in terms of parent banks’ location. The main
sample is divided into three sub-samples according to the three possible scenarios
for the subsidiary banks. As mentioned in Section 2.3, there are three possible
scenarios of the bank ownership network in the empirical setting of the analysis.
Scenario 1 is the case where both the parent and subsidiary banks are located in
non-GIIPS countries, thus they have no exposure to the crisis. In scenario 2, certain
subsidiary banks from a banking group are located in GIIPS countries, thus their
peer subsidiary banks located in non-GIIPS countries are indirectly exposed to the
crisis due to the ownership linkages. Scenario 3 is where the parent bank of a banking
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group is located in the GIIPS countries, thus subsidiary banks in this banking group
are highly exposed to the crisis, though they are located in Non-GIIPS countries.
The main sample is then separated in to two sub-samples according to the sub-
sidiary banks’ scenario. Notice that subsidiary banks in Scenario 1 are always in-
cluded in the sub-sample as they are the control group in the DID regressions.
Results are presented in Table 2.7. It shows that the negative and significant result
is mainly driven by subsidiary bank in Scenario 3, as the estimates for Scenario 2
banks are consistently insignificant. This implies that subsidiary banks located in
non-GIIPS countries that are indirectly exposed to the crisis were not significantly
affected by the external liquidity shock, suggesting that the parent bank could act
as a buffer which could isolate external shocks and stop the crisis transmission.
Table 2.7: Parent Location: Scenario 2 vs Scenario 3
Dependent Variable: Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 0.593 0.161 -3.37 5.963*** 3.341 17.260**
-2.379 -3.013 -8.333 -2.195 -2.656 -7.04
Post -12.530*** -6.692 -5.18 -14.105*** -10.282** -8.674
-2.87 -4.519 -7.597 -2.959 -4.755 -7.665
Exposure*Post -0.891 -1.12 1.063 -5.541*** -4.011** -8.886***
-1.956 -2.321 -4.582 -1.606 -1.853 -2.935
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,655 2,403 1,336 2,579 2,342 1,256
No. of Banks 566 523 334 550 506 314
R2 0.02 0.11 0.154 0.031 0.116 0.193
Notes: This table presents results for the Scenario test. Refer to Table 2.3 for full specifications. In scenario 2 the parent bank of
a banking group is located in non-GIIPS countries, and subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries are indirectly exposed to the crisis;
while in scenario 3 the parent bank is located in GIIPS countries thus the subsidiary banks are directly exposed to the crisis. It shows
that the negative and significant result is mainly driven by subsidiary bank in Scenario 3, as the estimates for Scenario 2 banks are
consistently insignificant. This implies that subsidiary banks located in non-GIIPS countries that are indirectly exposed to the crisis
were not significantly affected by the external liquidity shock, as the parent bank could act as a buffer which could isolate external
shocks and stop the crisis transmission. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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This analysis also presents an implication for policy makers. The performance
of the foreign banks in domestic banking system are increasingly important, partic-
ularly in developing economies. Therefore, as argued above, it could be necessary
for the regulatory authorities to monitor a foreign bank’s parent bank and the eco-
nomic and financial situation in its home country. In addition, the analysis in this
section suggests that it is not so necessary to supervise the parent bank’s operations
in other countries, apart from its home country, as a liquidity shock received by a
subsidiary bank in other countries would be isolated by the parent bank. Hence the
shock would be less likely to affect the domestic banking system.
2.6.5 Network Distance to the Crisis: Level 1 vs. Level 2+
Subsidiaries
As the bank ownership network is constructed based on the banks’ direct ownership
linkages, it allows us to observe the position of a single subsidiary bank in the
network hierarchy. Given this feature of the data, the analysis is able to explore the
heterogeneity in the banks’ ‘network distance’ to the crisis. In other words, it tests
how far the liquidity crisis can be transmitted through the bank ownership network.
A Level 1 connection is defined as the connection between the parent bank and
its immediate subsidiary bank, while a Level 2 connection is the connection through
which the parent bank owns the subsidiary bank’s subsidiaries. In this case, the
network distance between Level 2+ banks and the parent bank is longer than Level
1 banks. As the crisis would be transmitted from the parent bank to the subsidiary
banks in the sample, Level 1 bank are at the front line of the ownership network
facing the crisis, while Level 2+ banks are farer from the crisis in the network.
The regression results in Table 2.8 show that the estimated coefficients on the
DID term are consistently statistically significant for Level 1 banks across different
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Table 2.8: Network Distance to the Crisis: Level 1 vs Level 2+ Con-
nections
Dependent Variable: Level 1 Connection Level 2+ Connection
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 8.876*** 4.652 11.290** 5.214 0.275 7.556
-3.287 -5.087 -4.841 -3.594 -2.828 -10.996
Post -13.872*** -8.222* -5.526 -7.883 -10.38 -10.042
-3.018 -4.372 -6.825 -7.018 -11.615 -24.2
Exposure*Post -5.850*** -3.872* -5.583** -6.707* -3.684 -16.874*
-1.649 -2.237 -2.421 -3.524 -2.826 -8.892
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,285 2,091 1,286 716 645 330
No. of Banks 566 523 334 550 506 314
R2 0.032 0.162 0.215 0.039 0.109 0.267
Notes: This table shows regression results for the heterogeneity test in banks’ network distance to the crisis. Refer to Table 2.3
for full specifications. Level 1 connection is the connection between the parent bank and its immediate subsidiary bank, while Level
2 connection is the connection through which the parent bank owns the subsidiary bank’s subsidiaries. In this case, the network
distance between Level 2+ banks and the parent bank is longer than Level 1 banks. As the crisis would be transmitted from the
parent bank to the subsidiary banks in the sample, Level 1 bank are at the front line of the ownership network facing the crisis, while
Level 2+ banks are farer from the crisis in the network. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term are consistently significant
for Level 1 banks across different models while for Level 2 banks the coefficients are estimated less significant. It implies that the
bank ownership network could act as a liquidity crisis transmission while its power would be limited to the Level 1 connections.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
models while for Level 2 banks the coefficients are not consistently significant at
conventional levels. This implies that the bank ownership network could act as a
liquidity crisis transmission while its power would be limited to the Level 1 connec-
tions, as the negative effect on Level 2+ banks is weaker. This result implies that
subsidiary banks can also act as a buffer thus alleviating the liquidity shock within
the network, and stop the crisis being transmitted further. This is consistent with
the implication from the previous analysis on banks in different scenarios. Both
analyses could help policy makers to consider the extent to which the foreign banks
and their parent banks need to be supervised and regulated.
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2.7 Robustness Checks
2.7.1 Dynamic Difference-in-Differences
This section estimates the dynamic DID method to examine the main hypothesis;
results are presented in Table 2.9. The estimated coefficient on Exposure is still
positive and statistically significant; this is consistent with the estimates from the
conventional DID regressions. The key terms in these regressions are the interac-
tions between Exposure and year dummy variables, rather than the Post dummy
variables in the conventional DID method. The interaction with the dummy variable
for the year of 2008 is the omitted base year. As Table 2.9 shows, the estimated
coefficients on the interactions between Exposure and dummy for the year 2009
are negative but not statistically significant, which suggests that the difference in
lending growth between highly exposed banks and less exposed banks in the year of
2009 are not statistically different from the year of 2008. This implies that there is
a common trend between bank’s lending activity over the pre-crisis period, which
satisfies one of the key assumptions of the DID approach. Then, the interaction
terms become significant starting from the year of 2010 which is the first year of the
crisis. As column (1) shows, the estimates on interaction terms for each year in the
crisis period are negative and significant and the size of the effect is considerable,
suggesting that bank’s exposure has a long-term negative effect on bank’s lending
activity. However, once subsidiary bank’s characteristics are included as control
variables in column (2), both the significance and size of the interaction estimates
decrease, especially for the years of 2012 and 2013. Moreover, as column (3) results
show, once we add parent bank’s characteristics in to the regression, the significance
drops further, and the negative number for the year of 2013 is no longer significant.
Overall this implies that bank’s exposure has a pronounced effect during the crisis
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period (2010-2012), but it reverts back to the mean in 2013.
Table 2.9: Robustness Checks: Dynamic Difference-in-Differences
Dependent variable: Dynamic DID
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3)
Exposure 6.873*** 4.611* 8.428
(-2.558 (-2.682) (-5.401)
Exposure * 2009 -2.977 -3.391 -3.117
(-2.319 (-2.455) (-2.387)
Exposure * 2010 -5.787** -4.989** -6.512**
(-2.294 (-2.304) (-3.027)
Exposure * 2011 -7.635*** -6.350*** -7.922**
(-2.167 (-2.180) (-3.129)
Exposure * 2012 -6.117*** -4.820** -6.592*
(-2.145 (-2.200) (-3.581)
Exposure * 2013 -6.663*** -5.563** -5.714
(-2.027 (-2.158) (-3.791)
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,001 2,736 1,616
No. of Banks 638 590 393
R2 0.032 0.11 0.16
Notes: This table shows the robustness check for the baseline result with a dynamic DID setting. Refer
to Table 2.3 for full specifications. Year effect and bank level fixed effect are controlled in each regression.
We do not include any control variables in the first regression while the second regression includes controls
for subsidiary’s characteristics and then in the third regression we further include controls for parent’s
characteristics. The number of observations decreases as we include more control variables into the model
due to data availability. The interactions between Exposure and year dummy variables are the key term in
the dynamic DID regressions. Overall, the estimates from the dynamic DID approach are consistent with
the findings from the conventional DID method that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries were transmitted
to other European countries though bank’s cross-border ownership linkages. What is more, the dynamic
DID regressions show that the transmission effect is most effective in 2011 when the GIIPS crisis reach the
peak, and it dies out in the year of 2013 as the crisis is mitigated in most GIIPS countries. Significance
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Another implication from the dynamic DID analysis is that the magnitude of the
negative effect of bank’s exposure reaches its highest level in 2011, when the GIIPS
sovereign debt crisis also peaked, as suggested by Figure 2. This trend is consistently
predicted by all three models. Looking at column (3), for instance, banks with 1
percent higher exposure would reduce their lending growth rate by 6.51 percentage
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points in the year of 2010, while in 2011 these banks would reduce lending growth
rate by 7.9 percentage points, compared with the lending growth rate in the base
year, 2008. In 2012, the negative effect of exposure on loan growth rate reduces
to 6.59 percentage points, and it is only significant at 10 percent level. This effect
drops further in the year of 2013, and becomes no longer significant.
2.7.2 Dynamic Ownership Network
The baseline results of the analysis are estimated based on a static bank owner-
ship network, which is constructed with bank ownership data in December 2010.
Throughout the analysis, it assumes that the ownership network did not change
over the sample period. However, the networks may have changed over the crisis
period. The reason why the analysis initially focused on a static network is that the
direct ownership data in Bankscope is not consistently recorded for bank in each
year. Some ownership linkages are not recorded in a specific year while they appear
in later periods. In this case, a dynamic network may no be accurate due to the
noises created by missing ownership data in the database.
In this section, the DID analysis is conducted based on a dynamic ownership net-
work as a robustness check for the baseline result. The dynamic ownership network
is constructed year by year using the time varying ownership data. The regression
results are presented in Table 2.10. It reveals that the estimated coefficient on the
key terms are qualitatively the same as the baseline results. Overall, the robust-
ness checks confirm the baseline results that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries
were transmitted to other European countries through bank’s cross-border owner-
ship linkages.
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Table 2.10: Robustness Check: Dynamic Ownership Network
Dependent Variable: Conventional DID
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3)
Exposure 2.461 0.84 1.94
(-1.736) (-1.878) (-2.716)
Post -11.940*** -9.876** -12.476**
(-3.066) (-4.073) (-4.905)
Exposure*Post -4.617*** -3.385** -3.829**
(-1.491) (-1.564) (-1.725)
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,753 2,519 1,899
No. of Banks 575 531 462
R2 0.029 0.08 0.11
Notes: This table shows the robustness check for the baseline result with a dynamic ownership network,
which is constructed year by year using the time varying ownership data. Refer to Table 2.3 for full
specifications. The estimated coefficient on the key terms are qualitatively the same with the baseline
results. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
2.7.3 Different Crisis Timing
Following the literature (Popov and Van Horen, 2015; De Marco, 2013), the previous
analysis uses the year of 2010 as a cut-off between the pre- and post-period of the
debt crisis in the GIIPS countries. A potential concern with this setting is that it
may be appropriate for the crises in Greece, Spain, and Ireland but not in Portugal
or Italy, as the sovereign shocks from these two countries actually were materialised
in 2011. Thus, it maybe preferable to use the year during which a crisis starts in
a country as this country’s Year 0 and then use years -2, -1, +1, and +2, etc. to
label the years as pre- and post-period, to analyse a banking network’s exposure
to a country in relation to the crisis in that country. This procedure may produce
stronger results.
This section examines whether the baseline results could be affected by a different
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Table 2.11: Robustness Check: Different Crisis Timing
Dependent Variable: Original Results New Crisis Timing
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 5.325** 3.083 7.108 5.190*** 3.016 6.39
-2.1 -2.257 -4.794 -1.988 -2.164 -4.794
Post -12.918*** -7.701* -5.017 16.427* 11.945 30.122**
-2.767 -4.323 -6.73 -9.702 -10.573 -11.721
Post * Exposure -5.189*** -3.920** -5.756** -5.112*** -3.866** -5.326**
-1.476 -1.59 -2.354 -1.409 -1.526 -2.325
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,001 2,736 1,616 3,001 2,736 1,616
No. of Banks 638 590 393 638 590 393
R2 0.03 0.108 0.158 0.049 0.141 0.196
Notes: This table shows results from the robustness check for the baseline result with a different crisis timing. Refer to Table 2.3 for
full specifications. It defines the crisis dummy Post equal to 1 for Greece, Ireland and Spain from 2010 onward; otherwise 0. Meanwhile
it defines Post equal to 1 for Italy and Portugal from 2011 onward; otherwise 0. As it shows, the regression results with the new crisis
timing turn out to be consistent with the baseline results, and the magnitude of the effect is estimated to be very close in each model.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
timing of the crisis period. First, it defines the crisis dummy Post equal to 1 for
Greece, Ireland and Spain from 2010 onward; otherwise 0. Meanwhile it defines Post
equal to 1 for Italy and Portugal from 2011 onward; otherwise 0. The results are
presented in Table 2.11, along with the original results. As it shows, the regression
results with the new crisis timing turn out to be consistent with the baseline results,
and the magnitude of the effect is estimated to be very close in each model.
In addition, the new crisis timing is also introduced into the dynamic DID re-
gressions. The crisis dummies are created for each GIIPS country in each year. For
example, the dummy variable Crisis + 1 is defined to be equal to 1 for Greece, Ire-
land and Spain in 2010; otherwise 0. But the same dummy variable is defined to be
equal to 1 for Italy and Portugal in 2011; otherwise 0. The results from the dynamic
DID regressions with this new crisis timing are presented in Table 2.12, along with
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Table 2.12: Dynamic DID with different crisis timing
Dependent Variable: Original Results New Crisis Timing
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 6.873*** 4.611* 8.428 0.869 -0.639 4.88
-2.558 -2.682 -5.401 -1.304 -1.303 -4.519
Exposure * 2009 -2.977 -3.391 -3.117
-2.319 -2.455 -2.387
Exposure * 2010 -5.787** -4.989** -6.512**
-2.294 -2.304 -3.027
Exposure * 2011 -7.635*** -6.350*** -7.922**
-2.167 -2.18 -3.129
Exposure * 2012 -6.117*** -4.820** -6.592*
-2.145 -2.2 -3.581
Exposure * 2013 -6.663*** -5.563** -5.714
-2.027 -2.158 -3.791
Exposure * Crisis - 1 -1.201 -2.556 -1.187
-1.929 -1.879 -2.195
Exposure * Crisis + 1 -3.259** -3.422** -4.006*
-1.531 -1.432 -2.391
Exposure * Crisis + 2 -2.932*** -2.386** -5.885***
-1.01 -0.971 -1.928
Exposure * Crisis + 3 -1.952* -1.127 -3.692
-1.014 -0.973 -2.8
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 3,001 2,736 1,616 3,001 2,736 1,616
No. of Banks 638 590 393 638 590 393
R2 0.032 0.11 0.16 0.027 0.107 0.159
Notes: This table shows results from the robustness check for the dynamic DID regressions with a different crisis timing. Refer to Table
2.3 for full specifications. The crisis dummies are created for each GIIPS country in each year. For example, the dummy variable Crisis
+ 1 is defined to be equal to 1 for Greece, Ireland and Spain in 2010; otherwise 0. But the same dummy variable is defined to be equal to
1 for Italy and Portugal in 2011; otherwise 0. As it shows, the estimations from the new regressions are again consistent with the original
results. Furthermore, the common trend assumption holds in both settings. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
the original results. The estimations from the new regressions are again consistent
with the original results. Furthermore, the common trend assumption holds in both
settings.
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2.7.4 Definition of the Subsidiary Bank
Another concern related to the empirical setting is related to the definition of a
subsidiary bank in a bank ownership network. In the previous analysis, an effective
ownership linkage between parent and subsidiary banks is defined by a control stake
where the parent bank holds 50% or more of the subsidiary bank’s total equity.
However, the ownership level of subsidiaries may create some noise in the results.
For example, 50% ownership may not be as strong as 90% ownership in affecting
the contagion. If a bank is only 50% owned by the parent may have more room to
resist influence from the parent than a bank that is 90% owned by the parent. This
section explores the heterogeneity among subsidiary banks with different levels of
the ownership linkages.
Table 2.13: Distribution of Different Level of Ownership Linkages
Ownership Level No. of Banks No. of Obs. Percent Cum.
50% 59% 66 340 11.28 11.3
60% 69% 26 131 4.34 15.6
70% 79% 40 210 6.97 22.6
80% 89% 26 123 4.08 26.7
90% 100% 481 2,211 73.33 100
Total 639 3,015 100 -
Notes: This table shows the number of subsidiary banks with different level of the ownership linkages in the sample.
As it shows, over 70 percent of ownership linkages in the sample are more than 90% owned. In other words, most of the
entities are close to wholly owned subsidiaries rather than joint ventures.
As Table 2.13 shows, over 70 percent of ownership linkages in the sample are
more than 90% owned. In other words, most of the entities are close to wholly
owned subsidiaries rather than joint ventures. Based on this fact, the main sample
is split into two sub-samples using 90% as the cut-off. The baseline regression is
then performed with the two sub-samples separately, and the results are presented
in Table 2.14. As it shows, the DID term for the group with stronger ownership ties
is consistent with the baseline results and statistically significant. For the weaker
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ownership links, the estimated coefficients are similar but the standard errors are
larger given the smaller number of observations in the group. So overall, there is
not much evidence of heterogeneity in the effect size.
Table 2.14: Subsidiary Banks with Different Levels of Ownership
Linkages
Dependent Variable: 50% - 90% 90% - 100%
Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 20.414* 21.9 29.460* 8.726** 10.020** 10.820**
-12.262 -17.939 -16.848 -3.439 -4.273 -5.056
Post -10.400** -16.189** -5.205 -14.050*** -5.469 -6.518
-4.974 -6.219 -8.89 -3.13 -4.831 -7.501
Post * Exposure -8.837** -9.835 -6.323 -5.712*** -5.633*** -5.529**
-4.217 -6.056 -4.982 -1.749 -1.963 -2.291
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 804 758 442 2,211 1,992 1,268
No. of Banks 158 152 104 481 439 312
R2 0.054 0.088 0.103 0.031 0.138 0.167
Notes: This table shows results from the test for heterogeneity among bank with different levels of ownership linkages. Refer to
Table 2.3 for full specification. As it shows, the DID term for the group with stronger ownership ties is consistent with the baseline
results and statistically significant. For the weaker ownership links, the estimated coefficients are similar but the standard errors are
larger given the smaller number of observations in the group. Overall, there is no clear evidence of heterogeneity in the effect size.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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2.8 Conclusion
Over the past two decades, the world’s economies are increasingly interconnected
through bank ownership ties. There has been a substantial increase in foreign bank
ownership in the domestic banking system. As such, it is important to understand
the possible consequences of the interconnectedness of the global banking system.
It has been argued that the presence of foreign banks can stimulate competition and
innovation in domestic banking system thus improving the overall efficiency of the
financial sector. This should have a long-term positive effect on the development of
the domestic economy. However, a large proportion of foreign owned banks could
expose the domestic baking system to international liquidity crises. This chapter
examined whether a liquidity crisis can be transmitted internationally through a
bank’s cross-border ownership linkages.
The 2010 European debt crisis provided a unique opportunity to identify this
transmission. The ownership network for international banks operating in the
European countries was constructed, based on the ownership data provided by
Bankscope. Then the exposure to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries was cal-
culated for each subsidiary bank located in non-GIIPS countries, measured by the
proportion of their banking groups’ assets in GIIPS countries. The Difference-in-
Differences method was implemented to examine the transmission effect. The results
from the DID regressions show that the treatment has a negative and significant ef-
fect on a bank’s lending growth rate during the crisis period, and the magnitude of
the effect is large. Overall the results of this study suggest that subsidiary banks
operating in non-GIIPS countries who were exposed to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS
countries due to the ownership linkages tend to have a lower lending growth rate
during the crisis period, compared with those who were not exposed. This, in turn,
suggests that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries banking system was transmitted
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to other European countries through cross-border bank ownership linkages.
This study also presents opportunities for future work. While the current data
has allowed this study to identify ownership ties, given the relatively small number
of observations within GIIPS countries and incomplete information on changes in
ownership over time it has been unable to test the ‘support effect’ of the internal
capital market, where the ‘support effect’ is the notion that subsidiary banks suffer-
ing liquidity shock in GIIPS countries could be supported by their owners located
outside of GIIPS countries.
An important caveat to the findings is that it cannot fully capture the banks’
exposure to government bonds. While one can control for the bank-specific time-
invariant levels of exposure through a bank-fixed effect, it is not possible with the
current data to control for the time-varying exposure to GIIPS debts.
This analysis has implications for policy in terms of the regulation of interna-
tional banks. First, as a liquidity shock can be transmitted through cross-border
bank ownership linkages, regulatory authorities across countries might to think care-
fully about the activities of international banks and whether any of these should be
ring fenced. Specific policies targeted at international banks so as to isolate for-
eign liquidity shocks could help support the stability of a domestic banking system.
While such regulation may come at an operational cost for the banks involved, this
has to be balanced against the need for a stable financial system. Second, this chap-
ter provides empirical evidence for operation of the internal capital market within
banking groups in which international banks allocate their banking assets in order
to maximise the profits. Regulators across countries would do better to coordinate
their activities and agree policy on an international rather than domestic level. This
may help alleviate the potential for contagion across an international bank’s internal
capital market.
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SOVEREIGN DISTRESS,
BANK STRENGTH AND
PERFORMANCE:
Evidence from the Euro-zone
Sovereign Debt Crisis
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3.1 Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis showed how banks’ exposures to distressed gov-
ernments could be associated with financial instability. Large sovereign exposures
could lead to a ‘doom loop’ between the banking sector and sovereigns (Farhi and
Tirole, 2016): banks with large exposures to distressed sovereigns reduce lending,
causes slower economic growth, leads to greater sovereign distress. This sovereign-
bank diabolic loop has become a first-line political matter after the recent European
sovereign debt crisis. The recent global financial crisis reinforced the economic
weaknesses of some countries, which increased their risk of insolvency of their gov-
ernments, with sovereign yields soaring in particular until the summer of 2012. The
drop in some sovereign bond prices impacted banks’ balance sheets, in particular for
Euro Area banks, subsequently affecting lending to the real economy (Popov and
Van Horen, 2015; Acharya et al., 2016). The sovereign-bank diabolic loop was hence
reinforced, with banks less able to support a stronger post-crisis recovery that could
have alleviated some of the pressures to public finances.
Importantly, bank capital regulation de facto assumes that the credit risk associ-
ated with sovereign exposures is null: national discretions allow national authorities
to choose a 0% risk weight on their own sovereign exposures, and to reciprocate if
other national authorities have chosen to do the same for their own sovereigns. This
is in fact the case in Europe. Some authors have suggested that this feature has
amplified the cross-border sovereign risk spillovers (Kirschenmann et al., 2016), as
it allowed banks to be exposed to risky sovereigns without backing these exposures
with capital.
As a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area, the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is reviewing the regulatory framework for
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sovereign exposures.1 One argument is that if banks had more capital backing these
exposures, they would be more isolated from the sovereign distress and hence the
effect on credit supply would be reduced. Another argument, however, is that banks,
especially domestic ones, cannot possibly isolate from sovereign risk, and hence a
stronger capital position would not have prevented the contagion effect.
This chapter sheds light on the main channels through which shocks to the value
of sovereign bonds may affect bank lending behaviour and whether capital could
alleviate the transmission mechanism. It uses the European Banking Authority
(EBA) stress tests and transparency exercises, which contain granular information
of banks sovereign exposures, in order to focus on the accounting definition of these
exposures, since some exposures are recorded mark-to-market while others at book
valuation. This allows the analysis to have a much more precise estimate of how
exposed to the sovereign debt turmoil banks are. These data are matched with
bank-level balance sheet information obtained from SNL, such as solvency ratios,
asset size, or position in the interbank market, from 2010 to 2016.
In line with previous studies, it suggests that negative shocks to sovereign bond
prices are associated to lower subsequent bank lending for banks more exposed to
the shocks, but these relation is weaker for better capitalised banks (Kirschenmann
et al., 2016), what is known as the ‘capital channel’. Moreover, it shows that bank
capital matters especially for exposures that are both mark-to-market and subject
to no capital requirements, such as available for sale (AFS) exposures: this seems
to be the type of exposure through which sovereign shocks are transmitted directly
to bank solvency. The capital channel is less important for book-value exposures
(held to maturity (HTM)) and exposures with positive capital requirements (held for
trading (HFT)). It also reveals that the capital channel is particularly important for
short-term exposures (rather than medium- and long-term) and domestic exposures
1https://www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbs_work.htm.
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(rather than foreign). These results provide useful evidence to design a more robust
regulatory capital framework for sovereign exposures. If the goal of the reforms
is to better isolate banks’ balance sheets from sovereign shocks, the accounting
classification of the sovereign exposures should be taken into consideration.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews current literature
that is related to the sovereign-bank nexus and the impact of the application of fair
value accounting. Section 3.3 describes the data that would be analysed using the
econometric method presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the regression
results and offers a discussion before section 3.6 concludes this essay.
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3.2 Literature Review
This research connects to a growing literature on the topic of bank’s sovereign ex-
posures, where a great effort has been made since the Euro Area sovereign debt
crisis. One strand of literature focuses on bank’s motivation for taking on sovereign
exposures during the crisis. Two types of motivations are proposed: moral suasion
and carry trade. The moral suasion hypothesis argues that banks in distressed coun-
tries would increase their exposures to domestic sovereign debt during the crisis as
the government would put pressure on banks in order to get extra funding from
the banking system. Uhlig (2014)’s theoretical framework interacts banks, bank-
ing regulation, government default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary
union. The model assumes that sovereign bonds can be used by banks in repurchase
agreements with the common central bank, and suggests that banking regulators
in distressed countries have incentives to allow banks to hold more risky domestic
bonds, in order to pass the cheaper funding from the common central bank onto the
government in distress through the banking system. In effect, the default risk would
be shifted from the domestic banking system to the common central bank. In other
words, the distressed government would be indirectly financed by the common cen-
tral bank through domestic banking system by loosening banking regulation. This
model provides a theoretical foundation for the moral suasion hypothesis.
Becker and Ivashina (2014) documents the fact that domestic sovereign bond
holding positions of Euro Area banks substantially increased following the global
financial crisis. Using firm level data, the authors further show that bank credit
supply to the private sector has been crowded out by the increase in the banks’
sovereign exposure: firms are less likely to get financed through bank loans when the
banking system are more exposed to domestic sovereign debt, and when the sovereign
debts are risky. More interestingly, this paper shows that the distressed government
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exercise financial repression with respect to domestic banking system through two
channels: direct government ownership and board seats, which is consistent with
the moral suasion hypothesis.
Using monthly frequency data on banks’ sovereign debt holdings from the ECB,
Ongena et al. (2016) shows that during the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis domes-
tic banks in distressed countries tend to increase their exposures to risky domestic
sovereign debt by more than foreign banks. They also find this effect is more pro-
nounced for those domestic banks with higher government ownership and lower
initial government bond holdings. Their results suggest that this moral suasion
mechanism is robust controlling for the LTRO by ECB and it is not driven by other
concurrent motivations such as risk-shifting, carry-trade and so on.
De Marco and Macchiavelli (2015) also provide empirical evidence for moral sua-
sion hypothesis. Using sovereign exposure data disclosed by EBA EU-wide stress
tests and capital exercises, they argue that state-owned banks and banks with politi-
cians as board directors tend to have a stronger home bias than other banks during
the sovereign debt crisis: they tend to hold a higher fraction of domestic government
bonds in their total government bond portfolio. The authors further show home bias
strengthened only for state-owned banks over the crisis period, and this effect is more
pronounced in crisis countries. This result is consistent with Becker and Ivashina
(2014) that banks can be influenced by the distressed government through both the
ownership and board seat channel.
On the other hand, the carry trade hypothesis argues that banks tend to use
unsecured short-term funding from the wholesale market to finance their investment
in long-term risky government bonds issued by peripheral Euro Area countries which
offer higher return, without extra bank capital. By doing so, banks intend to earn the
spread between the higher return from the sovereign debt investment and the return
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lower cost of short-term funding in an effort to gamble for resurrection. A carry
trade motivation is also suggested by both theoretical models and empirical evidence.
Crosignani (2015)’s theoretical model introduces a government and a banking sector
for each country in a two-country and two-date setting. The model assumes that
banks can lend to domestic private sector and invest in both domestic and foreign
government bonds. Meanwhile governments issue debts and impose taxes on banks’
income from lending to the private sector to maximise their expenditure. In the
good states, the taxes collected by the government would be sufficient enough to
repay their debts. However, the government cannot make the repayment in the bad
states, which introduces the risk of sovereign default. Assuming limited liability
for banks which gives them the risk-shifting incentive, the model predicts that less-
capitalised banks tend to have a higher level of domestic sovereign debts, which is
consistent with the carry trade hypothesis.
Acharya and Steffen (2015) empirically documents bank’s carry trade behaviour
during the European sovereign debt crisis, focusing on the publicly listed European
banks that participated in the EBA stress tests and capital exercises throughout
the 2010 to 2012 period. They authors show that European banks use short-term
funding to finance their investment in long-term debts issued by peripheral countries.
They further show that banks with a higher short-term leverage, higher risk-weighted
assets and lower regulatory capital ratio would have a higher level of peripheral
sovereign debt. In addition, their results suggest that this result is not driven by
home bias or moral suasion as banks in non-Euro Area countries are also highly
exposed to the peripheral sovereign debts.
Acharya et al. (2016) also shows that less capitalised banks and banks with more
government interventions increase their exposures to the domestic sovereign debts,
indicating the effect of both carry trade and moral suasion channel. In addition,
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using bank-firm relationship data collected from DealScan database and firm level
data from Amadeus database, they identify that firms associated with GIIPS banks
2 tend to perform worse during the sovereign debt crisis period compared with those
only associated with non-GIIPS banks. Furthermore, the authors show that only
the carry trade channel has a negative and significant real effect on borrowing firms
while moral suasion channel has no significant effect on the firms’ corporate policies.
Horváth et al. (2015) shows similar results by also using the EBA sovereign
exposure dataset. This paper provides empirical evidence that riskier bank in crisis
countries tend to have a higher level of home bias in terms of government bond
holdings, where bank risk is measured by leverage. This result is consistent with the
implication of the carry trade hypothesis that less capitalised banks tend to increase
their holdings in risky sovereign debts. Furthermore its results also support moral
suasion hypothesis as it shows that home bias is more pronounced for government
owned bank, indicating the influence of the government on those banks.
Both carry trade and moral suasion hypothesis are also suggested by Altavilla
et al. (2016). They exploit the monthly government bond holding data for Euro
Area banks recorded by the ECB, then show that government-owned banks, recently
bailed-out banks, and less capitalised banks in crisis countries tend to increase their
domestic government bond holdings during the crisis period. They also show that the
increased sovereign risk significantly reduced bank lending, given banks’ exposure
to the sovereign debts.
Buch et al. (2016) shows evidence on carry trade hypothesis by focusing on banks
located in Germany, rather than those in crisis countries. Using granular data on
German banks’ sovereign debt holdings provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, they
find that less capitalised banks tend to increase their sovereign exposure during the
Euro Area sovereign debt crisis. They further show that the risk of a bank’s sovereign
2That is, banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
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debt portfolio is positively correlated with the risk of the bank itself.
Overall, these papers provide empirical evidence supporting both the moral sua-
sion hypothesis and the carry trade hypothesis, which explains why banks tend to
hold or even increase their exposures to distress sovereigns during the sovereign debt
crisis period. However, these papers do not examine how banks’ exposure to the
distressed sovereigns would have an effect on banks themselves given a sovereign
shock.
Another strand of literature on bank sovereign exposures focuses on how a
sovereign shock would have an impact on the performance of the banking system,
usually measured by bank default risk and credit supply. This research question is
critical as a sovereign crisis might cause a banking crisis that could possibly evolve
into an overall economic recession, as was seen in several peripheral European coun-
tries during the sovereign debt crisis.
A two-way feedback model is proposed by Acharya et al. (2014) to explain the re-
lationship between the riskiness of the government and the domestic banking system.
They introduce three sectors in the model: financial sector, non-financial corporate
sector and government. Aggregate output is jointly produced by both financial and
corporate sector, where the financial sector is leveraged, thus insolvency is possible.
In the model, government has the option to bailout the financial sector, by either
increasing the tax on the corporate sector or borrowing from the financial sector.
However, both types of the government’s funding sources are limited. It cannot
always increase tax revenue from the corporate sector due to the Laffer curve of
taxation, while extra borrowing from the financial sector can be costly as the value
of the existing sovereign debts held by the financial sector would be diluted, causing
“collateral damage” which would further damage the financial sector. In this setting,
if the optimal size of a government bailout is sufficiently large, the bailout cannot
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be financed by taxation thus sovereign debts dilution would become the preferable
solution. This two-way feedback mechanism implies a so-called doom loop between
a sovereign crisis and a banking crisis. Empirically, Acharya et al. (2014) verifies
this loop by testing the correlation between the risk of sovereign and bank indicated
by their CDS spread, over the 2007 to 2011 period. The result shows that the bank
CDS spread would increase by 0.9% if the sovereign CDS spread increases by 10%
during the post-bailout period, while there is no significant relationship between
them before the bailout.
Cooper and Nikolov (2013) proposed a theoretical model interacting the gov-
ernment bond market with the financial market, by combining the sovereign debt
fragility model developed by Calvo (1988) with the bank run model developed by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The doom loop between sovereign and banking crisis
is established given the two facts that 1) banks tend to invest in a large amount
of long-term government bonds as their liquidity reserves; and 2) government pro-
vide both explicit and implicit guarantees to the banking system. Given a potential
sovereign default, the banking sector would be negatively affected as it is highly
exposed to the government bonds. In order avoid bank default, government would
bailout those banks in trouble financed by extra borrowing, which in turn causes
a further deterioration of the government bond market, thus the balance sheet of
banking sector that requires a even larger bailout. This result is consistent with the
prediction of the model by Acharya et al. (2014).
Leonello (2014) also theoretically confirms the diabolic loop between the sovereign
and banking crisis, allowing the interaction between the sovereign debt market and
the banking sector. Moreover, the model suggests that a government guarantee
would reduce the probability of both a sovereign default and a banking crisis if the
banking sector is highly productive or the government has a low level of public ex-
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penditure. However, given a banking system with low productivity or a government
with high public expenditure, though the banking sector would benefit from the
government guarantee, a sovereign default is more likely to happen with increased
borrowing cost for the government. Different from the doom loop models with focus
on a closed economy, Farhi and Tirole (2016) proposes a "double decker bailout"
model for the feedback loop mechanism, which allows for both domestic banking
system bailout by the government and sovereign debt forgiveness by foreign claim-
holders. Their paper provides implications for sovereign debt renationalisation and
banking unions.
Using a different theoretical framework, Bocola et al. (2016) introduces the risk
of sovereign default into a business cycle model with financial intermediation, based
on the framework developed by Gertler et al. (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
In the model, banks either lend to the firms or invest in the government bonds, using
deposits collected from households along with their own funds. As banks are usually
highly exposed to the sovereign debts, the model predicts that a potential sovereign
default that drives down the the market value of the government bonds would have
a negative effect on banks’ lending to the private sector through two channels: a
liquidity channel through which devaluation of the government bonds reduces the
borrowing capacity of the banks; and a risk channel because the net worth of the
bank would be driven down. The model is estimated by using Italian data, which
shows that the sovereign debt crisis in Italy increased the borrowing cost for firms
and the risk channel contributed 45 percent of the effect. Overall the sovereign crisis
in Italy is estimated to have decreased aggregate output by 1.4 percent.
Gennaioli et al. (2014b) also proposed a theoretical model for the effect of a
sovereign default on the private credit supply from the banking system. The model
suggests that banks tend to hold government bonds as their liquidity reserve. Thus,
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sovereign default would deteriorate banks’ balance sheet and also dry up the liq-
uidity of the banking system, resulting in a decrease in the banking credit supply.
Furthermore it shows that the adverse effect of sovereign default would be larger in
countries with more developed financial institutions and in banking systems which
are more exposed to the sovereign debt. Using country-level data, empirical evi-
dence is also provided. It documents 110 sovereign default episodes in 81 countries
from 1980 to 2005, based on the S&P rating data, then shows that banking sys-
tems that are highly exposed to the government bonds tend to reduce their credit
supply to the private sector in a sovereign default episode. In a companion paper,
Gennaioli et al. (2014a) collects bank-level information from Bankscope database.
Using the same empirical setting and econometric method, it shows that banks with
higher government bond holdings tend to have a lower lending growth rate given a
sovereign default shock, confirming their country-level findings at a bank-level.
Also using the sovereign rating data, Adelino and Ferreira (2016) explore the
causal effect of sovereign downgrades on bank lending. It argues that the rating
of a bank could be negatively affected if the rating of the bank’s home country is
downgraded. As a result, it would induce an adverse effect on bank’s borrowing cost
and capacity to borrow in the wholesale funding and bond markets, given the fact
that a rating is an important investment criterion for institutional investors in these
markets. This in turn would have a negative effect on a bank’s lending activity.
Using historical sovereign downgrading data from S&P and loan-level syndicated
lending data from DealScan, their empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that
sovereign downgrading event has a negative effect on bank’s syndicated lending
supply.
Many papers in the literature have focused on the 2010 Euro Area sovereign debt
crisis. Popov and Van Horen (2015) exploits a typical difference-in-difference setting
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to examine the performance of the European banks that are highly exposed to the
GIIPS debt over the crisis period. Banks’ sovereign exposure data were collected
from the disclosure of the 2011 EBA stress test which provides detailed sovereign
exposure information for 90 major European banks as of December 2010. They
collect syndicated lending data from Dealogic Database for 34 non-GIIPS banks
that participated in the 2011 EBA stress test, and the empirical results suggest that
those non-GIIPS banks that were highly exposed to GIIPS debt significantly reduce
their syndicated lending after the 4th quarter of 2010. Though it argues that the
transmission mechanism might be due to both capital and funding channel, their
empirical analysis is quite silent on which of these channels was more important.
De Marco (2015) uses a very similar empirical setting with Popov and Van Horen
(2015) to explore the causal relationship between the Euro Area sovereign debt
crisis and credit supply. Banks’ exposures to the sovereign crisis are also measured
using the sovereign holding data provided by the 2011 EBA stress test. It confirms
Popov and Van Horen (2015)’s finding that highly exposed banks tend to have
a lower growth rate in syndicated lending during the crisis period. Furthermore,
it empirically tests both the capital channel and funding channel, and the results
suggest that only funding channel matters. However, this result is just based on an
analysis of a relatively short period around the year of 2010 where banks’ sovereign
exposure data are provided.
Acharya et al. (2016) goes a step further to explore the real effect of the sovereign
debt crisis. It collects bank-firm relationship data from DealScan and firm-level data
from Amadeus, then shows that firms associated with banks that are highly exposed
to the sovereign crisis tend to perform worse in terms of investment, job creation
and sale growth, compared with those associated with less exposed banks. The
adverse real effect on firms might also be due to the increase in the cost of corporate
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financing during the sovereign debt crisis, as documented by Augustin et al. (2014).
Bofondi et al. (2013) focuses on the Italian banking system to explore the causal
link between sovereign risk and bank lending. They collect loan-level data for all
Italian banks from the Italian Central Credit Register and construct a sample con-
taining 670,000 bank-firm linkages from December 2010 to December 2011. They
use foreign banks operating in the Italian banking system as control group, and
show that domestic banks tend to have a lower lending growth rate, which suggests
that credit supply has been tightened by the banks that are highly exposed to the
crisis. However, this paper does not explain the transmission channel of the effect
of sovereign risk on bank lending.
Korte and Steffen (2015) shows some indirect evidence of a capital channel.
The paper’s central hypothesis is that during the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis,
sovereign risk (measured by sovereign CDS spreads) across EU countries tend to
move in a similar way and the co-movement would be more pronounced when the
domestic banking systems are highly exposed to foreign sovereign debts that are
not funded with their bank capital. They construct an index for the EU sovereign
CDS market, using the outstanding debt of each EU government as the weight, and
find that the sovereign CDS spread has a stronger co-movement with the EU CDS
index when the level of capital against sovereign exposures in the domestic banking
system is low. They also re-estimate the tests only for non-GIIPS countries where
the EU CDS index is replaced by the individual GIIPS CDS spreads and find that
the co-movement is more pronounced if the banking system are more exposed to the
respective GIIPS country without the support of bank capital.
In summary, this strand of literature suggests that a sovereign shock would
have a negative effect on banks that are exposed to the sovereign through their
government bond holdings. Two transmission channels were proposed in the this
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strand of literature: capital channel and funding channel. However, the empirical
evidence on these two transmission channels is not clearly provided. Thus, this
chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature and provide evidence on how exactly
sovereign shocks can negatively affect banks’ lending activities.
This chapter is also related to studies on the effect of application of fair value
accounting on banks behaviour. Landsman (2006) provides a comprehensive discus-
sion on the advantages and disadvantages of fair value accounting, compared with
the traditional asset valuation method based on historic cost. Based on a review on
previous US-based empirical studies (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al.,
1996; Nelson, 1996), Landsman (2006) concludes that on top of the book value, fair
value provides incremental explanatory power in a bank’s share price. It suggests
that fair value accounting could provide additional information for investors, rela-
tive to historical cost accounting. This result is also supported by empirical evidence
from Australia (Barth and Clinch, 1998) and the UK (Aboody et al., 1999; Lin and
Peasnell, 2000).
On the other hand, Landsman (2006) also points out some potential issues re-
lating to the implementation of fair value accounting in the banking sector. First,
estimated fair value of financial assets might not be relevant and reliable, espe-
cially for those non-publicly-traded instrument where market price information is
not available. This argument is supported by empirical evidence from two US-based
studies focusing on corporate debt instruments (Barth et al., 1998, 2000). Second,
given the fact that the fair value has to be estimated by manager’s models for assets
that are not publicly traded and market price are not directly available, Landsman
(2006) argues that the manager of a bank has incentive to manipulate the model
inputs when calculating the fair value of its non-publicly traded assets. This would
have effects on the bank’s stock price and capital ratio, which would potentially
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mislead investors and regulators. Third, Landsman (2006) suggests from a regu-
latory perspective that the estimated fair value of either bank assets or liabilities
could contain measurement errors, which might generate excessive volatility in bank
earnings and regulatory capital ratio. This argument is supported by the empirical
findings from Barth et al. (1995) and Barth (2004).
In the aftermath of the great financial crisis, a major concern on fair value ac-
counting is that whether the implementation of fair value accounting in the banking
sector would cause excessive write-downs and contagions during a stressed period
which would eventually lead to a banking crisis, given the fact that most of the
impaired banking assets (asset-backed securities) during the crisis were marked-to-
market.
Theoretically, it is possible that the financial condition of a bank could be neg-
atively affected by fair value accounting for the following reasons. First, market
prices of underlying assets might deviate from their fundamental values, either due
to lack of liquidity in the market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) or limits of arbitrage
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, fair value accounting which requires assets to be
marked to market prices would generate a negative shock on banks given a sharp
drop in the market price of certain assets held by those banks, even though the
quality of these assets is not fundamentally deteriorated. Second, contagions in the
banking sector are also possible due to fair value accounting. If a distressed bank
sell a considerable amount of its financial assets at a fire sale price, other banks
holding similar assets would receive a negative shock on their balance sheet if those
assets are market to market, as they would have to revalue their assets based on the
fire sale price. This would cause excessive write-downs to otherwise sound banks
and drive down their capital ratios (Cifuentes et al., 2005; Allen and Carletti, 2008;
Heaton et al., 2010). However, Laux and Leuz (2009)’s analysis suggests that even
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though fair value accounting is likely to exacerbate volatility in banks’ financial
statement, and mark-to-market approach in its pure form may cause contagion in
the banking sector, historical cost accounting might not be an appropriate remedy.
It suggests that the current prudential policies need to be adjusted to overcome the
disadvantages of fair value accounting, rather than abandon this approach entirely.
Empirically, Khan (2010) examines the linkages between fair value accounting
and systemic risks of the banking sector based on a sample of all listed US bank
holding companies over the period from 1988 to 2007. It shows that the use of fair
value accounting is positively associated with contagions risks in the banking system
and this effect is more pronounced in a less liquid market environment. In addition,
Khan (2010)’s cross-sectional analysis shows that this contagion effect are less likely
to be transmitted to well-capitalised banks compared with those with a lower capital
ratio, given a same level of use of fair value accounting. This empirical evidence is
consistent with Allen and Carletti (2008)’s theoretical predictions on how fair value
accounting could possibly amplify a banking crisis.
However, many argue that fair value accounting was not a contributor to the
great financial crisis. Laux and Leuz (2010)’s analysis suggests that fair value ac-
counting did not amplify the crisis for bank holding companies in the US for the
following reasons. First, fair value assets only accounted for a small fraction on bank
holding companies’ balance sheet, while most of their assets were accounted for on
a historical cost basis. Second, compared with book value, fair value is relevant
even for assets that banks intend to hold for a long term, as it provides further
transparency in the banking sector which benefits investors and regulators. Third,
even though it might exacerbate volatility in banks’ balance sheet during normal
periods, the transparency provided by fair value accounting could mitigate infor-
mation asymmetry and reduce uncertainty in the banking sector, which might have
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alleviated the severity of the crisis. Fourth, the effects of depreciation in fair value
of banking assets on banks’ earnings and capital ratios were shielded by regulatory
filters, which means that the fair value accounting approach in practice is not in
its pure form as assumed in the theoretical models by Allen and Carletti (2008).
Barth and Landsman (2010)’s analysis reaches a similar conclusion that fair value
accounting did not contribute to the financial crisis.
Shaffer (2010)’s empirical exercises focus on large US banks over the crisis pe-
riod, as small banks had a negligible amount of assets accounted for on a fair value
basis. Its empirical results suggest there is no clear links between use of fair value
accounting and regulatory capital ratio for the sample banks during the crisis pe-
riod. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided by Kolev (2008), Song et al.
(2010), and Goh et al. (2015) on market pricing of banks’ fair value assets do not
suggest that fair value accounting approach have caused excessive write-downs dur-
ing the great financial crisis. In addition, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2017)’s review on existing studies on the effect of fair value accounting on bank
behaviours over the crisis period concludes that there is no clear evidence that fair
value accounting may lead to contagion in the banking sector. Overall, these em-
pirical evidence are consistent with the argument that fair value accounting did not
play a significant role in the crisis.
To sum up, previous papers in the literature have deeply investigated the moti-
vation of a bank to increase its sovereign exposure during sovereign distress period,
and explored the possible crowding-out effect of the bank’s home-bias on private
credit supply. Moreover, the effect of bank’s sovereign exposure on its credit supply
given a sovereign shock has been widely tested using data from various sources and
many different measurements on bank’s sovereign exposure. The capital channel
and funding channel have been proposed in the literature to rationalise this adverse
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effect.
However, the heterogeneity among different types of bank’s sovereign exposures3
has yet been fully explored in the literature. There is no consensus in the literature
yet whether fair value accounting could cause excess negative impact on a bank’s
financial condition. In addition, there is still no convincing empirical evidence on the
transmission channels through which the bank’s sovereign exposure can negatively
affect bank lending during the sovereign crisis period. Thus, the central theme of
this chapter is to identify the following issues with a robust empirical strategy: 1)
the adverse effect of sovereign exposure on bank lending; 2) the heterogeneity among
different types of sovereign exposure; and 3) the transmission channels of the adverse
effect, more specifically, the capital channel and the funding channel, where point 2
and 3 fill gaps in the literature.
3For instance, exposures that are marked to market vs. accounted for at historical cost, short-
term vs. long-term exposure, or domestic vs. foreign exposure.
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3.3 Transmission Mechanisms and Hypotheses
This section describes the difference among bank’s sovereign exposure with different
accounting classifications. This is important for the analysis as different accounting
and regulatory treatment on various types of sovereign exposure could have different
economic impacts.
A bank can be exposed to a sovereign in several ways: it can make a loan to a
sovereign; it can own a government bond; or it can enter into a derivative contract
where the counterparty is a sovereign or the underlying asset is a government bond.
These ways are treated differently from each other in accounting standards, in how
those standards are reflected in prudential regulation, and in regulatory capital
requirements. Table 3.1 summarise the main difference of different categories of
banks’ sovereign exposures.
The key difference in accounting standards is between those exposures that are
valued on a historical cost basis and those valued on a fair value basis. Loans and
government bonds that a bank intends to hold to maturity (HTM) are valued on
a historical cost basis, which means that any sovereign distress which falls short of
the sovereign defaulting does not change the value of those exposures on a bank’s
balance sheet. Whereas exposures that are fair valued are valued using current
market prices; this means changes in market prices resulting from sovereign distress
will reduce the value of those exposures on a bank’s balance sheet and create a
loss that is deducted from a bank’s equity. Bonds that are classified as available
for sale (AFS), held for trading (HFT), or under the fair value option (FVO), and
derivatives are fair valued.
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Table 3.1: Sovereign Exposure in Different Accounting Classification
Items
Accounting Treatment Regulatory
Classification Valuation Impact of sovereing distress Treatment
Loan & Advances HTM Historical Cost
No change in value if a sovereign
does not default. If a sovereign
defaults, any losses are ac-
counted for in a bank’s profit and
loss account, which are de-
0% risk-weight
Government Bonds
HTM Historical Cost ducted from a bank’s equity.
AFS Fair Value
Changes in the market value are
reflected in a bank’s AFS re-
serves, which is part of a bank’s
equity. Jurisdictions adopt dif-
ferent approaches to how changes
to the AFS reserves are reflected
in a bank’s regulatory capital
(see Appendix Table A3.1)
FVO Fair Value Changes in the market value Capital Must be
HFT Fair Value are reflected in a bank’s profit held against the
Derivatives HFT Fair Value and loss account. market risk
Notes: HTM stands for Held to Maturity, AFS for Available for Sale, FVO for Fair Value Option, and HFT for Held for Trading.
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There are several differences in the regulatory treatment of these exposures. In
the EU during the period we look at, loans and bonds that are HTM and AFS
received a 0% risk weight, which implies banks were not required to have capital
against those exposures. 4 Although changes in the fair value of AFS exposures
are reflected in a bank’s equity, there were differences both across time and EU
member states in whether those fair value changes were filtered out of a bank’s
regulatory capital (i.e. the capital used to calculate its regulatory capital ratios).
Focusing on losses, before 2014 regulators in member states applied different filters.
Under the Basel III reforms to bank regulation, any filters applied to losses on AFS
exposures were to be phased out between 2014 and 2018. Some member states
gradually phased out the filters, but others had removed the filters completely from
2014 (see Appendix Table A3.1). Changes in the fair value of FVO and HFT bond,
and derivative exposures flow straight through to both book and regulatory capital.
And banks are required to hold capital against the market risk associated with those
exposures.
Differences in accounting treatments could affect how big an impact sovereign
distress has on a bank. For instance, if a sovereign is in distress but has not defaulted
a bank does not have to change the value of its bonds issued by that sovereign if
those bonds are classified as historic cost exposures (e.g. HTM), but it does have to
change the value - to reflect the fall in the bond price - if the bonds are classified as
fair value exposures (e.g. AFS, FVO or HFT).
4Under the EU Capital Requirements Regulation, government debt denominated in a govern-
ment’s own currency receives a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach to credit risk
(European Commission (2013)).
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Table 3.2: Transmission Mechanisms of Sovereign Exposure: an ex-
ample
Panel 1: balance sheet before the sovereign shock
Bank A Bank B
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Cash/Reserves 10 Deposit 70 Cash/Reserves 10 Deposit 70
Government Bonds Interbank 10 Government Bonds Interbank 10
- HTM 10 - HTM 5
- AFS 5 - AFS 10
- HFT 5 - HFT 5
Loans 70 Equity 20 Loans 70 Equity 20
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 Total 100
Negative Sovereign Shock (-40%) ⇓
Panel 2: balance sheet after the sovereign shock
Bank A Bank B
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Cash/Reserves 10 Deposit 70 Cash/Reserves 10 Deposit 70
Government Bonds Interbank 10 Government Bonds Interbank 10
- HTM 10 - HTM 5
- AFS 3 - AFS 6
- HFT 3 - HFT 3
Loans 70 Equity 16 Loans 70 Equity 14
Total 96 Total 96 Total 94 Total 94
Table 3.2 presents an numerical example on this specific issue with two simplified
bank balance sheets. Panel 1 in Table 3.2 presents the balance sheet for two banks
before a sovereign shock occurs. Assuming the main structure of bank A and bank B
are essentially the same: both banks start with 100 unit of total assets where 10% are
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allocated as cash or central bank reserves, 20% are invested in identical government
bonds issued by a single sovereign, and 70% are outstanding loans; on the other
side, 70% of the banks’ liabilities are customer deposits, 10% are borrowed from the
interbank market, while equity accounts for 20% of the total liabilities. However, the
only difference between the two banks is how the sovereign exposures are classified
on their balance sheets. Bank A classifies 10 units of their sovereign exposure as
HTM, 5 units as AFS, and 5 unites as HFT, while bank B, hold 10 units of its
sovereign exposure as AFS, 5 units as HTM, and 5 units as HFT.
Now assuming that a specific shock hits the sovereign the two banks are exposed
to, and the market value of the government bonds dropped by 40%. Due to the
difference between the accounting treatments of sovereign exposures, the two banks
would be differently affected, and the balance sheet for the two banks after the
sovereign shock are presented by Panel 2 in Table 3.2. As HTM exposures are
valued based on historic cost, bank A’s HTM exposure would remain at 10 units,
while the value of the bank’s AFS and HFT exposures would drop by 40% to 3 units.
The drop in the value of the bank’s AFS exposures would be directly reflected by a
drop in the bank’s equity (assuming no regulatory filter applies), while the change
in the value of HFT exposures would be realised through profits/losses then finally
reflected by a change in the bank’s equity. Overall, bank A’s equity dropped from
20 units to 16 units due to the sovereign shock. The impact of the sovereign shock
would be greater for bank B, as more sovereign exposures are classified as AFS assets
where the value has to be marked to market. After the adjustment, bank B’s equity
would drop from 20 units to 14 units, which is strictly lower than bank A’s equity
in this sovereign distress scenario, thus one may expect that bank B tend to restrict
their lending activity by more to maintain its regulatory capital at a certain level,
compared with bank A. This example clearly shows that how the different accounting
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classifications and valuation methods of banks’ sovereign exposures would affect the
capital channel through which a sovereign shock would have an impact on banks.
Thus, the impact of the sovereign shock, via the capital channel, might be weaker
if a bank’s exposure to the distressed sovereign are accounted for on a historic cost
basis than if its holdings are accounted for on a fair value basis. This mechanism is
developed as a key hypothesis to be tested in our research.
• HYPOTHESIS 1. Given a negative sovereign shock, a bank’s lending activities
would be more affected if more of the bank’s impaired sovereign exposures were
accounted for on a fair value basis, instead of historic cost basis.
Furthermore, accounting treatments also have implications for the capital re-
quirements associated with sovereign exposures. If an exposure is HTM or AFS, a
banks is typically not required to hold any capital against the credit risk (i.e. the
risk the sovereign defaults) it is exposed to. In the EU, there is a 0% risk weight for
credit risk for exposures to all EU sovereigns. But if an exposure is HFT or FVO,
a bank is required to hold capital against the market risk (i.e. the risk the market
value falls) it is exposed to. Taking Bank A in Table 3.2 as an example. Bank A
has exactly the same amount of AFS and HFT exposures (5 units each) prior to the
sovereign shock, where regulatory capital is required for HFT exposures but not for
for AFS exposures. Though the sovereign shock triggered a loss of 2 units exposures
for both AFS and HFT accounts, one may expect that the 2 units drop in the AFS
exposure might have a greater impact on the bank’s lending activity than a 2 units
drop in the value of HFT exposures, as the potential losses from the change in the
market value of the HFT exposure were buffered with certain amount of regulatory
capital.
Thus, the impact of a sovereign’s distress might be weaker if a bank’s exposure
if HFT or FVO because a bank has some capital against the risk of incurring losses
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on those exposures than if its exposures are HTM or AFS. In other words, if a bank
is required to hold capital against an exposure, the shock of a sovereign getting
into distress may be smaller. This puts forward the second key hypothesis in our
research.
• HYPOTHESIS 2. The impact of a sovereign shock on bank lending activities
could be alleviated if certain level of regulatory capital were required to be held
against the impaired sovereign exposures.
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3.4 Data
The main focus of this research is to test the effect of a bank’s sovereign exposure
on its lending activity during sovereign distress period, then explore the hetero-
geneity among different types of the sovereign exposure which could be decomposed
according to the classification category, residual maturity and counter-party. Fur-
thermore, it tests the two hypothesised transmission channels - capital and funding
channel through bank’s sovereign exposure. To do this, it combines the data col-
lected from multiple sources: granular data on bank’s sovereign exposure disclosed
by EBA stress tests and exercises; bank balance sheet and income statement infor-
mation from SNL database; and country-level variables collected from Bloomberg,
Datastream and Moody’s. Detailed information on the data used in the econometric
analysis is described by the rest of this section.
3.4.1 EBA Sovereign Exposure Data
The sovereign exposure data for the banks in the analysis comes from the disclosure
of a series EU-wide stress tests and exercises conducted by the European Banking
Authority (EBA) since 2010. One of the purposes of these exercises is to test the
stability of the European banking system facing the sovereign debt crisis. Thus,
detailed information on banks’ sovereign exposures has been collected as part of
the exercises, in order to estimate the potential adverse effect of those exposure on
banking stability.
Table 3.3 summarises the main characteristics of the sovereign exposure datasets
provided by EBA. The first column of Table 3.3 presents the name of exercises while
the second column shows the dates when the data were collected. From the second
column, one can observe that the sovereign exposure data are not collected at a
regular intervals, but they are collected at very close to a semi-annual frequency.
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The sample period starts from the first quarter of 2010 when the crisis had started,
and ends at the last quarter of 2016. Thus, it covers information on bank’s sovereign
exposure for both crisis and post-crisis periods. The number of EU banks partici-
pated in those exercises is presented in column 3. As it shows, the sample initially
covers 90+ banks in the first two stress tests, then the number decreases to 60+ in
the following capital and transparency exercises from 2011 to 2013. It bounces back
to 123 banks in the 2014 stress tests but shrinks to 51 in the latest stress test in
2016.
The sample size varies across different exercises mainly due to two reasons. First,
the data are collected for exercises focusing on different specific issues, thus EBA
adjusted its sampling criteria across those exercises. For example, the number of
participant banks decreases to 65 in the 2011 capital exercise from 90 in the stress
test conducted earlier in the same year because the EBA capital exercise was only
focused on the very big banks in the European banking system. Second, the number
of banks in EU countries changes overtime as a result of mergers and acquisitions
in the banking sector (eg. the Spanish banking consolidation). For example, the
sampling criterion for 2010 and 2011 stress tests was to cover 60 percent of the total
banking assets in each EU country. As a result, the sample size was 91 and 90
respectively. However, the 51 banks participated in the latest stress test in 2016
covered over 70 percent of the total banking assets in the EU countries. Though the
number of banks varies across the datasets, most of the major European banks have
been covered by all the EBA exercises, which means that the sample of the panel
dataset is still representative.5
5See a list of the sample banks in the appendix.
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Table 3.3: Summary of EBA Sovereign Exposure Datasets
Sovereign Exposure Breakdown by
EBA Exercise Data Date No. of Banks Category Maturity Counter-party
Stress Test 2010 2010 Q1 91 No No 30 European Countries
Stress Test 2011 2010 Q4 90 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
Capital Exercise 2011 2011 Q3 65 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
Capital Exercise 2012 2011 Q4 62 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
2012 Q2
Transparency Exercise 2013 2012 Q4 64 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
2013 Q2 + HK, JP, CH, US, AU, CA
Stress Test 2014 2013 Q4 123 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
+ HK, JP, CH, US, AU, CA, CN, HR
Transparency Exercise 2015 2014 Q4 105 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
2015 Q2 + HK, JP, CH, US, AU, CA, CN, HR
Stress Test 2016 2015 Q4 51 Yes Yes 30 European Countries
+ HK, JP, CH, US, AU, CA, CN, HR
Notes: Category denotes the accounting classification for banks’ sovereign exposure, which includes held to maturity
(HTM), available for sale (AFS), fair value option (FVO), held for trading (HFT), loan and advances, and derivatives.
Maturity denotes the residual maturity of a bank’s sovereign exposure.
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Compared with other data sources, an advantage of the EBA sovereign exposure
datasets is that they provide very detailed information on bank’s sovereign debt
holdings. As indicated by the last three columns in Table 3.3, one can observe a
bank’s exposure to a specific sovereign with a specific residual maturity, classified in
a specific accounting category. More specifically, in terms of the category breakdown,
it provides information on how much of the bank’s sovereign exposure is classified
into the following categories: HTM, AFS, FVO, HFT, and derivatives. Given the
different regulatory treatments of these categories of sovereign exposure as described
previously, they may have different effects on a bank during a sovereign crisis.
The sovereign exposure is decomposed by the following range of the residual
maturity: less than 3-months, 3-months to 1-year, 1-year to 2-year, 2-year to 3-year,
3-year to 5-year, 5-year to 10-year, 10-year to 15-year, and more than 15-year. It is
usually considered that short-term sovereign exposures tends to be less risky then
long-term exposure. However, the relative perceived riskiness can be very different
during the sovereign crisis period. As a distressed government tend to have more
trouble with meeting its debt obligations maturing in the nearer term, bank’s short-
term sovereign exposure can have much more risk than the long-term exposure to
the same sovereign, during the sovereign distress period. For example, the slope of
the Greek bond yield curve became negative at the peak of the crisis, which clearly
shows a higher risk of short-term debts. Thus, this study takes the advantage of
the granularity of the datasets to explore the difference between bank’s short-term
exposures and long-term exposures.
For the information on counter-party countries, as the last column of Table 3.3
shows, the EBA disclosed banks’ exposure to 30 European countries in its first four
exercises. Then the list was extended to include six more countries/areas outside
of the EU during the 2013 transparency exercise, and further extended to include
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bank’s exposure to China and Croatia since the 2014 stress test. Given the fact that
regulatory authorities tend to give a lower risk-weight on a bank’s domestic sovereign
exposure compared with exposure to foreign countries, the analysis also tests the
different effect of domestic exposure and foreign exposure, using the counter-party
information provided by the datasets.
Overall, the granularity of the datasets allows it to explore the heterogeneity
among different types of bank’s sovereign exposures from three aspects: accounting
category, residual maturity and counter-party country. As Table 3.3 shows, the first
EBA sovereign exposure dataset does not have the decomposition of the exposure
by category and maturity, thus the sample period of the main analysis starts from
the 4th quarter of 2010.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the information we could directly observe from
the EBA sovereign exposure datasets.6 The dashed line in the graph shows the
trend of non-GIIPS banks’ total exposure to GIIPS debts over the sample period
from 2010 Q4 to 2015 Q4. The total exposure is decomposed by its accounting
category below the dashed line, where the gap between the dashed line and the
areas is the amount of HTM exposure. It clearly shows that the amount of non-
GIIPS banks total exposure to GIIPS country has dropped significantly since 2010
as the crisis erupted. Two other facts can also be observed from the decomposed
exposure. First, the AFS exposure accounts for at least around half of the total
exposure at all times during the sample period. Second, the decrease in the total
exposure in the early stage of the crisis is mainly due to the decrease in the AFS
exposure. Notice that the significant drop in AFS exposure could be due to two
reasons: 1) banks may be selling these AFS assets at the early stage of the crisis
trying to prevent their capital to be affected by the potential further devaluation in
6To transform the datasets to have a semi-annual frequency, linear interpolation has been
conducted for 2011Q2 and 2014Q2 as sovereign exposure data are not available for these two
dates. The trend in the graph is based on a balanced panel to avoid inconsistency.
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Figure 3.1: Non-GIIPS Banks’ Exposure to GIIPS Debt
breakdown by accounting classification, Euro(millions)
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Source: European Banking Authority
Notes: This figure shows an example of the information we could directly observe from the EBA sovereign exposure datasets. The
dashed line in the graph shows the trend of non-GIIPS banks’ total exposure to GIIPS debts over the sample period from 2010 Q4
to 2015 Q4. The total exposure is decomposed by its accounting category below the dashed line, where the gap between the dashed
line and the areas is the amount of HTM exposure. Linear interpolation has been conducted for 2011Q2 and 2014Q2 as sovereign
exposure data are not available for these two dates. The trend in the graph is based on a balanced panel to avoid inconsistency.
their AFS assets; 2) apart from that, it maybe just because the market value of the
AFS assets is decreasing as they are marked to market.
The non-GIIPS banks’ total exposure to GIIPS debts is decomposed by the
residual maturity of the debts in Figure 3.2, where short-term is defined by maturity
less than 2-year; medium-term is defined by the range of 2-year to 5-year; and long-
term is everything above 5-year. As it shows, the drop in the total exposure before
the year of 2012 is mainly due to the decrease in banks’ short-term and medium-
term exposure. Again this could be for two reasons: banks were selling off these
short-term and medium-term assets as they tend to be riskier; or the market value
of those short-term and medium-term debts significantly dropped thus driving down
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Figure 3.2: Non-GIIPS Banks’ Exposure to GIIPS Debt
breakdown by residual maturity, Euro(millions)
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Source: European Banking Authority
Notes: This figure shows the decomposition for non-GIIPS banks’ total exposure to GIIPS debts based on the residual maturity.
Short-term is defined by maturity less than 2-year; medium-term is defined by the range of 2-year to 5-year; and long-term is everything
above 5-year. Linear interpolation has been conducted for 2011Q2 and 2014Q2 as sovereign exposure data are not available for these
two dates. The trend in the graph is based on a balanced panel to avoid inconsistency.
banks’ exposures.
Figure 3.3 illustrates another example showing the trend of the total sovereign
exposure of the German banking system over the sample period, decomposed by ac-
counting category. Though the German banks’ total sovereign exposures decreases
over time, the overall trend is quite flat. However, the decomposition of the total
exposure shows that German banks significantly reduced their AFS exposure while
added to HTM exposure in the early stage of the crisis, keeping the total amount
of exposure relatively stable. Given this fact, one may consider that those German
banks were actually reclassifying their AFS assets into HTM category. We fur-
ther decompose German banks’ exposure in different category by its counter-party
countries: GIIPS versus non-GIIPS. There is no evidence that the decrease in AFS
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Figure 3.3: German Banks’ Total Exposure
breakdown by accounting classification, Euro(millions)
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Source: European Banking Authority
Notes: This figure shows the trend of the total sovereign exposure of the German banking system over the sample period, decomposed
by accounting category. Linear interpolation has been conducted for 2011Q2 and 2014Q2 as sovereign exposure data are not available
for these two dates. The trend in the graph is based on a balanced panel to avoid inconsistency.
exposure and increase in HTM exposure is because banks were selling off GIIPS
debts in AFS category while buying in core-country’s debt, which confirms the re-
classification hypothesis. As the reclassification behaviour only happened during
the crisis period, this is evidence that bank’s AFS exposure can be very different
from HTM exposure during sovereign distress period.
These examples illustrate the main feature of the EBA sovereign exposure datasets
and the basic facts that could be extracted from those data. The main analysis com-
bines the EBA datasets with other bank-level and country-level variables to formally
answer the research questions of this essay.
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3.4.2 Bank-level Financial Data
Apart from the sovereign exposure data, other bank-level information is collected
for the banks participated in the EBA exercises from the SNL Financial database
which provides high quality data for the financial firms with a quarterly frequency. It
follows Gennaioli et al. (2014a) and uses bank’s loan growth rate as a measurement
of bank’s lending activity. Data are also collected for the following items to control
their effect on bank’s loan growth: bank size measured by the logarithm of bank’s
total assets; bank capital measured by a series of regulatory capital ratios and
proxies for leverage ratio; liquidity captured by bank’s total liquid assets as a ratio
of total assets; profitability measured by bank’s return on assets; and interbank
ratio measured by bank’s interbank lending scaled by its interbank borrowing. All
bank-level variables described above are collected with a quarterly frequency, which
gives us a panel dataset with 1,248 observations for 78 banks over the period from
2010Q4 to 2015Q4. The summary statistics of these variables is presented in the
first panel in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean St.D. Min Max
Bank Level
Loan Growth 1,248 -0.254 3.556 -14.57 17.22
Size 1,248 11.89 1.513 8.343 14.73
CET1 Ratio 1,248 12.09 3.366 1.83 28.69
Liquidity 1,248 88.99 105.7 8.455 983.8
Profitability 1,248 -0.0115 1.449 -7.38 2.45
Interbank Ratio 1,248 67.83 75.86 0.38 806.2
Sovereign Holding Position
Total Position 1,248 22.53 12.8 -10.51 63.59
HTM Position 1,248 8.283 9.165 -0.62 52.15
AFS Position 1,248 11.22 9.364 0 52.13
TB Position 1,248 2.915 4.519 -1.346 41.81
Derivative Position 1,248 0.0979 1.117 -13.1 8.858
Short-term Position 1,248 4.559 3.641 -1.879 22.22
Medium-term Position 1,248 2.899 2.362 -2.447 11.57
Long-term Position 1,248 3.799 3.269 -1.701 17.01
Domestic Position 1,248 7.171 6.161 -0.0672 31.03
Foreign Position 1,248 4.098 4.547 -6.644 23.84
Country Level
GDP Growth 1,248 0.671 2.428 -10.73 8.23
Unemployment Rate 1,248 12.06 6.628 3.07 27.83
Inflation Rate 1,248 1.116 1.449 -2.2 6
Depreciation 1,248 1.031 4.864 -33.33 25
Gov. Bond Yield 1,248 3.777 5.091 0.19 41.74
Number of Banks 78 78 78 78 78
The second panel of Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics for the sovereign debt
holding positions from the EBA datasets, scaled by the banks’ total assets collected
from SNL database. As it shows, it also calculates the decomposed sovereign debt
holding by its category, maturity and counter-party respectively. These variables
are also controlled in the corresponding regressions of the econometric analysis.
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3.4.3 Sovereign Shock Indicator
The main idea of this essay is to analyse a bank’s sovereign exposure on its lending
activity during a sovereign crisis, thus data are collected for sovereign ratings, gov-
ernment bond yield and CDS spread to indicate specific sovereign shocks during the
sample period. Following Adelino and Ferreira (2016), it uses sovereign downgrades
as the primary sovereign shock indicator in the analysis. Sovereign rating data is
collected from one of the main rating agencies - Moody’s for the 30 European and 8
non-EU counter-party countries disclosed by the EBA sovereign exposure datasets.
Downgrade notches are calculated for these countries in each quarter, to match the
quarterly frequency of the bank-level panel dataset.
It also calculates the increase in the quarterly average of government bond yield
and CDS spread as alternative sovereign shock indicators for the same group of
countries. However, the quarterly downgrade notched is the preferable indicator
as it shows clear sovereign shocks in each specific country in each quarter, while
the data of the government bond yield and CDS spread can be very volatile within
a quarter, especially during the crisis period. Using the increase in the quarterly
average of the market data as indicators can either miss information or capture
something else rather than the sovereign shock.
The trend of the aggregate quarterly sovereign shocks for the 30 European coun-
tries and 8 non-EU countries over the sample period is presented in Figure 3.4.
The aggregate sovereign downgrade notches as the primary sovereign shock indica-
tors are depicted with bars while the alternative indicators are presented with lines,
where the CDS spread indicator is labelled with the vertical axis to the right. All of
the three indicators consistently show that the European sovereign debt crisis was
peaked during the second half of 2011. However, it clearly shows that the indicators
based on bond yield and CDS spread are much more volatile then the downgrade
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notches. In addition, there are some spikes in the indicator of bond yield in the later
period of the crisis, which is not very consistent with the other two indicators.
Figure 3.4: Sovereign Shock Indicators
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Notes: This figure shows the trend of the aggregate quarterly sovereign shocks for the 30 European countries and 8 non-EU countries
over the sample period. The aggregate sovereign downgrade notches as the primary sovereign shock indicators are depicted with bars
while the alternative indicators are presented with lines, where the CDS spread indicator is labelled with the vertical axis to the right.
All of the three indicators consistently show that the European sovereign debt crisis was peaked during the second half of 2011. It
also shows that the indicators based on bond yield and CDS spread are much more volatile then the downgrade notches.
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3.5 Econometric Method
3.5.1 Bank Exposure to the Sovereign Crisis
This chapter tests the effect of a sovereign crisis on a bank’s lending activity, given
the bank’s holding positions on the specific sovereign debts. To do this, a mea-
surement is constructed to capture a bank’s exposure to the sovereign crisis. Given
the information on banks’ holding positions on sovereign debts provided by the
EBA datasets, the downgrading notches by Moody’s as the primary sovereign shock
indicator and the bank-level information collected from the SNL database, it com-
bines the data from the 3 data sources and follow Popov and Van Horen (2015)
and De Marco (2015) to construct the exposure measurement as the equation shows
below
Exposurei,t =
∑
k
Positioni,k,t−1 × Shockk,t
Total Assetsi,t−1
where
• i stands for each bank in the sample
• t denotes each quarter in the sample, ranging from 2010Q4 to 2015Q4
• Positioni,k,t is bank i’s holding position on country k’s debts at time t, col-
lected from the EBA datasets; it can either be the total holding position on
a certain country, or the position decomposition by its accounting category,
residual maturity, or counter-party country
• Shockk,t is the sovereign shock indicator for country k at time t, primarily the
downgrade notches for each country from Moody’s rating data
• Total Assetsi,t is bank i’s total assets at time t, collected from the SNL
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database.
As the equation shows, the Exposurei,t captures bank i’s exposure to the Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis at time t, which is equal to the summation of bank i’s
sovereign debts holding position on each country in the previous time period, times
its corresponding sovereign shock indicator in current period, then scaled by the
bank’s total assets. Furthermore, Position can either be the bank’s total sovereign
debts holding position, or the holding position decomposition by its accounting cat-
egory, residual maturity or counter-party country, depending on the situation.
The following is an example of the application of the exposure measurement in
a hypothetical scenario. Suppose a bank only holds sovereign debts issued by the
2 countries: country A and country B, and the sovereign distress happens in both
countries, the bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt crisis would be given by the
following equation:
Exposuret =
PositionA,t−1 × ShockA,t + PositionB,t−1 × ShockB,t
Total Assetsi,t−1
.
If the sovereign distress only happens in country A, the exposure measurement would
be reduced to the equation below:
Exposuret =
PositionA,t−1 × ShockA,t
Total Assetsi,t−1
where the bank’s holding position on country B’s debts would not be taken into
account as there is no sovereign shock stemming from country B. Thus, the exposure
measurement is actually a Difference-in-Difference term if one considers Position as
a treatment and Shock as a indicator for treatment period.
Figure 3.5 shows the trend of the average of the bank’s total exposure to the
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Figure 3.5: Bank Exposure to Sovereign Shocks
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Notes: This figure shows the trend of the average of the bank’s total exposure to the European sovereign debt crisis over the sample
period, where the exposure measurements are generalised by taking logarithm. The red line in the graph denotes the trend of the
exposure measurement constructed based on the downgrading notches which is the primary sovereign shock indicator, while the blue
line and the green line depict the measurement based on CDS spread and government bond yield respectively. As the European
sovereign debt crisis peaked in the second half of 2011, the average of the banks’ exposure to the crisis also increases to the highest
point, and this is consistent across the exposure measurements based on different sovereign shock indicators. It also shows that the
measurements based on CDS spread and government bond yield are more volatile than the primary exposure measurement which is
based on sovereign downgrade notches.
European sovereign debt crisis over the sample period, where the exposure measure-
ments are generalised by taking the logarithm. The red line in the graph denotes the
trend of the exposure measurement constructed based on the downgrading notches
which is the primary sovereign shock indicator, while the blue line and the green
line depict the measurement based on CDS spread and government bond yield re-
spectively. As the European sovereign debt crisis peaked in the second half of 2011
as indicated by Figure 3.4, the average of the banks’ exposure to the crisis also in-
creases to the highest point, and this is consistent across the exposure measurements
based on different sovereign shock indicators. It also shows that the measurements
based on CDS spread and government bond yield are more volatile than the primary
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exposure measurement which is based on sovereign downgrade notches.
Figure 3.6: Average Trend of Loan Growth Rate
breakdown by exposure to the sovereign shocks
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Notes: This figure shows the trend of the average loan growth rate for banks in two different groups separately, where blue line
stands for the low exposed banks and red line for highly exposed banks. As it shows, before the start of the European sovereign debt
crisis in early 2010, there is a common trend between the two groups of banks - the collapse of the banking credit supply due to the
global financial crisis. The trends of loan growth for both groups bounce back in late 2009. However, the trends start to diverge as
the European sovereign debt crisis erupts in 2010: highly exposed banks tend to have a lower loan growth rate than the low exposed
banks as the crisis deepened in 2011. Moreover, it also shows that the two trends tend to converge in the later period of the crisis,
indicating that bank’s lending activity would not be affected if there are no further sovereign shocks.
Based on the average of the banks’ exposure to the crisis over the sample period,
the sample banks are equally separated into two groups: highly exposed banks with
exposure higher than the median and low exposed banks with exposure lower or
equal to the median. This gives us 43 banks in the low group and 43 in the high
group. Figure 3.6 depicts the trend of the average loan growth rate for banks in the
2 groups separately, where blue line stands for the low exposed banks and red line
for highly exposed banks. As it shows, before the start of the European sovereign
debt crisis in early 2010, there is a common trend between the two groups of banks
- the collapse of the banking credit supply due to the global financial crisis. The
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trends of loan growth for both groups bounce back in late 2009. However, the trends
start to diverge as the European sovereign debt crisis erupts in 2010: highly exposed
banks tend to have a lower loan growth rate than the low exposed banks as the crisis
deepened in 2011. Moreover, it also shows that the two trends tend to converge in
the later period of the crisis, indicating that bank’s lending activity would not be
affected if there are no further sovereign shocks. Controlling for other factors, this
effect is formally tested in the following regression analysis.
3.5.2 Regression Specification
The main purpose of this essay is to answer the 3 research questions: first, can
sovereign crisis have a negative effect on a bank’s lending activity through the bank’s
exposure to the sovereign debts; second, can better bank strength alleviate the ad-
verse effect of a sovereign shock where bank strength is measured by the level of
bank capital and funding stability; and third, is there any heterogeneity among dif-
ferent types of sovereign exposure? These research questions are formally examined
by the regressions with the following specifications.
The first step regression focuses on the first research question, and the specifica-
tion is illustrated by the equation below.
∆Loani,c,t = α0 + α1Exposurei,t−1 + α2Strengthi,t−1
+α3Xi,t−1 + α4Xc,t + γt + γi + i,c,t (3.1)
where
• i stands for each bank in the sample
• c denotes in which country the bank locates
• t denotes each quarter in the sample, ranging from 2010Q4 to 2016Q2
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• ∆Loani,c,t is the loan growth rate of bank i in country c at time t
• Exposurei,t measures bank i’s exposure to the sovereign debt crisis at time t,
where the exposure can either be the total exposure to the sovereign crisis, or
the exposure decomposition by the accounting category, residual maturity or
counter-party country
• Strengthi,t captures bank i’s strength, mainly measured by capital ratios and
funding stability ratios
• Xi,t is a set of bank-level control variables
• Xc,t is a set of macroeconomic control variables at country-level
• γt is time dummy variables controlling for quarter fixed effect
• γi controls for bank-level fixed effect
• i,c,t is the error term for bank i in country c at time t.
As the equation shows, it controls for bank and country specific characteristics
and bank-level and quarter fixed effect to investigate the effect of a sovereign shock
on bank lending activities. The central hypothesis here is that the estimated coeffi-
cient on Exposure, α1, is significantly less than 0, suggesting that a bank’s lending
activities would be negatively affected if the bank is exposed to the sovereign shocks.
For the second research question, an interaction term between Exposure and
Strength is introduced into the baseline model, and the specification is illustrated
by the equation below
∆Loani,c,t = β0 + β1Exposurei,t−1 + β2Strengthi,t−1 + β3Exposurei,t−1 × Strengthi,t−1
+β4Xi,t−1 + β5Xc,t + γt + γi + i,c,t.(3.2)
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The main hypothesis in this regression is that the estimated coefficient on the inter-
action term, β3, is significantly greater than 0, as it is expected that bank strength
would be helpful for banks to be more resilient to a sovereign shock. Indicating
bank strength with capital ratios and funding stability ratios, the regressions at
this stage would show implications for both capital channel and funding channel as
transmissions between sovereign crisis and banking crisis.
For the third research question, a bank’s exposure to the crisis is decomposed
by the exposure’s accounting category, residual maturity and counter-party country
to test the heterogeneity among these different types of exposure. For example, a
bank’s total exposure is decomposed by the accounting category and all the following
types of exposure are included into the regression: AFS exposure, HTM exposure,
TB exposure and derivative exposure. The estimates on these terms are expected to
differ from each other due to their different accounting and regulatory treatment. It
is expected that AFS exposure would have a greater adverse effect as this types of
exposure are marked to market while there is almost no capital requirement on these
holdings. Furthermore, all these decomposed exposure terms are also interacted with
the bank strength term to test their heterogeneity through capital channel.
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3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Baseline Results
The baseline results for the analysis are presented in Table 3.5, which answers the
first research question whether bank lending could be affected by a sovereign shock
if the bank is exposed to the shock through sovereign debt holdings. As Table 3.5
shows, the key term Total Exposure is lagged for 1, 2 and 3 period in three separate
regressions to test whether a sovereign shock would have a long lasting effect on bank
lending, and the results for the three regressions are presented in column 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Bank-level and country-level variables are included in each regression
to control for the effect of bank characteristics and macroeconomic demand-side
effect of the bank’s lending activity. In addition, bank and quarter fixed effect are
also controlled in all regressions.
The first panel of Table 3.5 shows the estimated coefficient on the key terms. As
it shows, the estimation on the 1-period-lagged term in the first column is positive
but insignificant, which indicates that bank lending in current period would not be
significantly affected by the sovereign shock occurred in the last quarter. However,
the key term with a 2-period lag is estimated to be negative and significant in col-
umn 2. As Total Exposure is generalised by taking logarithm, the interpretation of
the estimated number is the following: 1 percent increase in a bank’s exposure to
the sovereign crisis would reduce the bank’s lending growth rate by 0.975 percentage
point in the second following quarter, which is not just statistically but also eco-
nomically significant. The coefficient in column 3 is estimated to be a small negative
number, indicating that the adverse effect of a sovereign shock on bank lending tend
to last for 3 quarters. However this effect is not statistically significant. Overall,
the estimation on the key terms indicates that a sovereign shock would have an
120
3.6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS CHAPTER 3
Table 3.5: Baseline Result - Effect of Sovereign Shock on Bank Lend-
ing
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan% (1) (2) (3)
Total Exposuret−1 0.216
(0.310)
Total Exposuret−2 -0.975**
(0.444)
Total Exposuret−3 -0.306
(0.402)
Bank Level Controls
Total Sovereign Positiont−1 -0.026 -0.032 -0.039*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Sizet−1 -4.221* -4.565** -5.153*
(2.495) (2.220) (2.984)
Loan to Assets Ratiot−1 -0.127* -0.164** -0.161**
(0.070) (0.067) (0.080)
CET1 Capital Ratiot−1 0.062 0.075 0.078
(0.091) (0.092) (0.096)
Liquidityt−1 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Interbank Ratiot−1 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Return on Assetst−1 0.260*** 0.218** 0.176**
(0.083) (0.086) (0.084)
Country Level Controls
GDP Growtht−1 0.117 0.092 0.249**
(0.085) (0.105) (0.099)
Unemployment Ratet−1 0.098 0.091 0.243*
(0.084) (0.102) (0.122)
Inflation Ratet−1 -0.365** -0.235 -0.303
(0.172) (0.188) (0.201)
Depreciationt−1 -0.221* -0.213* -0.208*
(0.126) (0.124) (0.112)
Gov. Bond Yieldt−1 0.077 0.099 0.115*
(0.063) (0.061) (0.062)
Constant 5.159 11.015*** 7.366
(3.535) (4.063) (4.427)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,112 1,041 971
No. of Banks 78 78 77
R2 0.166 0.187 0.180
Notes: This table shows the baseline results of the analysis where the first panel shows the estimated coefficient on
the key terms. It shows that the estimation on the 1-period-lagged term is positive but insignificant. However, the key
term with a 2-period lag is estimated to be negative and significant in column 2: 1 percent increase in a bank’s exposure
to the sovereign crisis would reduce the bank’s lending growth rate by 0.975 percentage point in the second following
quarter. The coefficient in column 3 indicates that the adverse effect of a sovereign shock on bank lending tend to last
for 3 quarters. Overall the baseline results suggests that a sovereign shock would have an adverse effect on a bank’s
lending activity if the bank is exposed to the shock by holding the the specific sovereign debts.
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adverse effect on bank lending 2 quarters later. It expected that the negative ef-
fect of a sovereign shock can take 2 quarters to be reflected from a bank’s lending
activities for the following two reasons. First, banks will need to make accounting
operations to realise its losses due to the sovereign shock, then adjust its lending
activity as a response to the losses, and this process tend to take time. Second, the
managers of a bank will need to make judgement on the strength and permanence
of a sovereign shock based on other sources of information, so that they can confirm
whether the sovereign shock is a permanent shock and adjust the bank’s lending
strategy accordingly. This process tends to take time because some shocks may be
seen as temporary at the beginning while turn to be long-lasting/permanent as the
crisis continues to deteriorate.
In terms of the estimations on the bank-level control variables, there are some
consistent findings across the three models. Though bank’s exposure to the crisis
is estimated to be both statistically and economically significant, it does not show
a robust and significant effect for a bank’s total sovereign holding positions. Bank
size tend to be negatively related with lending growth rate. Taking estimations from
column 2 as an example, if a bank’s total assets increase by 1 percent, the bank’s
lending growth rate would decrease by 4.565 percentage point. Loan to assets ratios
is included in the model to control for the riskiness of the portfolio of a bank, and the
estimations on this term are consistently estimated to be negative and significant:
if the ratio of a bank increase by 1 percentage point, the bank’s lending growth
rate would decrease by 16 .4 basis points. Bank profitability is estimated to have
a positive effect on bank’s credit supply: a one percentage point higher return on
assets would increase the bank’s lending growth rate by 21.8 basis points in the next
quarter. Besides, we do no find any significant effect of bank capital, liquidity and
interbank funding position on bank lending at this stage.
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Overall, the baseline results here shows that a sovereign shock would have an
adverse effect on a bank’s lending activity if the bank is exposed to the shock by
holding the the specific sovereign debts. This result is consistent with the existing
findings in the literature (Gennaioli et al., 2014a,b; Popov and Van Horen, 2015;
De Marco, 2015).
3.6.2 Exposure Decomposition
Given the fact that the only the coefficient on the 2-period-lagged Total Exposure
is estimated to be significant in the first stage, it then focuses on the model spec-
ification with a 2-period lag on the key terms in the following analysis. Based on
the baseline results in the first stage, this section investigates the heterogeneity of
the effect among different types of exposure by replacing the Total Exposure term
with decomposed exposure, according to its accounting category, residual maturity
and counter-party country. The decomposed sovereign debt holding positions are
also included in corresponding regressions at this stage as control variables.
The regression results are presented in Table 3.6. The first column in Table 3.6
presents the baseline result estimated in the first stage analysis as a comparison.
The Total Exposure is then decomposed by accounting category in column 2. As
it shows, the only significant term is bank’s derivative exposure: 1 percent increase
in the exposure to the sovereign crisis in derivatives would reduce a bank’s lend-
ing growth rate by 13.26 percentage points. Apart from that, it does not show a
significant effect for a bank’s AFS epxosure, HTM exposure and trading book ex-
posure. The analysis on the transmission mechanism in Section 3.3 suggests that
the negative effect of a bank’s AFS sovereign exposure would be more significant
for less-capitalised banks. Thus, the insignificant coefficient estimated on AFS ex-
posure in column 2 might be driven by better-capitalised banks in the sample. The
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of Total Sovereign Exposure
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan% Exposure Breakdown by
Baseline Category Maturity Counterparty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Exposuret−2 -0.975**
(0.444)
AFS Exposuret−2 -0.292
(0.578)
HTM Exposuret−2 -1.063
(0.744)
TB Exposuret−2 -0.032
(1.143)
Derivative Exposuret−2 -13.258**
(6.438)
Short-term Exposuret−2 -0.838
(1.169)
Medium-term Exposuret−2 0.503
(1.354)
Long-term Exposuret−2 -1.404
(0.958)
Domestic Exposuret−2 -0.904**
(0.437)
Foreign Exposuret−2 -0.422
(1.104)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
Number of bankid 78 78 78 78
R-squared 0.187 0.194 0.189 0.189
Notes: This table shows the regression results with the decompositions of banks’ sovereign exposure, along with the
baseline results in column 1. Refer to Table 3.5 for full specifications. The sovereign exposure is decomposed according
to its accounting classification (AFS, HTM, TB), residual maturity (short, medium and long) and counterparty country
(domestic and foreign) respectively in column 2, 3 and 4.
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second stage analysis in the next section would further identify this capital channel.
Overall, the results at this stage suggests that the adverse effect of bank’s exposure
to the crisis is mainly driven by the exposure in derivatives.
Then, the exposure is decomposed by residual maturity, and the result is pre-
sented in column 3 in Table 3.6. Though the total exposure is estimated to be
negative and significant in the first stage, it does not show any significant effect
with the exposure decomposition by maturity, as column 3 shows. It then tests the
correlation among the decomposed exposure terms, as the insignificant result might
be due to the correlation between these terms which could possibly increase the
estimated standard errors. However the result of the test does not suggest a severe
correlation between them.
Column 4 in Table 3.6 shows the result for the regression with exposure decom-
position by counter-party country. As it shows, the Total Exposure is replaced
with a bank’s exposure to domestic sovereign shocks and its exposure to foreign
shocks. The estimated coefficient is only significant on the domestic exposure while
exposure to foreign shocks is estimated to have an statistically insignificant effect
on bank lending. It suggests that one percent increase in the exposure to domestic
sovereign shock would reduce a bank’s lending growth rate by 0.9 percentage points
2 quarters later. Overall, this result suggests that a bank’s exposure to the domestic
sovereign crisis tend to have a greater adverse effect on the bank’s lending activity.
3.6.3 Capital Channel and Interbank Funding Channel
In the first stage analysis, the results suggest that a sovereign shock can have a
negative effect on bank’s lending activity if the bank’s balance sheet is exposed to
the specific sovereign debt. This section investigates the reasons why the bank’s
exposure to the sovereign debt would have the adverse effect on the bank lending.
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Two mechanisms has been proposed in the literature: capital channel and funding
channel (Popov and Van Horen, 2015; De Marco, 2015). On one hand, the capital
channel hypothesis argues that a value bank’s sovereign debt holdings would decrease
given a sovereign distress event, which would have a negative effect on bank’s capital
level. Bounded by the regulatory capital requirement, a bank has two options to
maintain its capital ratio above the minimum requirement: issue new equity and
cut its lending. However, given the fact that raising capital ratio by issuing new
equity can be costly especially during a crisis period, banks tend to choose the latter
option thus reduce its credit supply.
On the other, the funding channel hypothesis argues that the devaluation of the
sovereign debts held by banks would reduce the banks’ borrowing capacity in the
wholesale funding market, as they usually use sovereign debts as collateral when
entering a wholesale funding contract. During a sovereign debt crisis, a bank may
not be able to sustain its lending activity if it is highly exposed to the sovereign debt
meanwhile highly dependent on wholesale funding. Evidence has been provided that
in the early stage of the European sovereign debt crisis, the Greek sovereign debts
has been abandoned to be used as collateral in the interbank market (Drechsler
et al., 2016). This section presents the results of the tests on both transmission
channels.
In the second stage analysis, it tests the transmission channels by using the
regressions specifications described by Equation 2. As it shows, a bank’s exposure
to the sovereign crisis is interacted with a strength indicator of the bank, where
bank strength is measured by a series of regulatory capital ratio, leverage ratio and
funding stability ratio to test the capital channel and funding channel.
To make the result clear and easier to be interpreted, dummy variables are
generated based on these bank strength indicators. More specifically, the dummy
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variables for regulatory capital ratios would be equal to 1 if a bank’s regulatory
capital is greater than the corresponding minimum requirement plus the conserva-
tion buffer; otherwise 0. For example, the minimum requirement on a bank’s CET1
capital ratio is 4.5% while the conservation buffer is 2.5%, thus a bank with a CET1
ratio higher than 7% would have a CET1 dummy equal to 1. The dummy variables
for tier1 capital ratio and total capital ratio follow the same setting. In terms of the
dummy variable for the interbank funding ratio, it equals to 1 if the ratio is greater
than 100%, indicating that this bank is a net interbank lender; thus a net interbank
borrower would have a dummy equal to 0. Other bank strength indicators includes
synthetic leverage ratios measured by a bank’s CET1 capital over total assets and
total equity over total assets, and funding stability ratios measured by a bank’s
deposit funding over total assets and wholesale funding over total assets. For these
bank strength indicators, the dummy variable would be equal to 1 if the ratio is
greater than the 25th percentile level of the whole sample.
The results of the second stage regressions are presented in Table 3.7. The coeffi-
cient in the first column is estimated from the baseline regression without interaction
terms and included in the table as a comparison. It suggests that a 1 percent in-
crease in a bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt crisis would reduce the bank’s
lending growth rate by 0.935 percentage points. However, this is the overall effect
estimated for all banks in the whole sample. From column 2 onward, interaction
terms between exposure and bank strength indicators are included into the baseline
regressions. As it shows, once the interaction term is included, the estimated coeffi-
cient on Total Exposure increases, and the coefficient on the interaction terms are
all estimated to be positive and significant.
Taking results in column 2 as an example, the first number suggests that for
banks with CET1 capital ratio lower than 7%, the lending growth rate would be 3.84
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percentage points lower if its exposure to the crisis increase by 1 percent. Compared
with the estimation from the baseline regression, the adverse effect of the sovereign
shock is about four times larger on less capitalised banks. However, the estimated
coefficient on the interaction term is 3.831, which means that the overall effect on
the better capitalised banks would be -3.84 + 3.831, which would be very close to 0.
This result suggests that the effect of a sovereign shock on the lending growth rate
of the better capitalised banks would be economically insignificant. In other words,
it suggests that the bank capital would alleviate the adverse effect of a sovereign
shock on the bank lending. As the rest of the table presents, it also tests this effect
with other capital ratios and leverage ratios, and the results are very consistent that
the estimated coefficient on the interaction terms are all positive and significant.
Overall, the findings provides robust evidence on the capital channel.
The funding channel is also supported by the results of these regressions. As the
bottom part of Table 3.7 shows, the coefficients on the interaction terms between
Total Exposure and Interbank Ratio are consistently estimated to be positive and
significant. Though estimated number is small, it shows that a net interbank lender
which is less dependent on the wholesale funding market tend to have a higher
lending growth rate given a sovereign shock.This effect is also tested with other
funding stability ratios, such as deposit funding over total assets and wholesale
funding over total assets. However, there are no significant estimations on the
interaction terms. Overall, the results supports the funding channel hypothesis.
Though the effect is only significant for interbank ratio while not significant for
other indicators, it argues that the interbank ratio should be consider as the primary
indicator as it shows the net position of a bank which can better capture the bank’s
reliance on the wholesale funding market.
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Table 3.7: Transmission Channels: Capital and Interbank Funding
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Exposuret−2 -0.935** -3.840** -3.787** -2.948* -1.980 -1.735
(0.433) (1.576) (1.491) (1.646) (1.601) (1.694)
Total Exposuret−2 * CET1 Ratiot−1 3.831***
(1.000)
Total Exposuret−2 * Tier1 Capital Ratiot−1 2.893***
(0.870)
Total Exposuret−2 * Total Capital Ratiot−1 2.835***
(0.925)
Total Exposuret−2 * CET1/Total Assetst−1 2.234*
(1.237)
Total Exposuret−2 * Equity/Total Assetst−1 1.898**
(0.788)
Total Exposuret−2 * Interbank Ratiot−1 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.024*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
No. of Banks 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.187 0.206 0.204 0.207 0.198 0.199
Notes: This table shows the results for the tests of capital channel and funding channel. Refer to Table 3.5 for full specifications. The coefficient in the first column is
estimated from the baseline regression without interaction terms and included in the table as a comparison. From column 2 onward, we start to include interaction terms
between exposure and bank strength indicators in to the baseline regressions. As it shows, we test the capital channel with different capital ratios and leverage ratios, and
the results are very consistent that the estimated coefficient on the interaction terms are all positive and significant, which provides robust evidence on the capital channel.
Besides, the significant estimates on the interaction term between Total Exposure and Interbank Ratio also provide evidence for the funding channel hypothesis.
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3.6.4 Capital Channel through Different Types of Exposure
This section decomposes a bank’s exposure to the sovereign crisis and interact each
exposure term with the bank strength indicators to test the heterogeneity among
these different types of exposure in the capital channel. Again, the total exposure is
decomposed by its accounting category, residual maturity and counter-party country.
The results are present by Table 3.8 - Table 3.10.
Table 3.8 shows the results from the regressions with category breakdown. First
column in Table 3.8 shows the baseline result, which suggests that only derivative
exposure matters. However, once the interactions between these exposure terms
and bank capital dummies are introduced into the regressions, the estimations con-
sistently show that a bank’s exposure to the crisis through its AFS sovereign debt
holdings has a negative and significant effect on the bank’s lending growth rate if
the bank is less capitalised. Given the fact that the coefficients on the interaction
terms between AFS exposure and bank capital dummies are consistently estimated
to be positive and significant across different models, it suggests that higher bank
capital would alleviate the adverse effect of bank’s exposure to the crisis due to its
AFS holdings. Furthermore, it suggests that a bank’s AFS sovereign exposure plays
a significant role through the capital channel when there is a sovereign shock. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that AFS exposure tend to have a greater
effect on less capitalised bank as AFS sovereign debt holdings are not risk-weighted
while they are marked-to-market.
Then, it decomposes a bank’s exposure to the crisis by the residual maturity, and
the results are presented in Table 3.9. The estimations in column 2 and 3 suggests
that for less capitalised banks, the short-term exposure tend to have a greater effect
on their lending growth. However, this effect is not consistently supported by the
regressions with other bank capital dummies. As presented by column 4,5 and 6
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in Table 3.9, the interaction term between AFS exposure and total capital ratio,
tier 1 capital over total assets, and equity over total assets are all estimated to be
insignificant.
Finally, a bank’s total exposure to the crisis is decomposed by the counter-party
country. Table 3.10 shows the regression results. The baseline results in the first
column of Table 3.10 suggests that 1 percent increase in a bank’s exposure to the
crisis due to its domestic sovereign debt holdings would reduce its lending growth
rate by 0.867 percentage points. Result in column 2 suggests that for less capitalised
banks the adverse effect would be tripled: 1 percent increase in a bank’s domestic
exposure would reduce its lending growth rate by 3.17 percentage points if the bank’s
CET1 ratio is less than 7%. However, the positive and significant estimation on the
interaction term suggests that this adverse effect on better capitalised banks would
be economically insignificant. This results is confirmed by other regressions with
different bank capital indicators.
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Table 3.8: Capital Channel through AFS Exposure
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFS Exposuret−2 -0.297 -8.874* -10.508** -4.856 -7.052* -0.469
(0.576) (4.600) (3.990) (4.468) (3.928) (3.245)
HTM Exposuret−2 -0.938 5.431 8.342** 3.538 6.269 0.403
(0.740) (5.028) (4.069) (5.058) (4.951) (4.497)
TB Exposuret−2 -0.194 -6.568 -5.420 -6.738 -11.925 -4.346
(1.160) (20.491) (9.199) (11.203) (13.463) (10.003)
Derivative Exposuret−2 -13.199** 60.940 58.762 1.418 29.285 32.133
(6.140) (42.008) (44.384) (47.656) (51.813) (43.244)
AFS Exposuret−2 * CET1 Ratiot−1 6.664**
(2.886)
AFS Exposuret−2 * Tier1 Capital Ratiot−1 7.752**
(3.058)
AFS Exposuret−2 * Total Capital Ratiot−1 4.085*
(2.174)
AFS Exposuret−2 * CET1/Total Assetst−1 8.943**
(3.639)
AFS Exposuret−2 * Equity/Total Assetst−1 -0.384
(1.441)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
No. of Banks 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.194 0.220 0.222 0.227 0.222 0.218
Notes: This table shows the results from the second-step regressions with category breakdown. Refer to Table 3.5 for full specifications. First column presents the baseline
result, which suggests that only derivative exposure matters. However, once we introduce the interactions between these exposure terms with bank capital dummies in to
the regressions, the estimations consistently show that a bank’s exposure to the crisis through its AFS sovereign debt holdings has a negative and significant effect on the
bank’s lending growth rate if the bank is less capitalised. It also suggests that higher bank capital would alleviate the adverse effect of bank’s exposure to the crisis due to
its AFS holdings. Overall it indicates that a bank’s AFS sovereign exposure plays a significant role through the capital channel when there is a sovereign shock, which is
consistent with the hypothesis that AFS exposure tend to have a greater effect on less capitalised bank as AFS sovereign debt holdings are not risk-weighted while they are
marked-to-market.
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Table 3.9: Capital Channel through Short-term Exposure
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short-term Exposuret−2 -0.866 -21.637*** -13.870** -5.785 -5.544 3.695
(1.139) (6.953) (6.750) (8.790) (8.716) (8.357)
Medium-term Exposuret−2 0.507 25.826*** 16.004* 9.736 10.727 -7.518
(1.325) (7.920) (8.172) (9.763) (10.191) (10.098)
Long-term Exposuret−2 -1.302 -3.781 -2.667 -0.202 -0.706 1.693
(0.914) (5.086) (4.976) (5.357) (5.256) (6.080)
Short-term Exposuret−2 * CET1 Ratiot−1 16.850***
(2.997)
Short-term Exposuret−2 * Tier1 Capital Ratiot−1 9.082***
(2.393)
Short-term Exposuret−2 * Total Capital Ratiot−1 2.178
(3.487)
Short-term Exposuret−2 * CET1/Total Assetst−1 0.848
(5.831)
Short-term Exposuret−2 * Equity/Total Assetst−1 -3.915
(2.804)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
No. of Banks 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.190 0.223 0.219 0.221 0.210 0.217
Notes: This table shows the results from the second-step regressions with maturity breakdown. Refer to Table 3.5 for full specifications. First column presents the baseline
result for comparison purpose. The estimations in column 2 and 3 suggests that for less capitalised banks, the short-term exposure tend to have a greater effect on their
lending growth. However, this effect is not consistently supported by the regressions with other bank capital dummies, as presented from column 4 to column 6.
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Table 3.10: Capital Channel through Domestic Exposure
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Exposuret−2 -0.867** -3.170** -3.544** -1.851 -1.336 -1.182
(0.433) (1.470) (1.348) (1.532) (1.521) (1.695)
Foreign Exposuret−2 -0.321 0.647 3.601 3.063 2.459 2.929
(1.087) (5.765) (6.382) (5.753) (5.750) (6.135)
Domestic Exposuret−2 * CET1 Ratiot−1 4.132***
(0.847)
Domestic Exposuret−2 * Tier1 Capital Ratiot−1 3.068***
(0.850)
Domestic Exposuret−2 * Total Capital Ratiot−1 2.810***
(0.945)
Domestic Exposuret−2 * CET1/Total Assetst−1 2.047*
(1.114)
Domestic Exposuret−2 * Equity/Total Assetst−1 2.101**
(0.860)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
No. of Banks 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.189 0.212 0.210 0.212 0.203 0.205
Notes: This table shows the results from the second-step regressions with counterparty country breakdown. Refer to Table 3.5 for full specifications. First column presents
the baseline result for comparison purpose. Result in column 2 suggests that for less capitalised banks the adverse effect would be tripled: 1 percent increase in a bank’s
domestic exposure would reduce its lending growth rate by 3.17 percentage points if the bank’s CET1 ratio is less than 7%. However, the positive and significant estimation
on the interaction term suggests that this adverse effect on better capitalised banks would be economically insignificant. This results is confirmed by other regressions with
different bank capital indicators.
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3.6.5 Heterogeneity among GIIPS and Non-GIIPS Banks
As it shows in the previous sections, the results support the hypothetical capital
channel through which a bank’s sovereign exposure would have a negative effect
on the bank’s capital given a sovereign shock, which would result in a lower credit
supply. On the other hand, this result also suggests that a higher level of bank
capital would alleviate the adverse effect caused by a sovereign shock. However,
one may argue that for those banks that are located in a crisis country, the adverse
effect of the sovereign shock might be too big to be alleviated even if the banks have
a higher capital ratio.
This section examines this issue by testing the heterogeneity of the capital ef-
fect among GIIPS and Non-GIIPS banks. To do this, a triple interaction term is
introduced between Total Exposure, bank capital indicators and a GIIPS dummy
variable in to the regressions. The results are presented in Table 3.11. As it shows,
there is no consistently significant estimates on the triple interaction term, which
suggests that the there is no significant difference in the effect of capital between
GIIPS and non GIIPS banks. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on the triple in-
teraction term is actually positive and significant in column 2, which is evidence
that the CET1 capital contributes more on the resilience of the banking system in
crisis countries.
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneity of Capital Effect among GIIPS and Non-
GIIPS Banks
Dependent Variable: ∆Loan (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Exposuret−2 -0.935** -2.915* -2.985* -2.438 -1.076 -0.973
(0.433) (1.608) (1.540) (1.562) (1.441) (1.430)
Total Exposuret−2 * GIIPS -0.669 0.566 0.392 -0.218 0.260
(0.497) (0.644) (0.491) (0.527) (0.591)
Total Exposuret−2 * CET1t−1 3.062***
(1.070)
Total Exposuret−2 * CET1t−1 * GIIPS 1.858**
(0.845)
Total Exposuret−2 * Tier1t−1 2.123**
(0.979)
Total Exposuret−2 * Tier1t−1 * GIIPS 0.872
(0.926)
Total Exposuret−2 * Totalt−1 2.195**
(1.031)
Total Exposuret−2 * Totalt−1 * GIIPS 0.863
(1.001)
Total Exposuret−2 * CET1/TAt−1 1.049
(1.271)
Total Exposuret−2 * CET1/TAt−1 * GIIPS 2.070**
(0.802)
Total Exposuret−2 * Equity/TAt−1 0.740
(0.949)
Total Exposuret−2 * Equity/TAt−1 * GIIPS 2.567***
(0.960)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041 1,041
No. of Banks 78 78 78 78 78 78
R2 0.187 0.208 0.208 0.209 0.202 0.210
Notes: This table shows the results from the regressions with a a triple interaction term between Total Exposure, bank capital
indicators and a GIIPS dummy variable, by which we explosre the heterogeneity of the capital effect among GIIPS and Non-GIIPS
banks. The sample contains 34 GIIPS banks and 44 non-GIIPS banks. Refer to Table 3.5 for full specifications. First column presents
the baseline result for comparison purpose. It shows that the triple interaction term are not consistently estimated to be significant,
which suggests that the there is no significant difference in the effect of capital between GIIPS and non GIIPS banks. Moreover, the
estimated coefficient on the triple interaction term is actually positive and significant in column 2, which is evidence that the CET1
capital contributes more on the resilience of the banking system in crisis countries.
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3.7 Conclusion
The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis showed how banks’ large exposures to distressed
governments could lead to instability in the banking system. Large exposures can
give rise to a ’doom loop’ between governments and the banking system, impairing
banks’ solvency and credit supply as a result. This causes slower economic growth,
which in turns increases further the sovereign’s distress. This was indeed the case
for the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis. The impact of Euro Area sovereign distress
on the banking system may have been more pronounced because the regulatory
requirements on banks’ sovereign exposures are very low. For example, banks are
not required to have any capital against the credit risk they face with their exposures
to EU sovereigns irrespective of the risk those sovereigns may default. Regulatory
limits on large exposures also exempt exposures to sovereigns. And until 2017,
banks were not required to deduct fully from regulatory capital the losses incurred
on sovereign exposures held as available for sale.
The links between sovereign exposures and bank lending have been explored in
a number of papers, but none of them have focused on the different accounting
treatment that these exposures can have. These differences might have important
implications, not only to understand the transmission channels from sovereign shocks
to bank lending, but also for the design of new regulation. And this is precisely what
this essay aims to do: it investigate whether the accounting treatments of sovereign
exposures affected the strength of transmission of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis
onto banks and bank lending. One of the key differences in accounting treatment
is the approach to valuing an exposure. Some exposures are valued according to
their value when they were created (’historical cost’ basis), while others are valued
according to their current market value (’fair value’ basis). Some have put forward
theories for why fair value accounting can increase instability in the banking system.
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This chapter sheds light on the main channels through which shocks to the value
of sovereign bonds may affect bank lending behaviour and whether capital could
alleviate the transmission mechanism. It uses the European Banking Authority
(EBA) stress tests and transparency exercises, which contain granular information
of banks sovereign exposures, in order to focus on the accounting definition of these
exposures, since some exposures are recorded mark-to-market while others at book
valuation. This allows the analysis to have a much more precise estimate of how
exposed to the sovereign debt turmoil banks are. These data are matched with
bank-level balance sheet information obtained from SNL, such as solvency ratios,
asset size, or position in the interbank market, from 2010 to 2016.
In line with previous studies, the findings suggest that negative shocks to sovereign
bond prices are associated to lower subsequent bank lending for banks more exposed
to the shocks, but these relation is weaker for better capitalised banks (Kirschen-
mann et al., 2016), what is known as the ‘capital channel’. Moreover, it shows that
bank capital matters especially for exposures that are both mark-to-market and
subject to no capital requirements, such as available for sale (AFS) exposures: this
seems to be the type of exposure through which sovereign shocks are transmitted
directly to bank solvency. The capital channel is less important for book-value ex-
posures (held to maturity (HTM)) and exposures with positive capital requirements
(held for trading (HFT)). It also reveals that the capital channel is particularly im-
portant for short-term exposures (rather than medium- and long-term) and domestic
exposures (rather than foreign). These results provide useful evidence to design a
more robust regulatory capital framework for sovereign exposures.
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4.1 Introduction
Following Keeley (1990)’s research, there has been a ongoing debate on the rela-
tionship between bank competition and financial stability in the literature for more
than two decades. This issue became especially important after the 2008 global
financial crisis, which has been widely attributed to the intensified competition in
the financial sector due to the U.S. banking deregulation and also the worldwide
financial liberalisation. As a result, the crisis induced large cost for the government
and in turn for the general public, and finally evolved into a long-lasting economic
recession in many major economies. On one hand, higher competition is generally
desirable as it is positively associated with economic efficiency in theoretical models.
Thus insufficient competition means lack of efficiency which would harm the over-
all social welfare. On the other hand, financial crises that might be caused by the
intensive competition in the financial sector is costly for everyone in the economy.
Therefore, it is essential to understand the relationship between banking compe-
tition and banking stability for policy makers to balance their goals: maintaining
financial stability while facilitating competition in the financial sector.
Taking the recent crisis as a example, many argue that the banking deregula-
tion and financial liberalisation in the past decades intensified the overall level of
competition in the financial sector, which then encouraged bank and other types
of financial institutions (investment banks mainly) to take excessive risks to com-
pete for profit. This argument is in line with the competition-fragility hypothesis.
It argues that in a more competitive environment banks would lose their "charter
value" thus are more likely to shift risk towards depositors with the deposit insur-
ance policy, while in a less competitive environment banks tend to have higher profit
and also more capital buffer, thus are not likely to take excessive risks which could
endanger the whole financial system (Keeley, 1990; Beck et al., 2006; Berger et al.,
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2009; Beck et al., 2013).
However, the competition-stability hypothesis argues that there is a positive re-
lationship between bank competition and financial stability, rather than a trade-off.
Lower lending rates resulted from higher level of bank competition reduces borrow-
ing cost for both firms and individuals, and this in turn would reduce banks credit
risk. Thus, the banking system as a whole would be more stable in a competitive
environment (Schaeck et al., 2009; Anginer et al., 2014). In addition, it is also
possible that there is an U-shaped relationship between competition and stability.
For a less competitive banking system, more competition would be preferred due to
increased efficiency and stability, but if the system is already highly competitive,
further increase in competition might induce excessive risk taking which threatens
the stability of the system. Therefore the effect of competition on stability could
go either way depending on where the banking system is located on the U-shaped
curve (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011). Overall,
both theoretical models and empirical evidence provide mixed results.
The aim of this study is to identify the effect of banking competition on banking
stability with a robust empirical setting. The U.S. bank branching deregulation in
the 1980s provides an opportunity to implement the difference-in-difference (DID)
method to identify the causal relationship between the competition shock on bank-
ing stability. The U.S. banking system has a long history of regulation while the
deregulation is just a recent story. Most of the states in the U.S. did not allow banks
to branch across counties or states before the 1980s. In the late 1970s, the ability
of banks to compete over a longer distance was enhanced by some technological im-
provements, such as the invention of ATM. As a result, individual states started to
deregulated their banking system both intra-state and inter-state branching, which
resulted in a higher level of competition in the banking sector. A very important
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feature of the deregulation is that different states deregulated their banking system
at different point in time. Taking advantage of this feature, the DID method is easily
implemented to address the causality issue. In addition, dynamic DID method also
implemented as a robustness check.
Following Beck et al. (2013), the banking stability is measured by Z-score calcu-
lated with a 3-year rolling window. Furthermore, alternative indicators for banking
stability are also adopted in the analysis, such as the inverse standard deviation
of ROA and non-performing loan ratio. All these indicators are calculated at both
state-level and bank-level.
The analysis shows that the intensified competition shock caused by the intra-
state branching deregulation significantly improves the state-level banking stability
by 45.2%. The result is not only statistically but also economically significant.
Meanwhile, it shows that the inter-state branching deregulation is estimated to
have no significant impact on banking stability at state-level. This baseline result is
confirmed by the dynamic difference-in-difference regressions and also the regressions
with alternative stability indicators. The bank-level analysis shows consistent result
that the intra-state competition shock has a positive and significant effect on the
stability of individual banks, which is also robust with the dynamic DID setting and
alternative bank-level stability indicators. However, the scale of the estimated effect
at bank-level is much smaller: the intensified intra-state competition just improves
the stability of individual banks by 2.12% on average. Overall, these findings provide
both state-level and bank-level evidence on the competition-stability hypothesis that
banking competition improves banking stability.
As the sample period of this analysis covers almost 20 years, there are some
banks entering and exiting the sample. The unbalanced feature of the bank-level
panel dataset may bias the estimated effect of the competition shock on bank-level
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stability. To examine this issue, both typical DID and dynamic DID regressions are
implemented with a balanced bank-level panel dataset as robustness checks. The re-
sults from these regressions are qualitatively unchanged compared with the previous
findings from the bank-level analysis. Furthermore, it examines the heterogeneity
among banks from three perspectives: bank size, bank profitability and the com-
petition environment faced by the bank. It shows that the intra-state competition
shock has a greater effect on the stability of small banks, while big banks and more
profitable banks are more likely to be affect by the inter-state competition shock.
The heterogeneity test also shows that the stability of banks operating in a less
competitive environment are more likely to be improved by the inter-state competi-
tion shock, which provides evidence on the non-linear relationship between banking
competition and stability.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follow. Section 4.2 reviews the literature
in relation with this study. Section 4.3 explains the empirical setting and model
specifications for the econometric analysis. Section 4.4 describes the main database
and variables. Section 4.5 presents the main results from the analysis and provides
discussions before Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Literature Review
This study is related to 2 strands of literature. Primarily, it is directly related to
the papers which identifies the effect of bank competition on financial stability. Lit-
erature on this topic has been comprehensively reviewed by Carletti and Hartmann
(2002), Beck (2008) and Vives (2011). However, none of them conclude that there
is an unambiguous relationship between competition and stability.
A pioneering research is done by Keeley (1990) who develops a theoretical model
suggesting that with protection of the deposit insurance, bank’s moral hazard prob-
lem would be intensified due to increased competition and decreased charter value.
Keeley (1990) also provides empirical evidence by using U.S. banking deregulation
in the 1980s as a test for the effect of increased competition. The results show
that higher level of competition in the banking system would increase bank’s de-
fault risk by increase in assets risk and decrease in bank capital. Allen and Gale
(2004) provides a purely theoretical analysis on the effect of competition on finan-
cial stability. They use different types of models to address this question: general
equilibrium models of financial intermediation and markets, agency models, spa-
tial competition models, Schumpeterian competition models, and contagion models.
However, the predictions of these models are not consistent. In some cases com-
petition are positively related with stability while other models predict a trade-off
between competition and stability.
Theoretically, higher level of competition reduce bank’s charter value thus they
tend to take excessive risks, while another possibility is that intensive competition
in banking system reduce borrowing cost thus banks would face less credit risks.
However, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) argues that there is another channel:
higher competition not only reduce bank’s credit risks but also reduce their profit
from performing loans, which provides provisions for loan losses. Taking this into
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account, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010)’s model predicts an U-shaped relation-
ship between competition and stability. Competition affects bank stability through
2 channels: 1)risk-shifting effect by which higher loan rate due to lack of competi-
tion would increase credit risks faced by banks; and 2)margin effect through which
bank’s revenue would be reduced since higher competition would reduce bank’s inter-
est margin. They found that in a highly competitive banking system, margin effect
is dominant thus further increase in the level of competition would have a negative
effect on bank stability, while risk-shifting effect is dominant in a concentrated sys-
tem therefore more competition is helpful for bank stability. Hakenes and Schnabel
(2011) also proposed a model suggesting that there is a U-shaped relationship be-
tween competition and stability, thus the effect of capital requirement on financial
stability would be ambiguous due to the non-linear effect of bank competition.
In terms of empirical literature, there is also no consensus among the relation-
ship between bank competition and financial stability. Using data for 69 countries
from 1980 to 1997, Beck et al. (2006) shows that banking crisis is less likely to occur
in countries where the banking system is highly concentrated, where the bank con-
centration is measured by the proportion of total assets held by the largest banks
in the system. However there is a doubt whether bank concentration is a good
indicator for the level of bank competition. Measuring competition by Panzar and
Rosse H-statistics for 45 countries, Schaeck et al. (2009) show that highly com-
petitive banking system are less likely to suffer from systemic banking crisis, even
when bank concentration is controlled in the model. This result suggests that bank
concentration and competition captures different aspect of a banking system thus
concentration may not be an accurate indicator for competition.
Using bank-level data, Berger et al. (2009) calculate a variety of measurement for
bank market power and stability at individual bank level. Overall, their results are
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consistent with the competition-fragility hypothesis that banks with higher market
power generally have less risks. Though they also found that bank’s portfolio risks
would increase due to higher market power, it argues that this risk may partly offset
by higher bank capital. Beck et al. (2013) also uses bank level data to investigate the
effect of bank’s market power on bank soundness, where market power is measured
by Lerner index and soundness is measured by Z-score. The results show that there
is a consistent positive relationship between bank’s markets power and soundness,
indicating that higher level of competition would erode bank’s charter value then
increase bank’s risk taking incentives. These results are consistent with Berger et al.
(2009). In addition, their study shows that the positive relationship between market
power and stability is even more significant in countries where there are stricter
activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock markets, more
generous deposit insurance and more effective credit information sharing system.
Anginer et al. (2014) also use bank-level data to calculate market power and
risk measurement. Similar with Beck et al. (2013), the market power is measured
by bank’s Lerner index. However, they use bank’s Distance to Default (DD) as a
measurement for bank risk, which is initially proposed by Merton (1974). There are
two advantages using this indicator rather than Z-score: first, both Lerner index
and Z-score are calculated based on profitability measures, which makes them more
likely to be positively correlated, thus using DD indicator avoids this potential
problem; second, Z-score is calculated from bank’s balance sheet (usually annual
data) while DD indicator is based on market value (daily basis), which makes DD
measurement updated more frequently and also more forward looking. Overall,
their results suggest that bank competition have a positive effect on bank stability,
and this effect is quite robust. This result is in line with the competition-stability
hypothesis.
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Apart from the literature on the topic of competition and stability, this study is
also related with papers identifying the effect of the U.S. banking deregulation. Most
papers in this area focus on the real effect of the deregulation. Strahan (2003) is the
first one using the U.S. banking deregulation as an empirical experiment to test its
real effects on three aspects: growth, entrepreneurship, and business cycle. It shows
that the growth rate of state income in real per capita significantly increased after
banking deregulation, which is consistent with Schumpterian view on the effect of
financial development on economic growth. It also shows that the number of newly
established incorporation is significantly higher in the post-deregulation period, sug-
gesting that banking deregulation also have a positive effect on entrepreneurship.
Finally it also suggests that the overall state-level business cycle is significantly
mitigated after inter-state banking deregulation due to financial integration among
states.
Subsequent literature test the real effect of U.S. banking deregulation on many
other different aspects, using the method proposed by Strahan (2003). For exam-
ple, Rice and Strahan (2010) whether finance for small firms could be affected by
banking deregulation. Overall it shows that interstate-branching deregulation has a
positive effect on small firm finance: the borrowing cost for small firms are signif-
icantly lower in open states. Landier et al. (2013) examine the effect of interstate
banking deregulation on housing price co-movement. It suggest that financial inte-
gration due to interstate banking deregulation explains 25% of the increased housing
price correlations over the 1976-2006 period. Kneer (2013) focuses on the labour
market. It shows that interstate banking deregulation significantly reduces labour
productivity in skill-intensive industries, as many skilled labour were absorbed by
the banking industry after the deregulation. Beck et al. (2010) shows that the in-
come of low-income group are significantly increased after deregulation while the
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effect on high-income group are not significant, thus banking deregulation tightens
the income distribution. All these paper are related with my study in terms of
methodology.
A few papers also use the U.S. banking deregulation as a experiment to iden-
tify the effect of bank competition on bank performance or stability. Stiroh and
Strahan (2003) and Strahan (2003) find that banks with better performance would
tend to grow faster in terms of bank size after banking deregulation, indicating that
banking assets are reallocated towards better banks due to the effect of increased
competition. However, their studies has little implication on financial stability in
post-deregulation period. Using similar method, Subramanian and Yadav (2012)
show that the instance of bank failure significantly reduced after banking deregu-
lation, arguing that there is a increase in banking stability as a results of banking
deregulation. Nonetheless, bank failure might not be seen as a stability indicator.
The reduction in the number of bank failures could be attribute to the deregulation
policy which allows bank to carry out merge and acquisition, which does not neces-
sarily mean that there is a overall improvement in banking stability. Thus, my study
is going to fill this gap in the literature by testing the effect of bank competition on
financial stability with a variety of stability measurements at both state-level and
bank-level, using the U.S. banking deregulation as a natural experiment.
Overall, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, using the intensified
competition in the banking sector caused by the US banking deregulation as an
exogenous shock, this paper identifies the relationship between bank competition
and stability with a Difference-in-Difference method, instead of the method of GMM
exploited by most of the empirical papers in the existing literature. Second, it
provides empirical evidence on the non-linear relationship between bank competition
and stability derived from the recent theoretical works (Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
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2010; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011) which has not been investigated empirically.
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4.3 Empirical Setting
4.3.1 The U.S. Banking Deregulation
The U.S. banking system has a long history of regulation while deregulation is only
a recent story. Branch banking across counties or states was not allowed until 1980s.
Thus, the banking system of the U.S. had a unitary structure where most entities
in the system were stand-alone banks. Since the late 1970s, individual states in the
U.S. started to deregulate their banking system for both intra-state and inter-state
branching which allowed banks to branch across counties and states respectively.
One of the reasons of the deregulation is that the ability of banks to compete over a
longer distance was enhanced by the technological improvement (e.g. the invention
of ATM). The deregulation in branch-banking resulted in an intensified competition
in the banking sector as it broke the policy barrier of market entry thus exposed
less efficient incumbent banks in a certain county or state to the more efficient
competitors from other administrative regions.
There were two types of bank branching deregulation ongoing: intra-state branch-
ing and inter-state branching. Intra-state branching deregulation was to allow banks
to branch across counties within a state while Inter-state branching deregulation
was to allow banks to branch across different states. Apart from this, another ma-
jor difference between the two types of deregulation is that Intra-state branching
deregulation was implemented with immediate effect while it could take a long time
for Inter-state branching to be effective as it was based on state-level reciprocations.
For example, Alabama deregulated their banks for inter-state branching in 1987.
However, the banking sector of Alabama would still be a closed system and would
not be exposed to outside competitors until another state reach an agreement with
Alabama on the issue of interstate bank branching. Therefore, one may expect that
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the competition level of the banking sector would not be intensified immediately
after the implementation of the Inter-state deregulation.
Figure 4.1: Cumulative Number of Deregulated States
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Notes: This figure shows the number of states where intra- or inter-state bank branching is deregulated over the period of 1970 -
1994.
Figure 4.1 shows the number of states where intra- or inter-state bank branching
is deregulated over the period of 1970 - 1994.1 As it shows, both types of dereg-
ulation were levied individually by each states. This staggered feature of the U.S.
banking deregulation provides us an opportunity to test the effect of the intensified
competition in the banking sector due to the deregulation policies on the stability
of the banking sector with the Difference-in-Difference method.
1See Table A4.1 in the appendix for detailed timing of both intra- and inter- state deregulation
in each state. For example, the intra-state branch banking was not regulated before 1970s in
California while the inter-state branch banking in California were deregulated in 1987.
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Figure 4.2: Trend of County-level HHI
 
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
-1
5
-1
4
-1
3
-1
2
-1
1
-1
0 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
C
o
u
ty
 L
ev
el
 H
H
I
Deregulation Timing
Intra-state Branching Deregulation
Notes: This figure shows the average trend of county-level HHI in the banking sector across the U.S.. Sample period: 1976 - 1994.
The horizontal axis depicts the years around the year of intra-state deregulation.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the average trend of county-level Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex (HHI) for the banking sector across the U.S. before and after the intra-state
branching deregulation, where the data were collected for the period from 1976 to
1994. The horizontal axis depicts the years around the year of intra-state deregula-
tion. As it shows, the increasing trend of county-level HHI is relatively flat before
the intra-state branching was deregulated, while the average trend becomes much
steeper after the intra-state deregulation. It indicates that the banking market be-
come more concentrated at the county level after the deregulation, as the banking
integration had been accelerated by the deregulation which allows for cross-county
mergers and acquisitions.However, it does not mean that the banking sector become
less competitive as the HHI increased after the deregulation. On the contrary, the
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intra-state deregulation intensifies the competition level in the banking sector as it
exposed local banks to a larger market, so that the post-deregulation competition
level should be indicated by the HHI calculated at the state-level.
Figure 4.3: Trend of State-level HHI
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Notes: This figure shows the number of states where intra- or inter-state bank branching is deregulated over the period of 1970 -
1994.
Similarly, the average trend of state-level HHI for the banking sector across the
U.S. has been depicted around the timing of the inter-state branching deregulation
in Figure 4.3, based on a sample period from 1976 to 1994. Overall, it suggests that
the banking sector in the U.S. became more concentrated at the state-level after
the introduction of the inter-state branching deregulation, as the average trend
before the deregulation is relatively flat while the trend is more upward-sloping
after the deregulation year. However, as the figure shows, the effect of the inter-
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state deregulation on the state-level market structure is lagged by 4-5 years on
average. This is lagged effect might be due to the fact that the inter-state branching
deregulation is based on a state-level reciprocation, so that it takes time for the
deregulation to take effect on the banking sector.
4.3.2 Measurement for Competition and Stability
The aim of this study is to test the causality between bank competition and bank sta-
bility, thus the measurement of competition and stability is the key issue throughout
the analysis. Most empirical papers in the competition-stability literature use dif-
ferent types of synthetic competition indicators such as market concentration (Beck
et al., 2006), H-statistics (Schaeck et al., 2009) or Learner index as a measurement
of market power (Berger et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014).
Different from those papers, this study looks at the exogenous competition shocks
caused by the banking deregulation in the U.S. during the 1980s, as the policy
changes exposed the local banking system to outside competitors. Therefore, two
dummy variables - Intra and Inter - are created as the equations show below in
order to capture the competition shocks caused by the intra-state and inter-state
deregulation.
Intras,t =

1, if intra-state branching is deregulated;
0, otherwise.
Inters,t =

1, if inter-state branching is deregulated;
0, otherwise.
where s stands for each state and t stands for each year. As the equations show,
the dummy variable Intra would be equal to 1 if the intra-state branching has been
deregulated in state s at time t, otherwise it would be equal to 0. Similarly, the
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dummy variable Inter would be equal to 1 if the inter-state branching has been
deregulated in state s at time t, otherwise 0.
The dummy variables based on the timing of the two types of banking dereg-
ulation capture the exogenous competition shock to the banking system induced
by the policy changes in different states at different time period. Then, the causal
relationship between bank competition and stability can be identified by the effect
of the competition shock on the stability of the banking system.
From the econometric perspective, the two deregulation dummy variables can
be seen as the Difference-in-Differences (DID) term in a regression. Banks/states
with deregulation dummy variables equal to 1 can be seen as the treatment group
in a Difference-in-Differences setting while those with deregulation dummy variables
equal to 0 the control group. For example, Alabama deregulated intra-state bank
branching in 1981 but its neighbour state Mississippi implemented the same policy
not until 1986. In this case, the effect of the competition shock due to the policy
change (treatment effect) on the banking system can be correctly identified by com-
paring the banking system in the two states during the period 1981-1985, meanwhile
considering their difference before 1981 and after 1986 (common trend).
Apart from the indicator for bank competition, the measurement on bank sta-
bility is also important. Following Beck et al. (2013), we use the Z score as the main
indicator for bank stability in this study. The Z score at bank-level is calculated as
the equation shows below:
Z Scorei,s,t =
ROAi,s,t + Equityi,s,t/Asseti,s,t
σn(ROAi,s)
(4.1)
where i stands for each bank, s stands for each state and t stands for each year. The
denominator of the fraction, σn(ROAi,s), is the standard deviation of the return on
assets for bank i in state s with a time rolling window of n. As frequently used in
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the literature of financial economics as a risk indicator, the standard deviation of
return captures the risk of a bank in a given period around time t. The numerator
of the Z score has two components: the return on assets of bank i at time t and
the bank’s equity over assets. The summation of the two components can be seen
as a measurement for a bank’s solvency at a point in time. Thus, the Z score as a
whole captures a bank’s solvency per unit of its risk. Higher Z score indicates better
stability.
Similarly, using aggregate data at state-level, the state-level Z score is calculated
based on the following equation:
Z Scores,t =
ROAs,t + Equitys,t/Assets,t
σn(ROAs)
. (4.2)
4.3.3 Regression Specifications
The U.S. banking deregulation during the 1980s is exploited as a natural experiment
to test the effect of the exogenous competition shock on individual bank risks and
also the financial stability in each state. As explained in the previous section, the
staggered feature of the policy changes allows us to use Difference-in-Difference(DID)
method to examine the effect of the increased competition due to the deregulation
policy.
Following Strahan (2003), the specifications of the regression model are illus-
trated by the equations below, where equation (1) shows the model for state-level
analysis and equation (2) shows the bank-level analysis. Both intrastate and inter-
state banking deregulation are of interest, thus the DID method is implemented by
the dummy variables for intra- and inter-state banking deregulation in the models.
Stabilitys,t = α0 + α1Intras,t + α2Inters,t + α4Xs,t + γt + γs + s,t (4.3)
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Stabilityi,s,t = α0 + α1Intras,t + α2Inters,t + α3Xi,s,t + α4Xs,t + γt + γs + i,s,t(4.4)
where
• i stands for each bank in the sample
• s stands for each state in the sample
• t denotes each quarter/year over the sample period
• Stabilitys,t is the state-level stability measurement for state s at time t
• Stabilityi,s,t is the bank-level stability measurement for bank i in state s at
time t
• Intras,t is a dummy variable for intrastate branching deregulation which takes
value 1 if the time is after the deregulation year; otherwise 0
• Inters,t is a dummy variable for interstate banking deregulation which takes
value 1 if the time is after the deregulation year; otherwise 0
• Xi,s,t is a set of bank-level control variables for bank i in state s at time t
• Xs,t is a set of state-level control variables for state s at time t
• γt is time dummy variables controlling for year effect
• γs controls for state level fixed effect for state s
• i,s,t is the error term for bank i in state s at time t
The key parameters to be estimated is the coefficient on the dummy variables for
both intra- and inter-state banking deregulation, as measurement for competition
shocks in the banking system. A positive and significant coefficient on the dummy
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variables would indicate that competition has a negative effect on banking stability
and vice versa. If the coefficient is not significant at all, it might imply that there
is a non-linear effect of competition on stability.
Dynamic Difference-in-Difference method is also implemented at both state- and
bank-level with the regression specification illustrated by equation (3) and (4) re-
spectively:
Stabilitys,t = α0 + α1Dereg3_1s,t + α2Dereg0_2s,t + α3Dereg3_5s,t + α4Dereg6_ s,t
+ α5Xs,t + γt + γs + s,t(4.5)
Stabilityi,s,t = α0 + α1Dereg3_1s,t + α2Dereg0_2s,t + α3Dereg3_5s,t + α4Dereg6_ s,t
+ α5Xi,s,t + α6Xs,t + γt + γi + i,s,t(4.6)
where
• Dereg = {Intra, Inter};
• Dereg3_1s,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if time t is 3, 2 or 1 year before
the deregulation in state s; otherwise 0;
• Dereg0_2s,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if time t is the deregulation year
in state s, or 1 and 2 year after the deregulation; otherwise 0;
• Dereg3_5s,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if time t is 3, 4 or 5 year after the
deregulation in state s; otherwise 0;
• Dereg3_5s,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if time t is 6 year or more after
the deregulation in state s; otherwise 0.
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Different from a general set-up of a DID model, there are two treatments in
this analysis: the competition shock induced by the intra-state deregulation and
the shock induced by the inter-state deregulation. However, the timing of the two
types of deregulation for the same state might be correlated to some extent, so that
including the two treatment in a single regression at the same time might increase the
standard error estimated on the DID terms, which would result in lower significance
levels for the treatment effect. To clearly identify the treatment effect, the DID
dummy variables for the two types of deregulation are first included in the regression
one by one separately, then included into a single regression together. By comparing
the size and significance of the estimated coefficient on the DID terms across different
models, one can be sure that whether the potential correlation between the two types
of deregulation can bias the estimations.
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4.4 Data
The main database for this study is Consolidated Reports on Condition and Income
(Call report). It provides detailed balance sheet and income statement data for all
banking institutions regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC).
The sample period is from 1976 to 1994, with an annual frequency for 19 periods.
The final sample in this analysis includes 250,654 observations for 18,012 banks from
49 states.
Summary statistics for both state-level and bank-level analysis are presented by
Panel 1 and Panel 2 in Table 4.1 respectively. The top part of each panel lists the
all the banking stability indicators used in the following analysis, while the rest of
each panel lists all the control variables.
The first variable in the list, log(Z3), is the logarithm of Z score calculated with a
3-year rolling window, which is the main stability indicator throughout the analyses
at both state-level and bank-level. In addition, Z score with a 5-year rolling window,
inverse standard deviation of ROA with 3- and 5-year rolling window, and the Non-
performing loan ratio are also used as alternative indicators for banking stability. It
shows that the non-performing loans at state-level account for 2.37 percent of total
loans on average over the period from 1983 to 1994.2
Size is the logarithm of total banking assets in a state. It controls for the effect
of the size of the banking sector on banking stability. Size Growth is the year-on-
year growth of the total banking assets in a state. One might expect a negative
relationship between growth and stability as those who expand faster tend to take
more risks on board. The variable commercial and industrial loans over total loans
(C&I loans) controls for the riskiness of the loan portfolio of a bank/banking sector,
as lending to commercial and industrial sectors tend to be riskier than mortgages
2Though the main sample period starts from 1976, the data on non-performing loans are only
available from 1983 onward.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Mean St.D. Min Max Obs.
Panel 1: State-level Analysis
Stability Indicators
log(Z3) 4.34 1.12 0.03 7.25 833
log(Z5) 3.94 1.02 0.17 6.70 735
log(1/σ3(ROA)) 2.45 0.94 0.41 5.23 833
log(1/σ5(ROA)) 2.10 0.81 0.45 4.57 735
NPL Ratio 2.37 1.57 0.38 12.77 588
Banking Sector Controls
Size 17.00 1.19 14.28 20.59 931
Size Growth 0.44 0.41 -2.43 3.24 882
C&I Loan 27.48 7.34 5.42 53.25 931
Loan to Assets 58.29 7.33 30.41 80.41 931
Liquidity 26.94 7.90 4.32 48.18 931
Interbank Borrowing 6.68 3.43 0.42 30.81 931
Macroeconomic Controls
GDP Growth 3.37 4.20 -28.08 30.61 931
Unemployment 6.69 2.09 2.30 17.80 931
Housing Price Index 4.79 0.33 3.95 5.76 931
Panel 2: Bank-level Analysis
Stability Indicators
Log(Z-score3) 4.23 0.71 0.81 10.54 213,323
Log(Z-score5) 3.60 0.79 -1.27 8.06 180,458
Log(1/sigma(ROA)3) 1.77 0.82 0.00 8.01 213,326
Log(1/sigma(ROA)5) 1.51 0.65 0.01 6.34 180,464
Non-performing Loan 2.22 2.91 0.00 100.00 148,636
Bank Level Controls
Size 10.54 1.27 5.46 19.16 246,201
Size Growth 0.91 1.69 -43.12 84.22 229,760
C&I Loan/Total Loan 20.96 13.93 0.00 100.00 245,871
Loan/Total Asset 53.69 14.04 0.00 100.00 246,071
Liquidity 34.51 14.77 0.00 99.94 246,200
Interbank Borrowing 1.30 3.70 0.00 92.52 246,200
State Level Controls
GDP Growth 3.01 3.75 -28.08 30.61 246,213
Unemployment 6.68 2.06 2.30 17.80 246,213
Housing Price Index 4.74 0.28 3.95 5.76 246,213
Notes: log(Z3) is the logarithm of Z score calculated with a 3-year rolling window, which is the main stability indicator in both
state- and bank-level analysis. In addition, Z score with a 5-year rolling window (log(Z5)), inverse standard deviation of ROA with 3-
and 5-year rolling window (log(1/σ3(ROA)), log(1/σ5(ROA))), and the Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio are also used as alternative
indicators for banking stability. Size is the logarithm of total banking assets in a state. Size Growth is the year-on-year growth of
the total banking assets in a state. The variable C&I loans is commercial and industrial loans over total loans, which controls for the
riskiness of the loan portfolio of a bank/banking sector. Loan to Assets ratio controls for the overall riskiness of the total assets of
a bank/banking sector. Liquidity is defined by total liquid assets over total assets, which captures the capability of a bank/banking
sector to meet its short-term obligations. Interbank Borrowing captures the interconnectness of the banking sector, or a bank’s
dependence on unstable short-term funding. Finally, state-level GDP Growth rate, Unemployment rate, and Housing Price Index
are used to control for the influence of macroeconomic conditions on banking stability.
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and other types of lending. Compared with central bank reserves, investment in
government bonds and other types of investment, loans are the riskiest assets on a
bank’s balance sheet. Thus, Loan to Assets ratio controls for the overall riskiness of
the total assets of a bank/banking sector. Liquidity is defined by total liquid assets
over total assets, which captures the capability of a bank/banking sector to meet
its short-term obligations. Interbank Borrowing captures the interconnectness of
the banking sector, or a bank’s dependence on unstable short-term funding. Finally,
state-level GDP Growth rate, Unemployment rate, and Housing Price Index are
used to control for the influence of macroeconomic conditions on banking stability.
4.4.1 Mean Test at State-level
The analysis proceeds with a simple mean test at state-level, to identify the difference
in banking stability and other banking sector characteristics before and after the
two types of banking deregulations. The results from the mean tests on state-level
stability indicators are presented by panel 1 in Table 4.2. It shows that the average
of the natural logarithm of the main stability indicator, Z score with a 3-year rolling
window, is 4.62 prior to the intra-state deregulation, which decreases to 4.15 in the
post-deregulation period. The result of the t test shows that the difference between
the two means are statistically significant at 1 percent level, which in turn suggests
that the state-level stability is on average lower after the deregulation of intra-state
banking, compared with the pre-deregulation period. The test based on the inter-
state banking deregulation shows similar result: the average of natural logarithm of
the Z score (with a 3-year rolling window) over the post-deregulation period (3.84)
is significantly lower than that over the pre-deregulation period (4.73).
The test is also conducted based on the occurrence of both type of deregulation:
the average of the natural logarithm of the Z score (with a 3-year rolling window)
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Table 4.2: Mean Test at State-level
Before After Difference
Variables Deregulation Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean St. E. Signif.
Panel 1: State-level Stability Indicators
log(Z3)
Intra-state 4.62 330 4.15 503 0.47 0.08 ***
Inter-state 4.73 467 3.84 366 0.89 0.07 ***
Both 4.70 283 3.79 319 0.91 0.09 ***
log(Z5)
Intra-state 4.17 294 3.78 441 0.40 0.08 ***
Inter-state 4.30 417 3.46 318 0.84 0.07 ***
Both 4.22 249 3.39 273 0.84 0.09 ***
log(1/σ3(ROA))
Intra-state 2.68 330 2.30 503 0.38 0.07 ***
Inter-state 2.79 467 2.01 366 0.78 0.06 ***
Both 2.74 283 1.97 319 0.77 0.07 ***
log(1/σ5(ROA))
Intra-state 2.27 294 1.99 441 0.27 0.06 ***
Inter-state 2.39 417 1.72 318 0.67 0.05 ***
Both 2.31 249 1.67 273 0.64 0.07 ***
NPL Ratio
Intra-state 2.90 143 2.19 445 0.71 0.15 ***
Inter-state 2.63 176 2.26 412 0.37 0.14 ***
Both 3.17 96 2.24 365 0.93 0.19 ***
Panel 2: Banking Sector Control Variables
Size
Intra-state 16.85 365 17.10 566 -0.25 0.08 ***
Inter-state 16.65 517 17.43 414 -0.78 0.07 ***
Both 16.74 318 17.42 367 -0.67 0.08 ***
Size Growth
Intra-state 0.49 330 0.40 552 0.08 0.03 ***
Inter-state 0.55 468 0.30 414 0.25 0.03 ***
Both 0.53 283 0.31 367 0.22 0.03 ***
C&I Loan
Intra-state 29.27 365 26.33 566 2.94 0.48 ***
Inter-state 28.92 517 25.69 414 3.24 0.47 ***
Both 29.56 318 25.48 367 4.08 0.56 ***
Loan to Assets
Intra-state 55.10 365 60.35 566 -5.25 0.46 ***
Inter-state 56.25 517 60.84 414 -4.59 0.46 ***
Both 54.97 318 61.47 367 -6.49 0.51 ***
Liquidity
Intra-state 30.19 365 24.85 566 5.34 0.50 ***
Inter-state 28.14 517 25.44 414 2.71 0.51 ***
Both 30.01 318 24.68 367 5.33 0.59 ***
Interbank Borrowing
Intra-state 5.71 365 7.30 566 -1.59 0.22 ***
Inter-state 5.90 517 7.65 414 -1.75 0.22 ***
Both 5.58 318 7.78 367 -2.21 0.24 ***
Notes: This table presents the results from a simple mean test on the effect of the competition shocks induced by the two
types of deregulations at state-level. Refer to 4.1 for the definition on the state-level variables.
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over the period where neither of the two types of deregulation occurred is 4.70, which
is significantly higher than that over the period where both intra- and inter-state
banking are deregulated (3.79). Overall, these results suggest that the state-level
banking stability measured by the Z score with a 3-year rolling window is on average
lower over the post-deregulation period.
The results from the tests on the Z score with a 5-year rolling window, in-
verse standard deviation of ROA with a 3- and 5-year rolling window all point
to a similar implication that the state-level banking stability decreased over the
post-deregulation period. However, the result from the test on non-performing loan
ratio suggests that non-performing loans as a proportion of total loans significantly
decreased over the post-deregulation period, which indicates an improvement in
banking stability.
Panel 2 in Table 4.2 show the results from the state-level mean tests on other
characteristics of the banking sector. It suggests that the banking sector in a state on
average grows significantly bigger in terms of total banking assets after the dereg-
ulation, though they grow at a significantly lower pace compared with the pre-
deregulation level. The amount of commercial and industrial loans as a proportion
of total loans significantly decreased by around 3 percentage points on average after
the deregulation, while the amount of total loans as a proportion of total banking
assets on average increases significantly by around 5 percent. The amount of liquid
assets in the banking system also dropped significantly, and the banks become more
interconnected through interbank lending markets over the post-deregulation period
as the interbank borrowing significantly increases.
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4.4.2 Mean Test at Bank-level
The mean tests are also conducted using bank-level variables. Panel 1 in Table
4.3 presents the results from the mean test on bank-level stability indicators. Dif-
ferent from the test results at state-level, the mean test on all bank-level stability
indicators indicates that there is a improvement in stability at bank-level after the
deregulation of intra- or inter-state banking. For example, it shows that the aver-
age of the natural logarithm of the main stability indicator, Z score with a 3-year
rolling window, increased from the pre-deregulation level 4.21 to 4.28 after the the
intra-state deregulation. This improvement is statistically significant at 1 percent
level. Consistent with the state-level results, the test on bank-level non-performing
loan ratio suggests that there is a decrease in non-performing loans as a proportion
of banks’ total loans, which also suggests that banking stability at bank-level was
improved over the post-deregulation period.
In terms of other bank characteristics, the mean test results at bank-level are
very consistent with the state-level analysis. As panel 2 in Table 4.3 shows, in-
dividual banks tend to grow larger over the post-deregulation period though they
grow at a slower pace; commercial and industrial lending as a proportion of banks’
total lending decreases after the deregulation while total lending as a proportion of
banks’ total assets increases; banks tend to hold less liquid assets and they are more
interconnected in the interbank lending market over the post-deregulation period.
To sum up, the mean test results suggest that there is a decrease in the banking
stability at state-level while bank-level stability is improved given the competition
shock caused by the banking deregulation. However, this simple test does not con-
sider other important factors such as time trend or region effect. The analysis then
performs a more rigorous regression analysis based on the specifications illustrated
by equation (3) - (6), and the results are presented in the next section.
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Table 4.3: Mean Test at Bank-level
Before After Difference
Variables Deregulation Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean St. E. Signif.
Panel 1: Bank-level Stability Indicators
log(Z3)
Intra-state 4.21 131,599 4.28 81,724 -0.07 0.00 ***
Inter-state 4.21 133,685 4.26 79,638 -0.05 0.00 ***
Both 4.20 110,393 4.27 58,432 -0.07 0.00 ***
log(Z5)
Intra-state 3.57 113,566 3.65 66,892 -0.08 0.00 ***
Inter-state 3.58 115,066 3.63 65,392 -0.05 0.00 ***
Both 3.56 94,309 3.64 46,135 -0.08 0.00 ***
log(1/σ3(ROA))
Intra-state 1.75 131,600 1.81 81,726 -0.06 0.00 ***
Inter-state 1.76 133,686 1.79 79,640 -0.03 0.00 ***
Both 1.75 110,394 1.80 58,434 -0.05 0.00 ***
log(1/σ5(ROA))
Intra-state 1.48 113,569 1.56 66,895 -0.07 0.00 ***
Inter-state 1.49 115,070 1.54 65,394 -0.04 0.00 ***
Both 1.48 94,312 1.54 46,137 -0.07 0.00 ***
NPL Ratio
Intra-state 2.66 63,186 1.90 85,450 0.76 0.02 ***
Inter-state 2.73 54,677 1.92 93,959 0.81 0.02 ***
Both 2.88 40,796 1.82 71,569 1.06 0.02 ***
Panel 2: Bank-level Control Variables
Size
Intra-state 10.25 148,554 10.98 97,647 -0.72 0.01 ***
Inter-state 10.26 151,805 10.99 94,396 -0.73 0.01 ***
Both 10.19 126,139 11.10 71,981 -0.91 0.01 ***
Size Growth
Intra-state 0.98 134,284 0.82 95,476 0.17 0.01 ***
Inter-state 1.06 136,232 0.70 93,528 0.37 0.01 ***
Both 1.06 112,049 0.72 71,293 0.34 0.01 ***
C&I Loan
Intra-state 21.59 148,483 19.99 97,388 1.60 0.06 ***
Inter-state 21.97 151,697 19.34 94,174 2.63 0.06 ***
Both 21.87 126,093 19.13 71,784 2.75 0.06 ***
Loan to Assets
Intra-state 53.22 148,531 54.42 97,540 -1.20 0.06 ***
Inter-state 53.50 151,767 54.00 94,304 -0.50 0.06 ***
Both 53.48 126,120 54.71 71,893 -1.23 0.07 ***
Liquidity
Intra-state 35.35 148,554 33.23 97,646 2.13 0.06 ***
Inter-state 35.08 151,805 33.60 94,395 1.48 0.06 ***
Both 35.14 126,139 32.68 71,980 2.47 0.07 ***
Interbank Borrowing
Intra-state 1.16 148,554 1.51 97,646 -0.35 0.02 ***
Inter-state 1.21 151,805 1.44 94,395 -0.22 0.02 ***
Both 1.16 126,139 1.53 71,980 -0.37 0.02 ***
Notes: This table presents the results from a simple mean test on the effect of the competition shocks induced by the two types of
deregulations at bank-level. Refer to 4.1 for the definition on the bank-level variables.
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4.5 Results
As described in previous sections, this research exploit the staggered feature of the
U.S. banking deregulation as a natural experiment to identify whether the competi-
tion shock induced by the policy change would have an impact on banking stability.
Based on the regression specifications expressed by equation (3) - (6), it analyses
the effect of the competition shock on banking stability at both state-level and
bank-level. Dynamic difference-in-difference method is also employed to check the
causality between the competition shock and banking stability. In addition, the
regressions are also performed with alternative indicators for banking stability to
make sure the result is not driven by the variations in the main stability indicator.
For bank-level analysis, the regression analysis are also conducted with a balance
panel dataset, to rule out the effect of bank entry and failure on the estimated
impact. Furthermore, the analysis continues to explore the heterogeneity among
individual banks with the balanced panel. The regression results are presented in
the rest of this section.
4.5.1 State-level Analysis: Baseline result
The baseline regression results for the state-level analysis are presented in Table
4.4. Dummy variable Intra and Inter are the key terms in these regressions as they
capture the competition shock introduced by the specific deregulation policies. The
regression analysis starts with a simple specification. As column 1 in Table 4.4
shows, it regresses the main stability indicator, logarithm of state-level Z score with
a 3-year rolling window (log(Z3)), on the dummy vairbale Intra and a constant,
with the state fixed effect. The coefficient on the key term, Intra, is estimated to
be -0.476 from this simple regression, and this effect is statistically significant at
1 percent level. It suggests that there is a decrease in banking stability at state-
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level given the competition shock induced by the implementation of intra-state bank
branching policy, which is consistent with the findings from the state-level mean test
analysis. However, this simple regression specification does not control for factors
other than the state fixed effect thus the result could be driven by the omitted
factors, especially the time effect.
In the second column in Table 4.4, the time fixed effect is introduced into the
model and there is a noticeable change in the estimated coefficient on the dummy
variable Intra: it turns to be positive and also statistically significant, which indi-
cates that there is an improvement in state-level banking stability. This noticeable
change clearly shows that the negative estimation in column 1 is driven by omitted
time effect. The estimated R2 suggests that the model with time fixed effect is
preferred as it increases from 20.4% in column 1 to 44.5% in column 2.
In term of interpretation on the estimated coefficient in log-linear model, there
is a major difference between continuous variables and dummy variables. The esti-
mated coefficient on a continuous variable in a log-linear model can be interpreted
as the percentage effect of the specific variable on the outcome variable. However,
as Kennedy (1981) suggested, the percentage effect of the dummy variable has to
be estimated based on the following equation:
pˆ = 100 ∗ (exp[cˆ− 12 ∗ Vˆ (cˆ)]− 1) (4.7)
where cˆ is the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable, and Vˆ (cˆ) is the estimated
variance in the estimated coefficient.
Thus, the estimated coefficient 0.637 with a standard error 0.21 in the second
column in Table 4.4 indicates that the banking stability at state-level is improved
on average by 85% in the post intra-state deregulation period. This implies that the
positive effect of the competition shock induced by the intra-state branching dereg-
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Table 4.4: State-level Baseline Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3)
Intra -0.476*** 0.673*** 0.460*** 0.381*** 0.381***
(0.152) (0.210) (0.167) (0.128) (0.128)
Inter -0.019 -0.013
(0.195) (0.186)
Banking Sector Controls
Size -0.520 -0.600 -0.775* -0.602
(0.442) (0.396) (0.436) (0.401)
Size Growth 0.615*** 0.466*** 0.495*** 0.467***
(0.217) (0.148) (0.151) (0.148)
Interbank Borrowing 0.027 0.020 0.020 0.020
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Liquidity -0.033 -0.040 -0.044* -0.040
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
C&I Loan 0.033* 0.037** 0.032** 0.037**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Loan to Assets -0.014 -0.018 -0.022 -0.018
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Economic Condition Controls
GDP Growth 0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Unemployment -0.159*** -0.171*** -0.165*** -0.171***
(0.057) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Housing Price Index -1.400*** -0.332 -0.325 -0.335
(0.442) (0.610) (0.674) (0.600)
Constant 4.627*** 5.057*** 20.861*** 18.452** 22.176** 18.511**
(0.092) (0.112) (7.724) (8.193) (9.063) (8.288)
No. of States 49 49 49 49 49 49
Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
R-squared 0.204 0.445 0.549 0.682 0.675 0.682
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the baseline regression results for the state-level analysis. Dummy variable Intra and Inter are the key
terms in these regressions as they capture the competition shock introduced by the specific deregulation policies. The regression
analysis starts with a simple specification. As column 1 shows, the coefficient on the key term, Intra, is estimated to be -0.476,
which is statistically significant at 1 percent level. It suggests that there is a decrease in banking stability at state-level given the
competition shock induced by the implementation of intra-state bank branching policy. However, this simple regression specification
does not control for factors other than the state fixed effect thus the result could be driven by the omitted factors. In the second
column, the time fixed effect is introduced into the model and there is a noticeable change in the estimated coefficient on the key
dummy variable: it turns to be positive and also statistically significant, which indicates that there is an improvement in state-level
banking stability. This noticeable change clearly shows that the negative estimation in column 1 is driven by omitted time effect.
Other control variables are then introduced into the model as it shows in column 3 and 4. The estimated coefficient on the dummy
variable Intra decreases from 0.673 to 0.460 in column 3. It also shows that the size of a banking sector in a individual state do not
have a significant effect on banking stability, while the year-on-year growth of the size is positively and significantly associated with
banking stability. The proportion of commercial and industrial loans (C&L loans) is also estimated to be positive and significant.
Interconnectness, liquidity and loan to asset ratio of a banking sector are all estimated to be insignificantly associated with state-level
banking stability. GDP growth of a state does not have a significant effect on banking stability in the state, while the increase in
unemployment rate and housing price can destabilise the state’s banking sector. Column 4 presents the results estimated with the
full specification where region-year fixed effect is included to control for all types of time-varying regional factors which would have
am impact on banking stability. As it shows, the estimated coefficient on the key term Intra is further decreased to 0.381 with an
even smaller standard error of 0.128. Based on the calculation proposed by Kennedy (1981), the percentage effect of the dummy
variable is estimated to be 45.2%: state-level banking stability is improved by 45.2% by the intensified intra-state competition in
the banking sector. The analysis continues with the full specification. In column 5, the estimated coefficient on Inter is negative
but insignificant. In the last column, dummy variables Intra and Inter are both introduced into the model. The results are very
consistent with the previous estimations. 169
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ulation on state-level banking stability is not just statistically but also economically
significant.
Along with the state and year fixed effect, other control variables are then in-
troduced into the model, and the results are presented by column 3 in Table 4.4.
As it shows, though it is still statistically significant at 1 percent level, the esti-
mated coefficient on the dummy variable Intra decreases from 0.673 to 0.460 with a
smaller standard error. Though it indicates that the percentage effect of the compe-
tition shock decreases from 85% to 56%, the scale of this effect is still economically
significant.
Column 3 in Table 4.4 also shows that the size of a banking sector in a individual
state do not have a significant effect on banking stability, while the year-on-year
growth of the size is positively and significantly associated with banking stability: 1
percentage point increase in the size growth rate of the banking sector would improve
banking stability in the state by 61.5%. The proportion of commercial and industrial
loans (C&L loans) is also estimated to be positive and significant: banking stability
in a specific state would be improved by 3.3% if the proportion of C&L loans of the
banking sector increases by 1 percentage point. Interconnectness, liquidity and loan
to asset ratio of a banking sector are all estimated to be insignificantly associated
with state-level banking stability.
Indicators for state-level macroeconomic conditions are also added into the model
as control variables. As it shows in column 3 in Table 4.4, GDP growth of a state does
not have a significant effect on banking stability in the state. However, the increase
in unemployment rate and housing price can destabilise the state’s banking sector,
as the coefficient on unemployment rate and housing price index are both estimated
to be negative and significant. Compared with the previous model specification in
column 2, the goodness of fit of the model is also improved with the control variables:
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55% of variations in state-level banking stability is explained by the current model.
Column 4 in Table 4.4 presents the results estimated with the full specification
where region-year fixed effect is introduced into the model. The Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) divides the United States into eight regions for the purpose
of economic and statistical analysis, and each region contains several states.3 Thus,
including the BEA region-year fixed effects in the model controls for all types of
time-varying regional factors which would have am impact on banking stability. As
it shows in column 4, the estimated coefficient on the key term Intra is further
decreased to 0.381 with an even smaller standard error of 0.128. Based on the cal-
culation proposed by Kennedy (1981), the percentage effect of the dummy variable is
estimated to be 45.2%: state-level banking stability is improved by 45.2% by the in-
tensified intra-state competition in the banking sector. Though the effect of housing
price level on banking stability is estimated to be insignificant with this full speci-
fication, the estimates on all other control variables remain qualitatively the same.
Introducing the BEA region-year fixed effect into the model further improves the
estimated R2 to 68.2%, indicating that some variations in banking stability indeed
can be explained by the time-varying regional factors that should not be omitted in
the model.
The analysis continues with the full specification. In column 5 in Table 4.4,
the dummy variable Intra is replace by Inter to explore the effect of inter-state
competition induced by the inter-state branching deregulation on banking stability.
As it shows, the estimated coefficient on Inter is negative but insignificant, which
suggests that the policy change does not have a significant effect on banking stabil-
ity. The insignificant result might be due to the fact that the inter-state banking
deregulation is levied by individual states on a basis of state-level reciprocation.
3The eight BEA regions are: New England, Mideast, Southeast, Great Lakes Region, Plains
Region, Rocky Mountain Region, Southwest and Far West Region. See Figure A4.1 in the appendix
for the mapping of BEA regions.
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For instance, even if a state declare to deregulate their banking system and allow
the entry of banks from other states, the banking sector would not be exposed to
outside competition if no other state reach an agreement with this state on the issue
of inter-state banking. Thus, the timing of inter-state deregulation might not be
relevant in terms of measuring inter-state banking competition shocks. In terms of
control variables, the estimations on size and liquidity of the banking sector change
slightly and turn to be negative and significant. Estimations on all other variables
remain qualitatively the same.
Finally, in the last column in Table 4.4, dummy variables Intra and Inter are
both introduced into the model. The results are very consistent with the previous
estimations. To sum up, the intensified intra-state banking competition significantly
improves the state-level banking stability on average by 45.2% while the inter-state
banking deregulation is estimated to have an insignificant impact on banking stabil-
ity. The growth rate of the size of a banking sector and the proportion of commercial
and industrial loans are estimated to have a negative and significant association with
banking stability. The banking system of a state could be significantly destabilised
by higher unemployment rate in the state. Overall, the key results are consistent
with the competition-stability hypothesis in the literature.
4.5.2 State-level Analysis: Dynamic DID result
The baseline results from the typical difference-in-difference (DID) regressions show
that higher level of banking competition induced by the intra-state banking dereg-
ulation would have a positive impact on the state-level banking stability. Following
regression specifications illustrated by equation (5) - (6), dynamic difference-in-
difference method is also employed in this analysis to confirm the causality iden-
tified by the typical DID method. The results from the state-level dynamic DID
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regressions are presented by Table 4.5.
As the bottom of Table 4.5 shows, all these regressions follow the full specification
where the state-level control variables, state fixed effect, year fixed effect and the
BEA region-year fixed effect are all included. The first column in Table 4.5 shows
that the key term in the typical DID setting, Intra, is decomposed with four dummy
variables capturing the timing of the deregulation. Pre-intra3−1 is a dummy variable
for the periods 3, 2, and 1 years before the implementation year of the intra-state
deregulation; Intra0−2 is a dummy variable for the implementation year and 1 and
2 years after that year. Similarly, Intra3−5 is a dummy variable for the period 3-
5 years after the implementation year while Intra6+ is a dummy variable for the
period at least 6 years after the implementation year. The first column in Table
4.5 shows that the coefficient on Pre-intra3−1 is estimated to be insignificant while
estimations on the other three dummy variables are all positive and significant. The
insignificant estimation on Pre-intra3−1 shows that there is no significant difference
between states in the treatment group and those in the control group before the
competition shock comes into play.
Similarly, column 2 in Table 4.5 shows that the dummy variable Inter in the
typical DID setting is also decomposed into four dummy variables. However, none of
the four dummy variables are estimated to be statistically significant, which implies
that the inter-state branching deregulation does not significantly affect the state-
level banking stability. In column 3, the dynamic DID terms are all included into
the single regression, and the estimations do not qualitatively differ from those in
column 1 and 2.
Figure 4.4 graphically presents the estimated effect of the competition shock in-
duced by both types of deregulation on banking stability. As the left panel in Figure
4.4 shows, the estimated effect on the period 3-1 (3 to 1 years before the intra-state
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Table 4.5: State-level Dynamic DID Result
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3)
Pre-intra 3−1 0.021 -0.011
(0.163) (0.168)
Intra 0−2 0.340* 0.305*
(0.180) (0.182)
Intra 3−5 0.491** 0.457**
(0.201) (0.202)
Intra 6+ 0.452* 0.435*
(0.245) (0.246)
Pre-inter 3−1 0.075 0.080
(0.162) (0.164)
Inter 0−2 0.083 0.096
(0.255) (0.244)
Inter 3−5 -0.403 -0.374
(0.340) (0.307)
Inter 6+ -0.366 -0.290
(0.364) (0.315)
No. of States 49 49 49
Observations 833 833 833
R-squared 0.683 0.684 0.691
State-level Controls Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results from the state-level dynamic difference-in-difference regres-
sions. Refer to Table 4.4 for full model specification. The first column shows that the key term in
the typical DID setting, Intra, is decomposed with four dummy variables capturing the timing of
the deregulation. Pre-intra3−1 is a dummy variable for the periods 3, 2, and 1 years before the
implementation year of the intra-state deregulation; Intra0−2 is a dummy variable for the imple-
mentation year and 1 and 2 years after that year. Similarly, Intra3−5 is a dummy variable for the
period 3-5 years after the implementation year while Intra6+ is a dummy variable for the period
at least 6 years after the implementation year. As it shows in column 1, the coefficient on Pre-
intra3−1 is estimated to be insignificant while estimations on the other three dummy variables are
all positive and significant. The insignificant estimation on Pre-intra3−1 indicates that there is no
significant difference between states in the treatment group and those in the control group before the
competition shock come into play. Similarly, column 2 in Table 4.5 shows that the dummy variable
Inter in the typical DID setting is also decomposed into four dummy variables. However, none of
the four dummy variables are estimated to be statistically significant. In column 3, the dynamic
DID terms are all included into the single regression, and the estimations do not qualitatively differ
from those in column 1 and 2. Overall the results from the dynamic DID regressions confirms the
causality between the intra-state banking competition shock and banking stability which has been
identified from the baseline results, as the common trend assumption of the DID method is satisfied
in this case. It also shows that inter-state branching deregulation does not significantly affect the
state-level banking stability, which is also consistent with the findings from the typical DID setting.
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deregulation) is not significantly different from zero, which means that banking sta-
bility in these periods are not significantly changed relative to the previous periods.
However, after the implementation of the intra-state deregulations as indicated by
the vertical line in the box, there is consistent and significant improvement in bank-
ing stability given the intensified intra-state banking competition. The right panel in
Figure 4.4 indicates that the state-level banking stability is not significantly affected
by the implementation of the inter-state branching deregulation, as the estimated
effect on all the dummy variables are not significantly different from zero.
Figure 4.4: Dynamics in Estimated DID Effects on State-level Bank-
ing Stability
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Notes: This figure graphically presents the estimated effect of the competition shock induced by both types of deregulation on
banking stability at state level. As the left panel shows, the estimated effect on the period 3-1 (3 to 1 year before the intra-state
deregulation) is not significantly different from zero, which means that banking stability in these periods are not significantly changed
relative to the previous periods. However, after the implementation of the intra-state deregulations as indicated by the vertical line
in the box, there is consistent and significant improvement in banking stability given the intensified intra-state banking competition.
The right panel indicates that the state-level banking stability is not significantly affected by the implementation of the inter-state
branching deregulation, as the estimated effect on all the dummy variables are not significantly different from zero.
Overall the results from the dynamic DID regressions confirms the causality
between the intra-state banking competition shock and banking stability which has
been identified from the baseline results, as the common trend assumption of the DID
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method is satisfied in this case. It also shows that inter-state branching deregulation
does not significantly affect the state-level banking stability, which is also consistent
with the findings from the typical DID setting.
4.5.3 State-level Analysis: Alternative stability indicators
Following Beck et al. (2013), the main indicator for banking stability in this analysis
is Z score calculated with a 3-year rolling window (Z3). To make sure the results
are not solely driven by the specific pattern and variation in the main stability
indicator Z3, the typical DID regressions are also implemented with alternative
stability indicators to confirm the findings from the previous analysis. As described
in Section 4, the alternative indicators are: Z score with a 5-year rolling window (Z5),
inverse standard deviation of ROA with a 3-year rolling window, inverse standard
deviation of ROA with a 5-year rolling window and non-performing loan ratio (NPL
Ratio).
The regression results with alternative state-level banking stability indicators
are presented in Table 4.6, along with the result estimated from the main indicator
in the first column. Column 2 in Table 4.6 presents the regression results with
Z5 as the state-level stability indicator. Compared with the results in column 1,
it shows that the number of observations decreases from 833 to 735 as the rolling
window widened, meanwhile the estimated coefficient on the key terms - Intra
and Inter - are qualitatively unchanged. Based on Kennedy (1981)’s method of
interpretation illustrated by equation 7, an estimation of 0.303 on Intra with a
standard error of 0.125 means that the state-level banking stability are estimated
to be improved by 34.3% given the intensified competition after the intra-state
branching deregulation, and this effect is statistically significant at 5 percent level.
The insignificant estimation on Inter also confirms the findings from the first column
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that the state-level banking stability is not significantly influence by the inter-state
branching deregulation.
Table 4.6: State-level Result - Alternative Stability Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z5) log(1/σ3(ROA)) log(1/σ5(ROA)) NPL Ratio
Intra 0.381*** 0.303** 0.371*** 0.298*** -0.499***
(0.128) (0.125) (0.108) (0.105) (0.181)
Inter -0.013 0.054 -0.001 0.063 -0.070
(0.186) (0.152) (0.161) (0.126) (0.157)
No. of States 49 49 49 49 49
Observations 833 735 833 735 588
R-squared 0.682 0.771 0.657 0.746 0.811
State-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the regression results with alternative state-level banking stability indicators, along with the result
estimated from the main indicator in the first column. Refer to Table 4.4 for full model specification. Column 2 presents the
regression results with Z5 as the state-level stability indicator. It shows that the number of observations decreases to 735 as the
rolling window widened, meanwhile the estimated coefficient on the key terms - Intra and Inter - are qualitatively unchanged.
The insignificant estimation on Inter also confirms the findings from the first column that the state-level banking stability is not
significantly influence by the inter-state branching deregulation. These findings are also confirmed by the positive and significant
estimations on Intra and the insignificant estimations on Inter in both column 3 and 4 where the state-level banking stability
are indicated by the inverse standard deviation of ROA with a 3- and 5-year rolling window, respectively. Column 5 presents the
regression results with NPL Ratio as the state-level banking stability indicator. The number of observations in this regression further
drops to 588, as the information on non-performing loans in the Call report is only available from 1983 onward. The estimation on
Intra also confirms the finding that the state-level banking stability is improved by the intensified intra-state banking competition
over the post-deregulation period.
These findings are also confirmed by the positive and significant estimations on
Intra and the insignificant estimations on Inter in both column 3 and 4 in Table
4.6 where the state-level banking stability are indicated by the inverse standard
deviation of ROA with a 3- and 5-year rolling window, respectively. Column 5 in
Table 4.6 presents the regression results with NPL Ratio as the state-level banking
stability indicator. The number of observations in this regression drops to 588 from
833 in the benchmark regression, as the information on non-performing loans in the
Call report is only available from 1983 onward. The estimation on Intra suggests
that the state-level non-performing loan ratio on average decreases by 0.499 percent-
age points after the intra-state deregulation, which also confirms the finding that
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the state-level banking stability is improved by the intensified intra-state banking
competition over the post-deregulation period.
To sum up the state-level analysis, evidence from the typical DID regressions, dy-
namic DID regressions and regressions with alternative state-level banking stability
indicators all suggest that the intensified banking competition caused by intra-state
branching deregulation improves the banking stability at the state-level, and the
effect is both statistically and economically significant.
4.5.4 Bank-level Analysis: Baseline result
The Baseline regression results for the bank-level analysis are presented in Table
4.7. As it shows, these regressions follow the full specification where the bank
fixed effect, year fixed effect and the BEA region-year fixed effect are all included.
Furthermore, each regression in the bank-level analysis also controls for bank specific
characteristics and state-level macroeconomic conditions.
As the first column of Table show, the dummy variable Intra is introduced
into the regression indicating the intensified competition level after the intra-state
branching deregulation. It shows that the estimated coefficient on Intra is positive
and statistically significant at 5 percent level. Using the interpretation method
proposed by Kennedy (1981), the estimation of 0.019 on Intra with a standard
error of 0.009 means that the bank-level stability is on average improved by 1.914%
in the more competitive environment after the intra-state branching deregulation.
Though the effect of the intensified intra-state competition on bank-level stability is
estimated to be consistent with that estimated in the state-level analysis, the scale
of the improvement in banking stability at bank-level is much smaller than that at
the state-level.
In the second column in Table 4.7, the dummy variable Intra is replace by Inter
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Table 4.7: Bank-level Baseline Result
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3)
Intra 0.019** 0.021**
(0.009) (0.009)
Inter 0.023** 0.026**
(0.010) (0.010)
Bank-level Controls
Size 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Size Growth -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interbank Borrowing -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C&I Loan 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loan to Assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State-level Controls
GDP Growth 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.038***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Housing Price Index -0.008 -0.026 -0.018
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant 3.516*** 3.596*** 3.535***
(0.248) (0.247) (0.249)
No. of Banks 16,410 16,410 16,410
Observations 213,154 213,154 213,154
R-squared 0.385 0.385 0.385
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the baseline regression results for the bank-level analysis. Column 1
shows that the estimated coefficient on Intra is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent
level. The estimation of 0.019 on Intra with a standard error of 0.009 means that the bank-level
stability is on average improved by 1.914% in the more competitive environment after the intra-
state branching deregulation. Column 2 shows that the coefficient on Inter is also estimated to be
positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level, and the scale of the effect is calculated to be
2.321%. Column 3 shows that the coefficient estimated on Intra and Inter are qualitatively the
same compared with the estimations in column 1 and 2 respectively. Overall, the results suggest
that banking stability at bank-level is improved by the intensified level of competition caused by
both types of banking deregulation. Furthermore, bank size is positively and significantly associated
with bank-level stability. However, the year-on-year growth of bank size is estimated to have a
negative and significant effect on bank-level stability, which indicates that banks that expand in a
faster pace might be using more aggressive strategies that generates excessive risks. The estimation
on InterbankBorrowing implies that banks relying more on the funding from the interbank market
tend to be less stable. The liquidity condition of a bank is estimated to have a positive and significant
association with its stability. It also suggests that the business model of a bank, as indicated by the
proportion of commercial and industrial loans (C&L loans) in a bank’s loan portfolio and the Loan
to Assets ratio, does not have a significant effect on the bank’s stability. Furthermore, it shows that
state-level macroeconomic conditions also matter for banking stability at bank-level.
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which indicates the inter-state banking competition shock induced by the inter-state
branching deregulation. The coefficient on Inter is also estimated to be positive and
statistically significant at 5 percent level, and the scale of the effect is calculated to
be 2.321%. The result is different from that in the state-level analysis which implies
that inter-state branching deregulation does not have an impact on banking stability
at state-level.
Column 3 in Table 4.7 presents the regression results where both Intra and Inter
are introduced into the model. As it shows, the coefficient estimated on Intra and
Inter are qualitatively the same compared with the estimations in column 1 and
2 respectively. Overall, the results suggest that banking stability at bank-level is
improved by the intensified level of competition caused by both types of banking
deregulation.
In terms of bank-level control variables, column 3 in Table 4.7 shows that bank
size is positively and significantly associated with bank-level stability: if a bank’s
size increases by 1%, the stability of the bank would be improved by 9.7%. However,
the year-on-year growth of bank size is estimated to have a negative and significant
effect on bank-level stability: 1 percentage point increase in the annual growth rate
of a bank’s size would reduce the bank’s stability by 0.3%. This indicates that
banks that expand in a faster pace might be using more aggressive strategies that
generates excessive risks. The estimation on InterbankBorrowing shows that 1
percentage point increase in a bank’s interbank borrowing would reduce the bank’s
stability by 0.3%, implying that banks relying more on the funding from the inter-
bank market tend to be less stable. The liquidity condition of a bank is estimated
to have a positive and significant association with its stability: if the liquid assets of
a bank increases by 1 percentage point, the stability of the bank would be improved
by 0.3%. It also suggests that the business model of a bank, as indicated by the
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proportion of commercial and industrial loans (C&L loans) in a bank’s loan port-
folio and the Loan to Assets ratio, does not have a significant effect on the bank’s
stability. Furthermore, it shows that state-level macroeconomic conditions also mat-
ter for banking stability at bank-level: 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth
would improve bank-level stability by 0.6%, while 1 percentage point increase in
unemployment rate would reduce bank-level stability by 3.8%.
4.5.5 Bank-level Analysis: Dynamic DID result
As in the state-level analysis, dynamic difference-in-difference method is also imple-
mented in the bank-level analysis to examine the causality between the competition
shock induced by both types of branching deregulation and bank-level stability.
Table 4.8 presents the results from the bank-level dynamic DID regressions.
As it shows in the first column in Table 4.8, the key dummy variable in the
typical DID setting, Intra, is decomposed into four dummy variables based on
the regression specification illustrated by equation 6. Pre-intra3−1 is the dummy
variable for the pre-deregulation period while Intra0−2, Intra3−5 and Intra6+ are the
dummy variables for the post-deregulation period, capturing the intensified intra-
state competition shock caused by the intra-state branching deregulation. It shows
that Pre-intra3−1 is estimated to be insignificant which indicates that there is no
significant difference between banks in the treatment group and those in the control
group before the intra-state competition shock comes into play. Meanwhile, Intra3−5
and Intra6+ are estimated to be positive and significant at 1 percent level. The
result confirms the causality between the intensified intra-state competition shock
and bank-level stability.
Similarly, column 2 in Table 4.8 shows that the dummy variable Inter in the
typical DID setting is also decomposed into four dummy variables. The dummy
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Table 4.8: Bank-level Dynamic DID Result
(1) (2) (3)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3)
Pre-intra 3−1 0.006 0.005
(0.008) (0.009)
Intra 0−2 0.019 0.022*
(0.012) (0.012)
Intra 3−5 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.015)
Intra 6+ 0.074*** 0.073***
(0.021) (0.021)
Pre-inter 3−1 0.001 -0.000
(0.010) (0.010)
Inter 0−2 0.025* 0.024
(0.015) (0.015)
Inter 3−5 -0.014 -0.015
(0.020) (0.020)
Inter 6+ -0.010 -0.012
(0.026) (0.026)
No. of Banks 16,410 16,410 16,410
Observations 213,154 213,154 213,154
R-squared 0.385 0.385 0.385
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results from the bank-level dynamic DID regressions. Refer to Ta-
ble 4.7 for full model specification. First column shows that the key dummy variable in the typical
DID setting, Intra, is decomposed into four dummy variables based on the regression specification
illustrated by equation 6. Pre-intra3−1 is the dummy variable for the pre-deregulation period
while Intra0−2, Intra3−5 and Intra6+ are the dummy variables for the post-deregulation period,
capturing the intensified intra-state competition shock caused by the intra-state branching deregu-
lation. It shows that Pre-intra3−1 is estimated to be insignificant which indicates that there is no
significant difference between banks in the treatment group and those in the control group before the
intra-state competition shock comes into play. Meanwhile, Intra3−5 and Intra6+ are estimated to
be positive and significant at 1 percent level. Similarly, column 2 in shows that the dummy variable
Inter in the typical DID setting is also decomposed into four dummy variables. The dummy vari-
able for the pre-deregulation period (Pre-inter3−1) is estimated to be insignificant, while the the
first dummy variable for the post-deregulation period (Inter0−2) is estimated to be positive and
significant. However, the estimation on the other two post-deregulation dummy variables, Inter3−5
and Inter6+ are not statistically significant. In the last column, the dynamic DID terms for both
types of deregulation are all included into the regression. As it shows, the estimations on the dummy
variables for the intra-state deregulation are qualitatively the same as in column 1, apart from the
fact that the the first post-deregulation dummy variable (Intra0−2) turns to be positive and sig-
nificant. This confirms that the banking stability at bank-level is improved given the competition
shock induced by the intra-state branching deregulation. In terms of the inter-state deregulation,
column 3 shows that none of the four dummy variables are estimated to be significant, indicating
that the findings from the typical DID regressions are not robust with the dynamic DID setting.
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variable for the pre-deregulation period (Pre-inter3−1) is estimated to be insignifi-
cant, while the the first dummy variable for the post-deregulation period (Inter0−2)
is estimated to be positive and significant. However, the estimation on the other
two post-deregulation dummy variables, Inter3−5 and Inter6+ are not statistically
significant. This provide weak evidence on the causality between the inter-state
competition shock on bank-level stability.
In the last column in Table 4.8, the dynamic DID terms for both types of dereg-
ulation are all included into the regression. As it shows, the estimations on the
dummy variables for the intra-state deregulation are qualitatively the same as in
column 1, apart from the fact that the the first post-deregulation dummy variable
(Intra0−2) turns to be positive and significant. Again, this confirms that the bank-
ing stability at bank-level is improved given the competition shock induced by the
intra-state branching deregulation. In terms of the inter-state deregulation, column
3 shows that none of the four dummy variables are estimated to be significant, in-
dicating that the findings from the typical DID regressions are not robust with the
dynamic DID setting.
The estimated effects of the competition shock caused by both type of deregu-
lations in column 3 are also graphically presented in Figure 4.5. The left panel in
Figure 4.5 shows that the estimated effect on the period 3-1 (3 to 1 years before the
intra-state deregulation) is not significantly different from zero, which means that
bank-level stability in these periods are not significantly changed relative to the pre-
vious periods. However, after the implementation of the intra-state deregulations as
indicated by the vertical line in the box, there is progressive and significant improve-
ment in bank-level stability given the intensified intra-state banking competition.
The right panel in Figure 4.5 indicates that the bank-level stability is not signifi-
cantly affected by the implementation of the inter-state branching deregulation, as
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics in Estimated DID Effects on Bank-level Bank-
ing Stability
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Notes: This figure graphically presents the estimated effects of the competition shock caused by both type of deregulations. The
left panel shows that the estimated effect on the period 3-1 (3 to 1 years before the intra-state deregulation) is not significantly
different from zero, which means that bank-level stability in these periods are not significantly changed relative to the previous
periods. However, after the implementation of the intra-state deregulations as indicated by the vertical line in the box, there is
progressive and significant improvement in bank-level stability given the intensified intra-state banking competition. The right panel
indicates that the bank-level stability is not significantly affected by the implementation of the inter-state branching deregulation, as
the estimated effect on all the dummy variables are not significantly different from zero.
the estimated effect on all the dummy variables are not significantly different from
zero.
Overall the results from the bank-level dynamic DID regressions confirms the
causality between the intra-state banking competition shock and banking stability
which has been identified from the baseline results, as the common trend assumption
of the DID method is satisfied in this case. It also shows that inter-state branching
deregulation does not significantly affect the state-level banking stability. These
findings are very consistent with the state-level evidence.
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4.5.6 Bank-level Analysis: Alternative stability indicators
Using alternative bank-level banking stability indicators, this section examines the
findings from the bank-level analysis in the previous sections, to make sure that
the results are not solely driven by the specific pattern and variation in the main
stability indicator Z3. As described in Section 4, the alternative bank-level stability
indicators are: Z score with a 5-year rolling window (Z5), inverse standard deviation
of ROA with a 3-year rolling window, inverse standard deviation of ROA with a 5-
year rolling window and non-performing loan ratio (NPL Ratio).
The regression results with alternative bankl-level stability indicators are pre-
sented in Table 4.9, along with the result estimated from the main indicator in the
first column. Column 2 in Table 4.9 presents the regression results with Z5 as the
state-level stability indicator. Compared with the results in column 1, it shows that
the number of observations decreases from 213,154 to 180,401 as the rolling window
widened, meanwhile the estimated coefficient on the key terms - Intra and Inter
- are qualitatively unchanged. This confirms the findings from the typical DID re-
gressions with the main indicator. Furthermore, this result is also confirmed by
the estimations in both column 3 and 4 in Table 4.9 where the state-level banking
stability are indicated by the inverse standard deviation of ROA with a 3-year and
5-year rolling window, respectively.
Column 5 in Table 4.9 presents the regression results with NPL Ratio as the
bank-level stability indicator. The number of observations in this regression further
drops 146,780, as the information on non-performing loans in the Call report is only
available from 1983 onward. However, the estimations on both Intra and Inter are
not statistically significant, which differs from the results in the previous regressions.
It suggests that the non-performing loan ratio at bank-level are not significantly
influenced by the intensified competition shock induced by both types of branching
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Table 4.9: Bank-level Result - Alternative Stability Indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z5) log(1/σ3(ROA)) log(1/σ5(ROA)) NPL Ratio
Intra 0.021** 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.042
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.037)
Inter 0.026** 0.020* 0.030*** 0.019** 0.024
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.038)
No. of Banks 16,410 16,407 16,410 16,407 15,601
Observations 213,154 180,401 213,154 180,403 146,780
R-squared 0.385 0.573 0.398 0.558 0.509
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results from the bank-level dynamic DID regressions. Refer to Table 4.7 for full model specification.
First column shows that the key dummy variable in the typical DID setting, Intra, is decomposed into four dummy variables based
on the regression specification illustrated by equation 6. Pre-intra3−1 is the dummy variable for the pre-deregulation period while
Intra0−2, Intra3−5 and Intra6+ are the dummy variables for the post-deregulation period, capturing the intensified intra-state
competition shock caused by the intra-state branching deregulation. It shows that Pre-intra3−1 is estimated to be insignificant
which indicates that there is no significant difference between banks in the treatment group and those in the control group before
the intra-state competition shock comes into play. Meanwhile, Intra3−5 and Intra6+ are estimated to be positive and significant
at 1 percent level. Similarly, column 2 in shows that the dummy variable Inter in the typical DID setting is also decomposed into
four dummy variables. The dummy variable for the pre-deregulation period (Pre-inter3−1) is estimated to be insignificant, while
the the first dummy variable for the post-deregulation period (Inter0−2) is estimated to be positive and significant. However, the
estimation on the other two post-deregulation dummy variables, Inter3−5 and Inter6+ are not statistically significant. In the last
column, the dynamic DID terms for both types of deregulation are all included into the regression. As it shows, the estimations
on the dummy variables for the intra-state deregulation are qualitatively the same as in column 1, apart from the fact that the the
first post-deregulation dummy variable (Intra0−2) turns to be positive and significant. This confirms that the banking stability at
bank-level is improved given the competition shock induced by the intra-state branching deregulation. In terms of the inter-state
deregulation, column 3 shows that none of the four dummy variables are estimated to be significant, indicating that the findings from
the typical DID regressions are not robust with the dynamic DID setting.
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deregulation. This result also differs from that in the state-level analysis that there
is a significant drop in non-performing loan ratio at state-level after the intra-state
deregulation. This might be due to the heterogeneity at bank level: the competition
shock affects different types of banks in different ways.
To sum up the bank-level analysis, evidence from the typical DID regressions, dy-
namic DID regressions and regressions with alternative bank-level banking stability
indicators all suggest that the intensified banking competition caused by intra-state
branching deregulation significantly improves the banking stability at bank-level.
Though the scale of the effect of the intra-state competition on banking stability
is much smaller at bank-level, it is still economically significant. Furthermore, the
dynamic DID regressions do not show strong evidence that there is a significant
improvement in the bank-level stability after the inter-state deregulation. Overall,
the bank-level results are consistent with the findings from the state-level analysis.
4.5.7 Bank-level Analysis: Balanced panel
As described in the previous sections, the main dataset in this analysis is the Call
report which records financial statements data for all banking institutions regulated
by the FDIC. It contains 250,654 observations for 18,012 banks and the sample
period starts from 1976 to 1994, with an annual frequency for 19 dates. However, this
unbalance panel dataset: some banks are established and recorded by the database
after 1976 while some others disappeared before 1994, due to the reason of failure,
merger or acquisition. This unbalanced feature of the bank-level data might might
potentially affect estimated results from the bank-level regressions. For instance,
banks that are failed, merged or acquisitive by others (banks exited the databased
before 1994) might be those particularly unstable banks.
This section examines whether the previous findings from the bank-level analysis
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are driven by the unbalanced feature of the bank-level datasets. To construct a
balanced panel dataset at bank-level, those unbalanced observations are dropped
from the dataset while only banks that could be observed over the whole sample
period are kept. Table 4.10 shows the results estimated from both the typical DID
regressions and dynamic DID regressions with the balanced panel dataset. As the
bottom of Table 4.10 shows, the number of banks in the balanced panel decreased by
51.1% from 16,410 to 8,107, while accordingly the number of observations decreased
by 35.4% from 213,154 to 137,779.
Though there is a significant drop in the number of observations in the balanced
panel, the key regression result remain qualitatively unchanged. The first three
columns in Table 4.10 present the regression results for the typical DID setting. It
shows that the estimations on the key terms - Intra and Inter - are all positive and
significant, and the scale of the estimated effect of the competition shock on bank-
level stability are very close to those in the baseline results presented in Table 4.7.
Furthermore, the estimations in column 4 - 6 are also very close to the regression
results presented in Table 4.8 where the dynamic DID is implemented with the
unbalance panel dataset. Overall, this consistent result suggests that the previous
findings in the bank-level analysis are not biased due to the unbalanced feature of
the main dataset.
4.5.8 Bank-level Analysis: Heterogeneity test
The overall bank-level analysis shows that the stability of individual banks is signifi-
cantly improved by the intensified competition induced by the intra-state branching
deregulation, while the inter-state deregulation does not have a long lasting effect
on the bank-level stability as indicated by the dynamic DID analysis. These results
are very consistent with the finding from the state-level analysis. However, the scale
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Table 4.10: Bank-level Result - Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3) log(Z3)
Intra 0.019* 0.022**
(0.010) (0.010)
Inter 0.028** 0.031***
(0.012) (0.012)
Pre-intra 3-1 0.015 0.014
(0.010) (0.010)
Intra 0-2 0.025* 0.029**
(0.014) (0.015)
Intra 3-5 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.018)
Intra 6+ 0.088*** 0.088***
(0.023) (0.024)
Pre-inter 3-1 0.008 0.008
(0.012) (0.012)
Inter 0-2 0.037** 0.036**
(0.018) (0.018)
Inter 3-5 -0.000 -0.000
(0.024) (0.024)
Inter 6+ 0.008 0.007
(0.030) (0.030)
No. of Banks 8,107 8,107 8,107 8,107 8,107 8,107
Observations 137,779 137,779 137,779 137,779 137,779 137,779
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.330
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the results estimated from both the typical DID regressions and dynamic DID regressions with the balanced
panel dataset. As the bottom shows, the number of banks in the balanced panel decreased by 51.1% to 8,107, while accordingly the
number of observations decreased by 35.4% to 137,779. The first three columns present the regression results for the typical DID
setting. It shows that the estimations on the key terms are all positive and significant, and the scale of the estimated effect of the
competition shock on bank-level stability are very close to those in the baseline results presented in Table 4.7. Furthermore, the
estimations in column 4 - 6 are also very close to the regression results presented in Table 4.8 where the dynamic DID is implemented
with the unbalance panel dataset. Overall, this consistent result suggests that the previous findings in the bank-level analysis are not
biased due to the unbalanced feature of the main dataset.
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of the effect estimated at bank-level are much smaller than the effect estimated from
the state-level analysis, which might be due to the heterogeneity at bank level.
In the state level analysis, taking estimations in column 6 in Table 4.4 as an ex-
ample, the banking stability at state-level is remarkably improved by the intensified
intra-state banking competition by 45.2%.4 Nevertheless, the percentage effect of
the same competition shock on bank-level stability is only estimated to be 2.12%, as
indicated by the estimations in column 3 in Table 4.7. This suggests that there might
be some heterogeneity among individual banks so that the average effect estimated
at bank-level is much smaller than that at the state-level.
This section examines the heterogeneity among banks in terms of the effect of the
competition shock on bank-level stability. It examines the bank-level heterogeneity
from 3 perspectives: bank size, bank profitability, and level of competition. Banks
at different scale might react in different ways when they face a common competition
shock to the system as they might have distinctive business models and strategies or
serve different customers. Bank profitability might have an impact on the channel
through which the competition shock would have an effect on bank-level stability.
Compared with non-profitable banks, profitable banks might be able to handle the
competition shocks more easily. The level of competition before the deregulation also
matters, as Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) and Hakenes and Schnabel (2011)
suggest that there might be a non-linear relationship between banking competition
and banking stability.
The heterogeneity test are based on the balanced panel datasets, and the tests
results are presented in Table 4.11. To test the heterogeneity among banks, the sam-
ple are separated equally into three sub-samples according to their pre-deregulation
characteristics. For example, in terms of the bank size measured by total assets, the
4The coefficient on the key term Intra is estimated to be 0.381 with an standard error of 0.128.
Based on the calculation proposed by Kennedy (1981),the percentage effect is estimated to be
45.2%
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level I sub-sample only contains small banks with relatively lower total assets, while
big banks are categorised into the level III sub-sample, leaving medium sized banks
in the level II sub-sample. Then the DID regression is implemented with the same
specifications for the three sub-samples separately to show whether the estimated
effect of the competition shock varies with the change in bank size.
The first panel in Table 4.11 presents the results from the heterogeneity test
on bank size, where bank size is measured by the amount of a bank’s total assets
immediately before the deregulation. It shows that the estimated coefficient on
Intra is only positive and significant for the level I sum-sample, indicating that
the intensified competition shock improves the stability of small banks, but has no
significant effect on medium-sized and big banks. On the other hand, the estimated
coefficient on Inter shows the opposite trend that the stability of big banks tend
to be more significantly improved by the intensified inter-state competition, while
small banks are unaffected. It indicates that the intra-state competition has a greater
impact on smaller banks while inter-state competition is more relevant to big banks.
The second panel in Table 4.11 shows that the heterogeneity test on bank size are
also conducted with a relative size measurement, though the result is very consistent
with that in panel 1.
The third panel in Table 4.11 shows the results from the heterogeneity test on
bank profitability. In terms of the intra-state competition, it does not show a clear
trend as the estimated coefficients on Intra are significant for both low-profitability
banks and high-profitability banks. On the other hand, the result suggests that
inter-state competition shock has a greater effect on banks with high profit level
as the estimated coefficient on Inter is positive and significant for banks in the
level III sub-sample while the estimations for the level I and II sub-sample are not
statistically significant.
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Table 4.11: Bank-level Result - Heterogeneity Test
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: ln(Z3) Level I Level II Level III
Absolute Size (total assets)
Intra 0.050*** -0.016 0.001
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Inter 0.028 0.040* 0.058**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
No. of Banks 2,521 2,522 2,519
Observations 42,851 42,871 42,804
R-squared 0.337 0.315 0.313
Relative Size (total assets/total banking assets in a county)
Intra 0.024 0.031* 0.015
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Inter 0.017 0.037* 0.056***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022)
No. of Banks 2,521 2,521 2,520
Observations 42,841 42,846 42,839
R-squared 0.335 0.323 0.312
Profitability (ROA)
Intra 0.044** 0.009 0.031*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Inter -0.016 0.029 0.101***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.020)
No. of Banks 2,520 2,521 2,521
Observations 42,835 42,844 42,847
R-squared 0.315 0.291 0.318
HHI (county level)
Intra 0.013 0.044** 0.004
(0.022) (0.018) (0.018)
Inter 0.017 0.041** 0.055**
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022)
No. of Banks 2,525 2,518 2,519
Observations 42,922 42,791 42,813
R-squared 0.323 0.330 0.326
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
BEA Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results from the heterogeneity test. To test the heterogeneity among banks, the sample are separated
equally into three sub-samples according to their pre-deregulation characteristics. For example, in terms of the bank size measured
by total assets, the level I sub-sample only contains small banks with relatively lower total assets, while big banks are categorised
into the level III sub-sample, leaving medium sized banks in the level II sub-sample. The first panel presents the results from the
heterogeneity test on bank size, where bank size is measured by the amount of a bank’s total assets. The results indicate that the
intra-state competition has a greater impact on smaller banks while inter-state competition is more relevant to big banks. The second
panel shows that the heterogeneity test on bank size are also conducted with a relative size measurement, and the result is very
consistent with that in panel 1. The third panel shows the results from the heterogeneity test on bank profitability, which suggests
that inter-state competition shock has a greater effect on banks with better profitability. The results from the heterogeneity test on
pre-deregulation competition environment is presented by the last panel, where competition is measured by HHI. The results show a
clear trend that the inter-state competition shock has a stronger impact on banks operating in a less competitive environment (high
HHI). This suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between banking competition and banking stability.
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Finally, the results from the heterogeneity test on pre-deregulation competition
environment is presented by the last panel in Table 4.11. As it shows, the mea-
surement for competition environment is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
calculated at county level. It shows that the estimated coefficient on Intra are
insignificant for both level I and level III banks, indicating that the effect of the
intra-state competition shock does not significantly differ due to the different level
of competition an individual bank faces. However, the estimated coefficient on Inter
across the three subs-samples shows that there is a clear trend that the inter-state
competition shock has a stronger impact on banks operating in a less competitive
environment (high HHI). This result is consistent with the theoretical predictions by
that there is a non-linear effect between banking competition and banking stability
(Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011).
193
CHAPTER 4 4.6. CONCLUSION
4.6 Conclusion
The debate on the relationship between banking competition and financial stability
in the literature of financial economics has been on-going for decades since Keeley
(1990). This issue has became a particularly important in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis erupted in 2008, as the intensive competition in the financial
sector before the crisis was seen as one of the main contributors to the collapse of
the system.
One strand of literature support the competition-fragility hypothesis that bank-
ing competition can destabilise the financial system. It argues that the "charter
value" enjoyed by the incumbent banks could be eroded by intensified competition
in the system, thus they are likely to take more risks on board and shift the excessive
risks towards depositors to maximise their profitability. While in a less competitive
environment, incumbent banks tend to have a higher level of profitability which
would ultimately contribute to a higher level of capital buffer and better banking
stability (Keeley, 1990; Beck et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2013).
However, the other strand of literature argues that competition in the banking
sector can actually improve banking stability. This competition-stability view sug-
gests that the interest rate on lending could be lowered due to banking competition,
thus firms and individuals as borrowers may have a lower borrowing cost, which in
turn reduces the credit risks faced by the banks. Overall, the stability of the banking
system could be improved by banking competition (Schaeck et al., 2009; Anginer
et al., 2014). In addition, some also argues that there might exist a non-linear rela-
tionship between banking competition and stability (Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
2010; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011).
The aim of this study is to employ a robust empirical strategy to identify the ef-
fect of banking competition on banking stability. Taking advantage of the staggered
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feature of the U.S. branch banking deregulation in the 1980s, this study implements
difference-in-difference (DID) method to address the issue of causality. In sum, it
identifies the effect of the intra-state and inter-state competition shock induced by
the deregulation policies on banking stability at both state-level and bank-level,
where banking stability is measured by Z-score calculated with a 3-year rolling win-
dow.
The analysis shows that the intensified competition shock caused by the intra-
state branching deregulation significantly improves the state-level banking stability
by 45.2%. The result is not only statistically but also economically significant.
Meanwhile, it shows that the inter-state branching deregulation is estimated to
have no significant impact on banking stability at state-level. This baseline result is
confirmed by the dynamic difference-in-difference regressions and also the regressions
with alternative stability indicators. The bank-level analysis shows consistent result
that the intra-state competition shock has a positive and significant effect on the
stability of individual banks, which is also robust with the dynamic DID setting and
alternative bank-level stability indicators. However, the scale of the estimated effect
at bank-level is much smaller: the intensified intra-state competition just improves
the stability of individual banks by 2.12% on average. Overall, these findings provide
both state-level and bank-level evidence on the competition-stability hypothesis that
banking competition improves banking stability.
The unbalanced feature of the bank-level panel dataset may bias the estimated
effect of the competition shock on bank-level stability. To examine this issue, both
typical DID and dynamic DID regressions are implemented with a balanced bank-
level panel dataset. The results from these regressions are qualitatively unchanged
compared with the previous findings from the bank-level analysis. Thus, it confirms
that main implication is not driven by the unbalanced observations in the dataset.
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Furthermore, it examines the heterogeneity among banks from three perspectives:
bank size, bank profitability and the competition environment faced by the bank.
It shows that the intra-state competition shock has a greater effect on the stability
of small banks, while big banks and more profitable banks are more likely to be
affect by the inter-state competition shock. The heterogeneity test also shows that
the stability of banks operating in a less competitive environment are more likely to
be improved by the inter-state competition shock, which provides evidence on the
non-linear relationship between banking competition and stability.
This study also presents opportunities for future work. Though the effect of the
competition shock on banking stability is investigated with a variety of stability
indicators, such as Z-score, inverse standard deviation of ROA, and non-performing
loan ratio, all of these indicators are constructed based on the balance sheet and
income statement. The effect could also be examined with stability indicators based
on banks’ market value. For example, the Distance-to Default is a bank risk mea-
surement proposed by Merton (1974). In addition, as the inter-state branching
deregulation is implemented based on state-level reciprocation, the announcement
of the implementation of the deregulation might not have a immediate effect. Thus,
using a simple dummy variable for the inter-state deregulation based on the year of
the announcement may not be able to capture the competition shock properly.
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5.1 Summary of Findings
This thesis uses micro-econometric methods to explore factors that could have an
impact on banking stability. Based on the European sovereign debt crisis, the first
essay aims to answer the following three empirical questions:
1. Can a foreign liquidity shock be transmitted to the domestic banking system
through bank ownership linkages?
2. Is there any heterogeneity among banks in transmitting the liquidity shock?
3. Is this transmission more pronounced in developing economies?
To do so, this study constructs cross-border ownership networks for banks located
in European countries, and exploits the 2010 European debt crisis as a natural
experiment to implement the difference-in-difference (DID) method. The exposure
to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries is constructed for each international banking
group (network) as measured by the proportion of their total banking assets in GIIPS
countries.
The baseline results from the DID regressions imply that the subsidiary banks
that are highly exposed due to the ownership linkages would significantly reduce
their lending during the crisis period, and the magnitude of this negative effect
is considerable: if the bank’s exposure increases by 1 percent, the bank’s lending
growth rate would reduce by 5.75 percentage points. This result supports the hy-
pothesis that highly exposed banks’ lending performance is negatively affected by
the foreign liquidity shock due to the cross-border ownership linkages. Furthermore,
it disentangles the transmission channel by exploring the heterogeneity among sub-
sidiary banks in the ownership network. It suggests that larger subsidiary banks and
those subsidiaries that were more profitable are found to be more resilient to the
shock. It also shows that the parent bank’s characteristics affect the transmission
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of the shock, supporting the notion of an internal capital market operating within
these banking groups. The analysis also shows that subsidiary banks located in
Eastern Europe are more fragile when facing a external liquidity shock, compared
with those located in Western Europe. This implies that subsidiary banks operat-
ing in developing countries tend to be more dependent on liquidity support from
their parent banks, as the financial sector is usually less developed in developing
countries.
The findings from the first essay are directly connected with a strand of literature
which focuses on the international transmission of liquidity shocks through bank
ownership linkages. For example, Peek and Rosengren (2000) examines whether a
liquidity shock in a single country (Japan) could be transmitted into another (United
States) while Aiyar (2012) identifies whether the global liquidity shock during the
2008 financial crisis were transmitted to a single country (United Kingdom). In a
cross-country setting, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) examines whether a liquidity
crisis in advanced economies could be transmitted to emerging markets through
foreign banks at country level. This essay builds on these papers by providing
empirical evidence at the level of the banks and their subsidiaries on the operation
of an internal capital market with a cross-country setting. Furthermore, it adds to
the literature, by including both developed and developing economies in the sample
and testing at the bank level whether bank ownership linkages across Europe can
serve as a vehicle to transmit liquidity shock.
The second essay focuses on the effect of sovereign shocks on banks’ lending
activities through their exposures to the distressed sovereign during the European
sovereign debt crisis. More specifically, this essay tries to examine the following
three issues:
1. Can a sovereign shock negatively affect banks’ lending activity?
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2. Through which channel a sovereign shock can destabilise the banking sector?
3. Can the accounting and regulatory treatments of sovereign exposures affect
the strength of transmission of the sovereign shock?
Using a rich dataset on banks’ sovereign exposures from the European Banking
Authority, the analysis also disentangles the transmission channel by breaking down
the type and accounting classification of the exposure. In line with previous studies,
the analysis shows that negative shocks to sovereign bond are associated to lower
subsequent bank lending for banks more exposed to the shocks. Furthermore, it
shows that the negative effect of a sovereign shock on bank lending is weaker for
better capitalised banks, which provides evidence on the so-called ‘capital channel’
through which a sovereign shock could be transmitted to banks.
The analysis also shows that bank capital matters especially for exposures that
are both mark-to-market and subject to no capital requirements, such as available
for sale (AFS) exposures: this seems to be the type of exposure through which
sovereign shocks are transmitted directly to bank solvency. The capital channel
is less important for book-value exposures (held to maturity) and exposures with
positive capital requirements (held for trading). It is also revealed that the capital
channel is particularly important for short-term exposures rather than medium-
and long-term exposures and that domestic exposures play a more important role
in transmitting sovereign shocks compared with foreign exposures.
The findings from the first step analysis in this essay are consistent with the
results from the empirical studies in the literature focusing on whether a sovereign
shock would have an impact on banks’ lending activities (Gennaioli et al., 2014a,b;
De Marco, 2015; Popov and Van Horen, 2015). This essay takes a step further from
the previous studies, and provides empirical evidence on how exactly a sovereign
shock could be transmitted to banks through the ‘capital channel’ and the ‘funding
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channel’. Further more, this essay also examines the heterogeneity among differ-
ent types of banks’ sovereign exposures with distinctive accounting and regulatory
treatment in terms of transmitting sovereign shocks. To my best knowledge, this
issues has not been fully explored in the literature. In addition, this essay also con-
tributes to the literature on the effect of the application of fair value accounting in
the banking industry where there is no consensus in the literature yet whether fair
value accounting could cause excess negative impact on a bank’s financial condition.
The third essay explores the relationship between banking competition and bank-
ing stability, using the staggered banking deregulation levied by individual states in
the U.S. as a natural experiment. Specifically, it identifies the effect of the inten-
sified competition induced by the deregulation on the stability of the U.S. banking
sector, and answers the following research questions:
1. Can banking stability be improved by a positive competition shock in the
banking sector?
2. Is the effect of banking competition on banking stability non-linear?
3. Is there any heterogeneity among banks in response to a higher level of com-
petition?
The analysis is conducted at state-level as well as bank-level. It shows that the
intensified competition shock caused by the intra-state branching deregulation sig-
nificantly improves the state-level banking stability. Meanwhile, it shows that the
inter-state branching deregulation is estimated to have no significant impact on
banking stability at state-level. This baseline result is confirmed by the dynamic
difference-in-difference regressions and also the regressions with alternative stabil-
ity indicators. The bank-level analysis shows consistent result that the intra-state
competition shock has a positive and significant effect on the stability of individual
201
CHAPTER 5 5.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
banks, which is also robust with the dynamic DID setting and alternative bank-level
stability indicators. However, the scale of the estimated effect at bank-level is much
smaller.
Furthermore, it examines the heterogeneity among banks from three perspec-
tives: bank size, bank profitability and the competition environment faced by the
bank. It shows that the intra-state competition shock has a greater effect on the
stability of small banks, while big banks and more profitable banks are more likely
to be affect by the inter-state competition shock. The heterogeneity test also shows
that the stability of banks operating in a less competitive environment are more
likely to be improved by the inter-state competition shock, which provides evidence
on the non-linear relationship between banking competition and stability.
Overall the contribution of this essays is two fold. First, it exploits the intensi-
fied competition in the banking sector induced by the U.S. banking deregulation as
an exogenous shock and identifies the the relationship between banking competition
and banking stability with a Difference-in-Differences method, instead of GMM ex-
ploited by most of the empirical papers in the existing literature. Second, it provides
empirical evidence on the non-linear relationship between banking competition and
banking stability predicted by a theoretical model proposed by Martinez-Miera and
Repullo (2010) and Hakenes and Schnabel (2011), which is a issue that has not been
fully investigated in the empirical literature.
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5.2 Policy Implications
Several policy implications can be drawn from the analysis in the first essay. First, as
a liquidity shock can be transmitted through cross-border bank ownership linkages,
regulatory authorities across countries might think carefully about the activities of
international banks and whether any of these should be ring fenced. Specific policies
targeted at international banks so as to isolate foreign liquidity shocks could help
support the stability of a domestic banking system. This is especially important for
regulatory authorities in developing countries, as the transmission effect is found to
be more pronounced for subsidiary banks located in Eastern Europe. While such
regulation may come at an operational cost for the banks involved, this has to be
balanced against the need for a stable financial system.
Second, the first essay provides empirical evidence for operation of the internal
capital market within banking groups in which international banks allocate their
banking assets in order to maximise the profits. Regulators across countries would
do better to coordinate their activities and agree policy on an international rather
than domestic level. This may help alleviate the potential for contagion across an in-
ternational bank’s internal capital market. Alternatively, supranational institutions
for banking supervision should be established to regulate multinational banking
groups that operate subsidiary banks across many countries as independent entities.
The establishment of the European Banking Authority (EBA) can be a good exam-
ple as the ultimate regulatory authority of the banking sector in EU countries. The
regulatory power across jurisdictions in the EU has been assigned to EBA, and it
has been conducting stress tests, capital exercises and transparency exercises since
2010, to assess the banking system of the European Union, using consolidated data
for multinational banks across E.U. countries. Similarly, a global-level supranational
regulatory authority on banking supervision might be established to better monitor
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the multinational banks operating subsidiary banks across continents, thus mitigate
the contagion effect of the internal capital market within the global bank ownership
networks.
The second essay also provides some implications in terms of designing regulatory
treatment on banks’ sovereign exposures in the macro-prudential policy framework.
As it shows, sovereign shocks can be transmitted to banks through banks’ exposure
to the specific sovereign debt, and capital channel plays a important role in terms
of transmitting the shocks. Thus, the current zero risk weight on banks’ sovereign
exposure to developed countries in the standardised approach might not be prudent.
Regulatory authorities may need to increase the risk weight on banks’ sovereign ex-
posures to make sure banks can weather sovereign shocks without unduly restricting
their lending activity.
More specifically, the risk weight on banks’ sovereign exposures should be de-
termined by the particular level of credit risk of the sovereign. For example, the
regulatory authorities for the banking sector across European countries might have
preferred to put a higher risk weight for banks’ exposure to GIIPS countries as the
government of GIIPS countries had weaker fundamentals compared with core coun-
tries in the EU, such as the U.K. and Germany. The equalised regulatory treatment
on banks’ exposure to GIIPS debts and those issued by core countries might have
encouraged banks in European countries to take more exposure to GIIPS countries,
as the literature on the carry trade hypothesis and the moral suasion hypothesis has
suggested. A risk-sensitive risk-weighting framework on banks’ sovereign exposure
maybe essentially helpful in protecting banks from sovereign shocks.
Furthermore, the risk weight on sovereign exposures should be specifically de-
signed according to the accounting classifications of those exposures, as different
accounting treatment can cause different economic consequences. For example, a
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bank’s sovereign exposure categorised as available for sale (AFS) assets and those
categorised as held to maturity (HTM) assets are both zero risk-weighted. However,
a major difference in the accounting treatment between the two types of sovereign
exposure is that AFS exposure are marked to market while HTM exposures are
accounted for on a historic cost basis. A drop in the market value of the AFS ex-
posure would drive down the bank’s capital immediately while the bank’s capital
is not affected at all if the exposures were categorised as HTM assets. Thus, a
higher risk weight might be necessary for sovereign exposures categorised as AFS
assets, compared with similar types of exposure categorised in HTM classification,
to protect banks’ capital against the market risk.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is currently reviewing the regu-
latory treatment on banks’ sovereign exposures, trying to establish a more robust
regulatory framework that could better isolate banks from sovereign shocks. Though
a risk-sensitive risk-weighting system on sovereign exposures seems to be good op-
tion for policy makers, this regulatory tool might be particularly difficult to be
implemented as a higher risk weight on sovereigns with weaker fundamentals would
reduce their borrowing capacity and increase their funding cost, which would further
deteriorate their financial condition. Another concern is that a higher risk weight on
banks’ sovereign exposure categorised as AFS assets may increase the cost of hold-
ing these AFS exposures because they will be required to hold a certain amount of
capital against the market risk. As banks generally hold their sovereign exposures
in the AFS category as liquidity reserves, a tighter regulatory treatment on AFS
sovereign exposures may increase banks’ cost of reserving liquidity. Thus, policy
makers will have to balance this issue.
The third essay provide evidence on competition-stability hypothesis which sug-
gests that there is a positive relationship between banking competition and financial
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stability. Thus, regulatory authorities may need to develop policies to facilitate ef-
fective competition in the banking sector, along with their prudential policies which
are specifically designed to maintain the stability of the financial system, because a
relative competitive environment in the banking sector may also improve the over-
all stability of the financial sector. This is in line with the methodology in the
current macro-prudential policy framework in terms of setting capital buffers: glob-
ally significantly-important banks (G-SIBs) and domestically significantly-important
banks (D-SIBs) need to hold a higher capital buffer on top of their total loss ab-
sorbing capacity (TLAC) than small banks. This risk-adjusted and impact-adjusted
regulatory capital framework can reduce cost for smaller banks thus enables them
to compete with banks with a large market share, which in turn also contributes to
improving the stability of the system.
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5.3 Limitations and Future Scopes
The analysis in the first essay indicates that subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries
which are not directly exposed to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries would be
negatively affected if they are connected with banks located in GIIPS countries
through ownership linkages. However, an important caveat to this finding is that
those bank’s direct exposure to GIIPS government bonds cannot be controlled at
subsidiary bank level. While it can control for the bank-specific time-invariant levels
of exposure through a bank-fixed effect, it is not possible with the subsidiary bank
level data from Bankscope to control for the time-varying exposure to GIIPS debts.
The first essay also presents opportunities for future work. It shows that a liq-
uidity crisis in certain countries (GIIPS) could be transmitted to other countries
(non-GIIPS) through the internal capital market within a network of bank owner-
ship. This transmission mechanism is labelled as the ‘contagion effect’ of the internal
capital market. However, given the relatively small number of observations within
GIIPS countries and incomplete information on changes in ownership over time, it is
unable to identify the support effect of the internal capital market. Therefore, future
works can aim to explore this ‘support effect’ through which the subsidiary banks
suffering liquidity shocks in GIIPS countries could be supported by their owners
located outside of GIIPS countries.
A common limitation for the first and second essays is that the indicator for
the stability of bank lending activity is the total loan growth at bank-level. Using
bank-level loan growth data to identify a supply side effect can be imprecise: even
though a country-level fixed-effect and other time-varying macroeconomic control
variables are used to control for the demand side effect, it is impossible to control
for the specific borrowers’ demand side effect. Future studies may use more granular
information on bank lending, loan-level data for instance, to construct a better indi-
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cator for lending stability, so that the borrower-level fixed effect can be introduced
to the regressions to rule out the demand side effect to the greatest extent.
The third essay presents avenues for future studies. Though the effect of the
competition shock on banking stability is investigated with a variety of stability
indicators, such as Z-score, inverse standard deviation of ROA, and non-performing
loan ratio, all of these indicators are constructed based on the balance sheet and
income statement. The effect could also be examined with stability indicators based
on banks’ market value. For example, the Distance-to Default is a bank risk mea-
surement proposed by Merton (1974). In addition, as the inter-state branching
deregulation is implemented based on state-level reciprocation, the announcement
of the implementation of the deregulation might not have a immediate effect. Thus,
using a simple dummy variable for the inter-state deregulation based on the year of
the announcement may not be able to capture the competition shock properly.
Furthermore, an important caveat to the findings from the third essay is that
the empirical setting does not control for the effect of banks’ geographical expan-
sion on banking stability. The competition shock in the empirical analysis of the
third essay is indicated by dummy variables for the intra- and inter-state branching
deregulations. However, previous studies suggest that both types of bank branching
deregulations in the U.S. were associated with the geographical diversification in the
banking system (Goetz et al., 2013), which in turn would have an impact on banks’
risk-taking behaviours (Goetz, 2012). Future studies could control for the geograph-
ical diversification channel so that its effect could be isolated from the effect of the
increased competition induced by the deregulations on banking stability.
Overall, the analysis of this thesis is based on historic events (eg. European
sovereign debt crisis and U.S. Banking deregulation) that could potentially have an
effect on banking stability. However, the recent technological innovations and devel-
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opments in the financial industry have been putting new threats onto the stability of
the banking sector. For example, the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms such as
Silicon Valley-based Lending Club and London-based Funding Circle have been us-
ing data science toolbox to compete with traditional commercial banks on their core
banking businesses. The competition from the P2P platforms have further squeezed
the interest margin of the traditional banking sector in the post-crisis low interest
rate environment. Furthermore, some for-ex focused financial technology firms such
as London-based Monzo and Revolut have also reduced banks’ fee income from ex-
changing currencies, which further lowers the profitability of the banking sector. In
addition, the rise of the decentralised crypto currencies may also threaten the central
position of the traditional banking system in the modern monetary and payment
system. Future studies may focus on the impact of these new developments in the
financial industry on banking stability.
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Table A3.1: Phase-out Process of the Filters on AFS exposure
Before 2014 2014 - 2017 2018 onwards
Proportion of AFS 100% TBC AT, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, All EU member states
losses included in FR, GR, HR, LT, LU, LV,
Common Equity MT, RO, SE, SK, UK
Tier 1 capital
<100% TBC BE, BG, DE, ES, HU, IE,
IT, NL, PT, SI
Source: European Banking Authority.
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Table A3.2: List of Sample Banks
Country Code Bank Name
AT
BAWAG P.S.K. Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft und Osterreichische Postsparkasse AG
Erste Group Bank AG
Osterreichische Volksbanken AG
BE
Dexia NV
KBC Group NV
CY
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd
Hellenic Bank Public Company Ltd
Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd
DE
Aareal Bank AG
Bayerische Landesbank
Commerzbank AG
Deutsche Bank AG
HSH Nordbank AG
Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG
Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen Girozentrale
Norddeutsche Landesbank-Girozentrale
DK
Danske Bank
Nykredit
ES
Banca March, S.A.
Banco Pastor, S.A.
BFA-Bankia
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
Banco Mare Nostrum
Banco Popular Español
Banco Santander
Banco de Sabadell
Bankinter
Grupo Banca Civica
Kutxabank
Liberbank
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Ronda, Cadiz, Almeria, Malaga, Antequera y Jaen
FI OP-Pohjola Group
FR
BNP Paribas
Groupe BPCE
Groupe Credit Agricole
Societe Generale
GR
Agricultural Bank of Greece S.A. (ATEbank)
Alpha Bank
Eurobank Ergasias
National Bank of Greece
Piraeus Bank
HU OTP Bank Ltd
IT
Banca Carige S.P.A. - Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.
Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese
Banca Popolare Dell’Emilia Romagna - Società Cooperativa
Banca Popolare Di Milano - Società Cooperativa A Responsabilità Limitata
Banca Popolare di Sondrio
Banca Popolare di Vicenza - Società Cooperativa per Azioni
(Continued on next page)
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Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa
Credito Emiliano S.p.A.
Mediobanca - Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A.
UniCredit S.p.A.
Unione Di Banche Italiane Società Cooperativa Per Azioni
NL
ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
ING Bank N.V.
NO DNB Bank Group
PL
Alior Bank S.A.
Bank BPH S.A.
Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A.
Bank Ochrony Srodowiska S.A.
Getin Noble Bank S.A.
Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski S.A. (PKO Bank Polski)
PT
Banco BPI
Banco Comercial Português
Caixa Geral de Depósitos
Espirito Santo Financial Group, SA (ESFG)
SE
Nordea Bank AB (publ)
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) (SEB)
Svenska Handelsbanken AB (publ)
Swedbank AB (publ)
SI
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d.
Nova Ljubljanska banka d. d.
UK
Barclays plc
HSBC Holdings plc
Lloyds Banking Group plc
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure A4.1: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Notes:
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Table A4.1: Timing of the U.S. Banking Deregulation
Intra-state Intra-state Inter-state
State de novo Deregulation M&A Deregulation Deregulation
Alabama 1990 1981 1987
Alaska <1970 <1970 1982
Arizona <1970 <1970 1986
Arkansas Not deregulated 1994 1989
California <1970 <1970 1987
Colorado Not deregulated 1991 1988
Connecticut 1988 1980 1983
Delaware <1970 <1970 1988
District of Columbia <1970 <1970 1985
Florida 1988 1988 1985
Georgia Not deregulated 1983 1985
Hawaii 1986 1986 Not deregulated
Idaho <1970 <1970 1985
Illinois 1993 1988 1986
Indiana 1991 1989 1986
Iowa Not deregulated Not deregulated 1991
Kansas 1990 1987 1992
Kentucky Not deregulated 1990 1984
Louisiana 1988 1988 1987
Maine 1975 1975 1987
Maryland <1970 <1970 1985
Massachusetts 1984 1984 1983
Michigan 1988 1987 1986
Minnesota Not deregulated 1993 1986
Mississippi 1989 1986 1988
Missouri 1990 1990 1986
Montana Not deregulated 1990 1993
Nebraska Not deregulated 1985 1990
Nevada <1970 <1970 1985
New Hampshire 1987 1987 1987
New Jersey Not deregulated 1977 1986
New Mexico 1991 1991 1989
New York 1976 1976 1982
North Carolina <1970 <1970 1985
North Dakota Not deregulated 1987 1991
Ohio 1989 1979 1985
Oklahoma Not deregulated 1988 1987
(Continued on next page)
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Oregon 1985 1985 1986
Pennsylvania 1990 1982 1986
Rhode Island <1970 <1970 1984
South Carolina <1970 <1970 1986
South Dakota <1970 <1970 1988
Tennessee 1990 1985 1985
Texas 1988 1988 1987
Utah 1981 1981 1984
Vermont <1970 1970 1988
Virginia 1987 1978 1985
Washington 1985 1985 1987
West Virginia 1987 1987 1988
Wisconsin 1990 1990 1987
Wyoming Not deregulated 1988 1987
Notes: Data are collected from Amel (1993) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). States that are deregulated
prior to 1970 are labelled with "<1970" while states that are not deregulated before the sample period ends
at 1994 are labelled with "Not deregulated".
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